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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Contents

ARTICLES

Secularism in Retreat
Peter L. Berger _____ 3

China: What Engagement Should Mean
Robert B. Zoellick _____ 13

The Third Side of the Triangle
Charles Horner _____ 23

Africa's Murderous Professors
Michael Chege _____ 32

Dayton, Bosnia, and the Limits of Law
Alfred P. Rubin _____ 41

Volkogonov's Journey
Neil McInnes _____ 47

Corridors of Silence
Roland Flamini _____ 55

The New Mandarins
Robert M. Pease _____ 59

Huntington's Clash: II
Wang Gungwu _____ 69

Presented at Court
John O'Sullivan _____ 74

Right the First Time
Jeffrey Gedmin _____ 77

The Company Man
Mark Falcoff _____ 81

From Atatürk to Erbakan
Andrew Mango _____ 84

CORRESPONDENCE

*Jack Matlock, Jr., Henry Trofimenko,
Richard Pipes, Mikhail Alexseev,
Michael Eisenstadt, Patrick Clawson,
Judith Yaphe, Hilton Root,
Patrick Kavanagh, Arnold Beichman* _____ 90

BOOKS

Huntington's Clash: I
Pierre Hassner _____ 63

QUARTERLY

NATO Enlargement: What's the Rush?
Adam Garfinkle _____ 102

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Secularism in Retreat

Peter L. Berger

A FEW YEARS AGO the first volume coming out of the Fundamentalism Project landed on my desk. The Fundamentalism Project was generously funded by the MacArthur Foundation and chaired by Martin Marty, the distinguished church historian at the University of Chicago. While a number of very reputable scholars took part in it, and although the published results are of generally excellent quality, my contemplation of this first volume evoked in me what has been called an *Aha!* experience.

Now, the book was very big. Sitting there on my desk, massively, it was of the “book-weapon” type, the kind with which one could do serious injury. So I asked myself: Why would the MacArthur Foundation pay out several million dollars to support an international study of religious fundamentalists? Two answers came to mind. The first was obvious and not very interesting: The MacArthur Foundation is a very progressive outfit; it understands fundamentalists to be anti-progressive; the Project, then, was a matter of knowing one’s enemies. The second was a more interesting answer: So-called fundamentalism was assumed to be a strange, difficult-to-understand phenom-

non; the purpose of the Project was to delve into this alien world and make it more understandable.

But here came another question: *Who* finds this world strange, and to *whom* must it be made understandable? The answer to that question was easy: people to whom the officials of the MacArthur Foundation normally talk, such as professors at American elite universities. And with this came the *Aha!* experience: The concern that must have led to this Project was based on an upside-down perception of the world. The notion here was that so-called fundamentalism (which, when all is said and done, usually refers to any sort of passionate religious movement) is a rare, hard-to-explain thing. But in fact it is not rare at all, neither if one looks at history, nor if one looks around the contemporary world. On the contrary, what is rare is people who think otherwise. Put simply: The difficult-to-understand phenomenon is *not* Iranian mullahs but American university professors. (Would it, perhaps, be worth a multi-million-dollar project to try to explain the latter group?)

The point of this little story is that the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false: The world today, with some exceptions attended to below, is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature written by historians and social scientists over the course of the 1950s and ‘60s, loosely labeled as “secularization theory”, was essentially mistaken. In my early

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work I contributed to this literature and was in good company so doing—most sociologists of religion had similar views. There were good reasons for holding these views at the time, and some of these writings still stand up. But the core premise does not.

The key idea of secularization theory is simple and can be traced to the Enlightenment: Modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals. It is precisely this key idea that has turned out to be wrong. To be sure, modernization has had some secularizing effects, more in some places than in others. But it has also provoked powerful movements of counter-secularization. Also, secularization on the societal level is not necessarily linked to secularization on the level of individual consciousness. Thus, certain religious institutions have lost power and influence in many societies, but both old and new religious beliefs and practices have nevertheless continued in the lives of individuals, sometimes taking new institutional forms and sometimes leading to great explosions of religious fervor. Conversely, religiously-identified institutions can play social or political roles even when very few people believe or practice the religion supposedly represented by these institutions. To say the least, the relation between religion and modernity is rather complicated.

Rejection and Adaptation

THE PROPOSITION that modernity necessarily leads to a decline of religion is, in principle, “value-free.” That is, it can be affirmed both by people who think it is good news and by people who think that it is very bad news indeed. Most Enlightenment thinkers and most progressive-minded people ever since have tended toward the idea that secularization is a good thing, at least insofar as it does away with religious phenomena that are “backward”, “superstitious”, or “reactionary” (a religious residue purged of these negative characteris-

tics may still be deemed acceptable). But religious people, including those with very traditional or orthodox beliefs, have also affirmed the modernity/secularity linkage, and have greatly bemoaned it. Some have defined modernity as the enemy, to be fought whenever possible. Others have, on the contrary, seen modernity as an invincible worldview to which religious beliefs and practices should adapt themselves. In other words, *rejection* and *adaptation* are two strategies open to religious communities in a world understood to be secularized. As is always the case when strategies are based on mistaken perception of the terrain, both strategies have had very doubtful results.

It is possible, of course, to reject any number of modern ideas and values theoretically, but to make this rejection stick in the lives of people is much more difficult. To do that, one can try to take over society as a whole and make one's counter-modern religion obligatory for everyone—a difficult enterprise in most countries in the contemporary world. Franco tried in Spain, and failed; the mullahs are still at it in Iran and a couple of other places; in most of the world such exercises in religious conquest are unlikely to succeed. And this unlikelihood *does* have to do with modernization, which brings about very heterogeneous societies and a quantum leap in intercultural communication, two factors favoring pluralism and *not* favoring the establishment (or re-establishment) of religious monopolies. Another form of rejection strategy is to create religious subcultures so designed as to exclude the influences of the outside society. That is a more promising exercise than religious revolution, but it too is fraught with difficulty. Where it has taken root, modern culture is a very powerful force, and an immense effort is required to maintain enclaves with an airtight defense system. Ask the Amish in eastern Pennsylvania, or a Hasidic rabbi in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn.

Notwithstanding the apparent power of modern secular culture, secularization theory

has been falsified even more dramatically by the results of adaptation strategies attempted by religious institutions. If we really lived in a highly secularized world, then religious institutions could be expected to survive to the degree that they manage to adapt to secularity. That, indeed, has been the empirical assumption of adaptation strategies. What has in fact occurred is that, by and large, religious communities have survived and indeed flourished to the degree that they have *not* tried to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements of a secularized world. Put simply, experiments with secularized religion have generally failed; religious movements with beliefs and practices dripping with “reactionary supernaturalism” (the kind utterly beyond the pale at self-respecting faculty parties) have widely succeeded.

The struggle with modernity in the Roman Catholic Church nicely illustrates the difficulties of various rejection and adaptation strategies. In the wake of the Enlightenment and its multiple revolutions, the initial response by the Church was militant and then defiant rejection. Perhaps the most magnificent moment of that defiance came in 1870, when the First Vatican Council solemnly proclaimed the infallibility of the Pope and the immaculate conception of Mary, literally in the face of the Enlightenment about to occupy Rome in the shape of the army of Victor Emmanuel I. The disdain was mutual: The Roman monument to the Bersaglieri, the elite army units that occupied the Eternal City in the name of the Italian Risorgimento, places the heroic figure in his Bersaglieri uniform so that he is positioned with his behind pointing exactly toward the Vatican. The Second Vatican Council, almost a hundred years later, considerably modified this rejectionist stance, guided as it was by the notion of *aggiornamento*—literally, bringing the church “up-to-date” with the modern world. (I remember a conversation I had with a Protestant theologian, whom I asked what he thought would happen at the Council, this before it

had actually convened; he replied that he didn’t know, but that he was sure that they would not read the minutes of the first Council meeting.)

The Second Vatican Council was supposed to open windows, specifically the windows of the anti-secular Catholic subculture that had been constructed when it became clear that the overall society could not be reconquered. (In the United States this Catholic subculture was quite impressive right up to the very recent past.) The trouble with opening windows is that you cannot control what comes in through them, and a lot has come in—indeed, the whole turbulent world of modern culture—that has been very troubling to the Church. Under the current pontificate the Church has been steering a nuanced course in between rejection and adaptation, with mixed results in different countries.

If one looks at the international religious scene objectively, that of the Roman Catholics as well as virtually all others, one must observe that it is conservative or orthodox or traditionalist movements that are on the rise almost everywhere. These movements, whatever adjective one may choose for them, are precisely those that rejected an *aggiornamento* as defined by progressive intellectuals. Conversely, religious movements and institutions that have made great efforts to conform to a perceived modernity are almost everywhere on the decline. In the United States this has been a much commented-upon fact, exemplified by the decline of so-called mainline Protestantism and the concomitant rise of Evangelicalism; but the United States is by no means unusual in this. Nor is Protestantism.

The conservative thrust in the Roman Catholic church under John Paul II has borne fruit in both the number of converts and in the renewed enthusiasm among native Catholics, especially in non-Western countries. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, too, there occurred a remarkable revival of the Orthodox Church in Russia.

The most rapidly growing Jewish groups, both in Israel and in the diaspora, are Orthodox groups. There have been similarly vigorous upsurges of conservative religion in all the other major religious communities—Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism—as well as revival movements in smaller communities (such as Shinto in Japan and Sikhism in India).

Of course, these developments differ greatly, not only in religious content (which is obvious), but in their social and political implications. What they have in common, though, is their unambiguously *religious* inspiration. In their aggregate they provide a massive falsification of the idea that modernization and secularization are cognate phenomena. Minimally, one must note that *counter*-secularization is at least as important a phenomenon in the contemporary world as secularization.

Two Revivals . . .

BOTH IN THE media and in scholarly publications these religious movements are often subsumed under the category of “fundamentalism.” This is not a felicitous term, not only because it carries a pejorative undertone, but because it derives from the history of American Protestantism, where it has a specific reference that is distortive if extended to other religious traditions. All the same, the term has some suggestive use if one tries to explain the aforementioned developments: It suggests a combination of several features—great religious passion, a defiance of what others have defined as the *Zeitgeist*, and a return to traditional sources of religious authority. These are indeed common features across cultural boundaries. And they do reflect the presence of secularizing forces, since they must be understood as a reaction *against* them. (In that sense, at least, something of the old secularization theory may be said to hold up, albeit in a rather back-handed way.) Clearly, one of the most important topics for a sociology of contemporary religion is precisely this

interplay of secularizing and counter-secularizing forces. This is because modernity, for fully understandable reasons, undermines all the old certainties; uncertainty, in turn is a condition that many people find very hard to bear; therefore, any movement (not only a religious one) that promises to provide or to renew certainty has a ready market.

While the aforementioned common features are important, an analysis of the social and political impact of the various religious upsurges must take full account of their differences. This becomes clear when one looks at what are arguably the two most dynamic religious upsurges in the world today, the Islamic and the Evangelical ones. Comparison also underlines the weakness of the category “fundamentalism” as applied to both.

The Islamic upsurge, because of its more immediately obvious political ramifications, is the better known of the two. Yet it would be a serious error to see it only through a political lens. It is an impressive revival of emphatically *religious* commitments. And it is of vast geographical scope, affecting every Muslim country from North Africa to Southeast Asia. It continues to gain converts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where it is often in head-on competition with Christianity. It is becoming very visible in the burgeoning Muslim communities in Europe and, to a much lesser extent, in North America. Everywhere it is bringing about a restoration not only of Islamic beliefs, but of distinctively Islamic lifestyles, which in many ways directly contradict modern ideas—such as the relation of religion and the state, the role of women, moral codes of everyday behavior and, last but not least, the boundaries of religious and moral tolerance.

An important characteristic of the Islamic revival is that it is by no means restricted to the less modernized or “backward” sectors of society, as progressive intellectuals still like to think. On the contrary, it is very strong in cities with a high degree of modernization, and in a number of countries it is particularly visible among people with

Western-style higher education; in Egypt and Turkey, for example, it is often the daughters of secularized professionals who are putting on the veil and other accoutrements expressing so-called Islamic modesty.

Yet there are also very great differences. Even within the Middle East, the Islamic heartland, there are both religiously and politically important distinctions to be made between Sunni and Shi'a revivals—Islamic conservatism means very different things in, say, Saudi Arabia and Iran. As one moves away from the Middle East, the differences become even greater. Thus in Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country in the world, a very powerful revival movement, the Nahdatul-Ulama, is avowedly pro-democracy and pro-pluralism, the very opposite of what is commonly viewed as Muslim "fundamentalism." Where the political circumstances allow it, there is a lively discussion about the relationship of Islam to various modern realities, and there are sharp disagreements between individuals who are equally committed to a revitalized Islam. Still, for reasons deeply grounded in the core of the tradition, it is probably fair to say that, on the whole, Islam has had a difficult time coming to terms with key modern institutions—such as pluralism, democracy, and the market economy.

The Evangelical upsurge is just as breathtaking in scope. Geographically that scope is even wider than that of the Islamic revival. It has gained huge numbers of converts in East Asia—in all the Chinese communities (including, despite severe persecution, in mainland China) and in South Korea, the Philippines, across the South Pacific, throughout sub-Saharan Africa (where it is often synthesized with elements of traditional African religion), and apparently in parts of ex-communist Europe. But the most remarkable success has occurred in Latin America; it is estimated that there are now between forty and fifty million Evangelical Protestants south of the U.S. border, the great majority of them first-generation Protestants.

The most numerous component within the Evangelical upsurge is Pentecostal, combining Biblical orthodoxy and a rigorous morality with an ecstatic form of worship and an emphasis on spiritual healing. Especially in Latin America, conversion to Protestantism brings about a cultural transformation—new attitudes toward work and consumption, a new educational ethos, a violent rejection of traditional *machismo* (women play a key role in the Evangelical churches). The origins of this worldwide Evangelical upsurge are in the United States, from where the missionaries were first dispatched. But it is very important to understand that virtually everywhere, and emphatically in Latin America, the new Evangelicalism is thoroughly indigenous and is no longer dependent on support from U.S. fellow-believers. Indeed, Latin American Evangelicals have been sending missionaries to the Hispanic community in this country, where there has been a comparable flurry of conversions.

Needless to say, the religious contents of the Islamic and Evangelical revivals are totally different. So are the social and political consequences (of which more below). But the two developments also differ in that the Islamic movement is occurring primarily in countries that are already Muslim or among Muslim emigrants (as in Europe); by contrast, the Evangelical movement is growing dramatically throughout the world in countries where this type of religion was previously unknown or very marginal.

... And Two Exceptions

THE WORLD today, then, is massively religious, and it is anything but the secularized world that had been predicted (be it joyfully or despondently) by so many analysts of modernity. There are two exceptions to this proposition, one somewhat unclear, the other very obvious.

The first apparent exception is in Western Europe, where, if nowhere else, the old secularization theory seems to hold.

With increasing modernization there has been an increase in the key indicators of secularization: on the level of expressed beliefs (especially such as could be called orthodox in Protestant or Catholic terms), and dramatically on the level of church-related behavior (attendance at services of worship, adherence to church-dictated codes of personal behavior—especially with regard to sexuality, reproduction, and marriage), and finally, with respect to recruitment to the clergy. These phenomena had been observed for a long time in the northern countries of the continent; since the Second World War they have quickly engulfed the south. Thus Italy and Spain have experienced a rapid decline in church-related religion—as has Greece (thus undercutting the claim of Catholic conservatives that Vatican II is to be blamed for the decline). There is now a massively secular Euro-culture and what has happened in the south can be simply described (though not thereby explained) as the invasion of these countries by that culture. It is not fanciful to predict that there will be similar developments in Eastern Europe, precisely to the degree that these countries too will be integrated into the new Europe.

While these facts are not in dispute, a number of recent works in the sociology of religion (notably in France, Britain, and Scandinavia) have questioned the term “secularization” as applied to these developments. There is now a body of data indicating strong survivals of religion, most of it generally Christian in nature, despite the widespread alienation from the organized churches. If the data hold up to scrutiny, a shift in the institutional location of religion, rather than secularization, would then be a more accurate description of the European situation. All the same, Europe stands out as quite different from other parts of the world. It certainly differs sharply from the religious situation in the United States. One of the most interesting puzzles in the sociology of religion is why Americans are so much more religious as well as more churchly than Europeans.

The other exception to the desecularization thesis is less ambiguous: There exists an international subculture composed of people with Western-type higher education, especially in the humanities and social sciences, which is indeed secularized by any measure. This subculture is the principal “carrier” of progressive, Enlightenment beliefs and values. While the people in this subculture are relatively thin on the ground, they are very influential, as they control the institutions that provide the “official” definitions of reality (notably the educational system, the media of mass communication, and the higher reaches of the legal system). They are remarkably similar all over the world today as they have been for a long time (though, as we have seen, there are also defectors from this subculture, especially in the Muslim countries). Why it is that people with this type of education should be so prone to secularization is not entirely clear, but there is, without question, a globalized *elite* culture. It follows, then, that in country after country religious upsurges have a strongly populist character: Over and beyond the purely religious motives, these are movements of protest and resistance *against* a secular elite. The so-called “culture war” in the United States emphatically shares this feature.

Questions and Answers

THIS SOMEWHAT breathless *tour d’horizon* of the global religious scene raises several questions: What are the origins of the worldwide resurgence of religion? What is the likely future course of this religious resurgence? Do resurgent religions differ in their critique of the secular order? How is religious resurgence related to a number of issues not ordinarily linked to religion? Let us take these questions in turn.

As to the origins of the worldwide resurgence of religion, two possible answers have already been mentioned. The first is that modernity tends to undermine the taken-for-granted certainties by which people lived

throughout most of history. This is an uncomfortable state of affairs, for many an intolerable one, and religious movements that claim to give certainty have great appeal by easing that discomfort. The second is that a purely secular view of reality has its principal social location in an elite culture that, not surprisingly, is resented by large numbers of people who are not part of it but who nevertheless feel its influence (most troublingly, as their children are subjected to an education that ignores or even directly attacks their own beliefs and values). Religious movements with a strongly anti-secular bent can therefore appeal to people with resentments that sometimes have quite non-religious sources.

But there is yet another answer, which recalls my opening story about certain American foundation officials worrying about “fundamentalism.” In one sense, there is nothing to explain here. Strongly felt religion has always been around: what needs explanation is its absence rather than its presence. Modern secularity is a much more puzzling phenomenon than all these religious explosions—and the University of Chicago is a more interesting topic for the sociology of religion than are the Islamic schools of Qom. In other words, at one level the phenomena under consideration simply serve to demonstrate *continuity* in the place of religion in human experience.

As to the likely future course of this religious resurgence, it would make little sense to venture a prognosis with regard to the entire global scene, given the considerable variety of important religious movements in the contemporary world. Predictions, if one dares to make them at all, will be more useful if applied to much narrower situations. One, though, can be made with some assurance: There is no reason to think that the world of the twenty-first century will be any less religious than the world is today.

There is, it must be said, a minority of sociologists of religion who have been trying to salvage the old secularization theory by

what may be called the last-gasp thesis: Modernization *does* secularize, and movements like the Islamic and the Evangelical ones represent last-ditch defenses by religion that cannot last. Eventually, secularity will triumph—or, to put it less respectfully, eventually Iranian mullahs, Pentecostal preachers, and Tibetan lamas will all think and act like professors of literature at American universities. This thesis is singularly unpersuasive.

Nonetheless, one will have to speculate very differently regarding different sectors of the religious scene. For example, the most militant Islamic movements will have difficulty maintaining their present stance *vis-à-vis* modernity should they succeed in taking over the governments of their countries (as, it seems, is already happening in Iran). It is also unlikely that Pentecostalism, as it exists today among mostly poor and uneducated people, will retain its present religious and moral characteristics unchanged as many of these people experience upward social mobility (this has already been observed extensively in the United States). Generally, many of these religious movements are linked to non-religious forces of one sort or another, and the future course of the former will be at least partially determined by the course of the latter. Thus in the United States, for instance, the future course of militant Evangelicalism will be different if some of its causes succeed—or continue to be frustrated—in the political and legal arenas.

Finally, in religion as in every other area of human endeavor, individual personalities play a much larger role than most social scientists and historians are willing to concede. Thus there might have been an Islamic revolution in Iran without the Ayatollah Khomeini, but it would probably have looked quite different. No one can predict the appearance of charismatic figures who will launch powerful religious movements in places where no one expects them. Who knows—perhaps the next religious upsurge in America will occur among disenchanted postmodernist academics!

DO THE RESURGENT religions differ in their critique of the secular order? Yes, of course they do, depending on their respective belief systems. Cardinal Ratzinger and the Dalai Lama will be troubled by different aspects of contemporary secular culture. What both, however, will agree upon is the shallowness of a culture that tries to get by without any transcendent points of reference. And there, certainly, they will have good reasons for criticism.

The religious impulse, the quest for meaning that transcends the restricted space of empirical existence in this world, has been a perennial feature of humanity. (This assertion is not a theological statement but an anthropological one—an agnostic or even an atheist philosopher may well agree with it.) It would require something close to a mutation of the species to finally extinguish this impulse. The more radical thinkers of the Enlightenment, and their more recent intellectual descendants, hoped for something like such a mutation, of course. Thus far this has not happened and it is unlikely to happen anytime in the foreseeable future. The critique of secularity common to all the resurgent movements is that human existence bereft of transcendence is an impoverished and finally untenable condition.

To the extent that secularity today has a specifically modern form (there were earlier forms, for example, in versions of Confucianism and Hellenistic culture), the critique of secularity also entails a critique of at least these aspects of modernity. Beyond that, however, different religious movements differ in their relation to modernity.

As noted, an argument can be made that the Islamic resurgence has a strong tendency toward a negative view of modernity; in places it is downright anti-modern or counter-modernizing (as in its view on the role of women). By contrast, the Evangelical resurgence is positively modernizing in most places where it occurs, clearly so in Latin America. The new Evangelicals throw aside many of the traditions that have been obsta-

cles to modernization (*machismo*, for one, also the subservience to hierarchy that has been endemic to Iberian Catholicism), and their churches encourage values and behavior patterns that contribute to modernization. Just to take one important case in point: In order to participate fully in the life of their congregations, Evangelicals will want to read the Bible and to be able to join in the discussion of congregational affairs that are largely in the hands of lay persons (indeed, largely in the hands of women). The desire to read the Bible encourages literacy, and, beyond this, a positive attitude toward education and self-improvement. The running of local churches by lay persons necessitates training in various administrative skills, including the conduct of public meetings and the keeping of financial accounts. It is not fanciful to suggest that in this way Evangelical congregations serve (inadvertently, to be sure) as schools for democracy and for social mobility.

HOW DOES THE religious resurgence relate to a number of issues that are not usually linked to religion? First let us take international politics. Here one comes up head on against the thesis, eloquently proposed by Samuel Huntington, to the effect that, with the end of the Cold War, international affairs will be affected by a “clash of civilizations” rather than by ideological conflicts. There is something to be said for this thesis. The great ideological conflict that animated the Cold War is certainly dormant for the moment, though I, for one, would not bet on its final demise. Nor can one be sure that new and different ideological conflicts may not arise in the future. Indeed, to the extent that nationalism is an ideology (more accurately, *each* nationalism has its own ideology), ideology is alive and well in a long list of countries.

It is also plausible that, in the absence of the overarching confrontation between Soviet communism and the American-led West, cultural animosities suppressed during the Cold War period are resurfacing. Some

of these animosities have themselves taken on an ideological form—as in the assertion of a distinctive Asian identity by a number of governments and intellectual groups in East and Southeast Asia. This particular ideology has become especially visible in debates over the allegedly ethnocentric/Eurocentric character of human rights as propagated by the United States and other Western governments and non-governmental organizations. But it would probably be an exaggeration to see these debates as signaling a clash of civilizations. The closest thing to a religiously defined clash of civilizations would come about if the radical Islamic interpretation of the world came to be established within a wider spectrum of Muslim countries, and actually became the basis of their foreign policies. As yet, this has not happened.

Religion in World Politics

TO ASSESS THE ROLE of religion in international politics, it would be useful to distinguish between political movements that are genuinely inspired by religion and those that use religion as a convenient legitimization for political agendas based on non-religious interests. Such a distinction is difficult but not impossible. Thus there is no reason to doubt that the suicide bombers of the Islamic Hamas movement truly believe in the religious motives they avow. By contrast, there is good reason to doubt that the three parties involved in the Bosnian conflict, which is commonly represented as a clash between religions, are really inspired by religious ideas. I think it was P.J. O'Rourke who observed that these three parties are of the same race, speak the same language, and are distinguished only by their religion—in which none of them believe. The same skepticism about the religious nature of an allegedly religious conflict is expressed in the joke from Northern Ireland (which also worked perfectly in the context of the Lebanese civil war): A man walks down a dark street in Belfast, when a gunman jumps out of a doorway, holds a gun to his head, and

asks: "Are you Protestant or Catholic?" The man stutters, "Well, actually I'm an atheist." "Ah yes", says the gunman, "But are you a Protestant or a Catholic atheist?"

It would be very nice if one could say that religion is everywhere a force for peace. Unfortunately, this is not the case. While it is difficult to pinpoint a frequency distribution, very probably religion much more often fosters war, both between and within nations, rather than peace. If so, that is hardly new in history. Religious institutions and movements are fanning wars and civil wars on the Indian subcontinent, in the Balkans, in the Middle East, and in Africa. Occasionally, religious institutions do try to resist warlike policies or to mediate between conflicting parties. The Vatican mediated successfully in some international disputes in Latin America. There have been religiously inspired peace movements in several countries (including the United States, during the Vietnam War). Both Protestant and Catholic clergy have tried to mediate the conflict in Northern Ireland, with notable lack of success. But it is probably a mistake to focus simply on the actions of formal religious institutions or groups. There may be a diffusion of religious values in a society that could have peace-prone consequences even in the absence of formal actions by church bodies. For example, some analysts have argued that the wide diffusion of Christian values played a mediating role in the process that ended the apartheid regime in South Africa, despite the fact that the churches themselves were mostly polarized between the two sides of the conflict (at least until the last few years of the regime, when the Dutch Reformed Church reversed its position on apartheid).

Relatedly, a religious resurgence may well have important implications for economic development. The basic text on the relation between religion and economic development is, of course, Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Scholars have been arguing over the thesis of this book for over ninety years. However one comes out on this (I happen to be an unreconstructed

Weberian), it is clear that some values foster modern economic development more than others. Something like Weber's "Protestant ethic" is probably functional in an early phase of capitalist growth—an ethic, whether religiously inspired or not, that values personal discipline, hard work, frugality, and a respect for learning.

The new Evangelicalism in Latin America exhibits these values in virtually crystalline purity. Conversely, Iberian Catholicism, as it was well established in Latin America, clearly does *not* foster such values. But religious traditions can change. Spain experienced a remarkably successful period of economic development beginning in the waning years of the Franco regime, and one of the important factors was the influence of Opus Dei, which combined rigorous theological orthodoxy with market-friendly openness in economic matters. Islam, by and large, has difficulties with a modern market economy—especially with modern banking—yet Muslim emigrants have done remarkably well in a number of countries (for instance, in sub-Saharan Africa), and there is a powerful Islamic movement in Indonesia—the aforementioned Nahdatul-Ulama—that might yet play a role analogous to that of Opus Dei in the Catholic world. For years now, too, there has been an extended debate over the part played by Confucian-inspired values in the economic success stories of East Asia; if one is to credit the "post-Confucian thesis" (and also allow that Confucianism is a religion), then here would be a very important religious contribution to economic development.

One morally troubling aspect of this matter is that values functional at one period of economic development may not be functional at another. The values of the "Protestant ethic", or a functional equivalent thereof, are probably essential during the phase that Walt Rostow called "the take-off." It is not at all clear that this is the case in a later phase. Much *less* austere values may be *more* functional in the so-called post-industrial economies of Europe, North America, and

East Asia. Frugality, however admirable from a moral viewpoint, may now actually be a vice, economically speaking. Undisciplined hedonists have a hard time climbing out of primitive poverty but, if they are bright enough, they can do very well in the high-tech, knowledge-driven economies of the advanced societies.

Finally, there is the effect of the religious resurgence on human rights and social justice worldwide. Religious institutions have, of course, made many statements on human rights and social justice. Some of these have had important political consequences, as in the civil rights struggle in the United States or in the collapse of communist regimes in Europe. But, as has already been mentioned, there are different religiously articulated views about the nature of human rights. The same goes for ideas about social justice; what is justice to some groups is gross injustice to others. Sometimes it is very clear that positions taken by religious groups on such matters are based on a religious rationale, as with the principled opposition to abortion and contraception by the Roman Catholic Church. At other times, though, positions on social justice, even if legitimated by religious rhetoric, reflect the location of the religious functionaries in this or that network of non-religious social classes and interests. To stay with the same example, most of the positions taken by American Catholic institutions on social justice issues other than those relating to sexuality and reproduction fall into this category.

This mixed analysis is emblematic of what must be our general conclusion. Both those who have great hopes for the role of religion in the affairs of this world and those who fear this role must be disappointed by the factual evidence, which, in the final analysis, points in not just one but several directions simultaneously. In assessing this role, there is no alternative to a nuanced, case-by-case approach. But one statement can be made with great confidence: Those who neglect religion in their analyses of contemporary affairs do so at great peril. □

China: What Engagement Should Mean

—Robert B. Zoellick—

THE UNITED STATES enjoyed a united policy toward China for two decades. That unity ended with Tiananmen Square. But the challenge of an ascendant China now requires a consistent, steady, long-term view. The United States must rebuild a bipartisan policy toward China based on a strategy that can be supported by successive presidents and Congresses, Republicans and Democrats.

Past U.S. policies toward China have reflected two very different national traditions. One has drawn images of China, its people, and its future salvation from America's missionary experience. The other approach has viewed China in light of the realist's concepts of power, national interest, and balancing relationships among great states. At times, the United States has managed to fuse these two traditions in an unlikely amalgam, although the compound has usually displayed cracks created by countervailing forces.

Missionaries, Heretics, and Romantics

AMERICA HAS had a special relationship with China. We have romanticized, and then demonized, China and its people, time and again, in a pendulum

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of alternating attitudes, which led in turn to swings in policy. America's missionary experience with China helped shape these views. Our first widespread public contact with China came from efforts in the nineteenth century to convert the Chinese to Christianity, to rescue them from their condition, to educate them, to make them like us.

It was an effort that tapped some of the best American impulses. The missionary movement reached deep into Christian churches across the United States, certainly far beyond the elite seaboard groups that considered themselves the guardians of U.S. foreign policy. Millions of children learned about China at Sunday school, or from evening programs with returning missionaries who brought home pictures and stories, and then asked for nickels and dimes to help the Chinese.

The missionaries' influence also extended to more select company. After all, many missionaries to China were trained at Yale, Princeton, Oberlin, and other leading schools, and their children returned to become political leaders, scholars, and foreign service officers. They became the American interpreters of China.

The children of missionaries also wrote books that influenced America's attitude toward China. The most famous and influential of these writers was Pearl Buck, whose book *The Good Earth* received the Pulitzer Prize, sold 1.5 million copies, became a Broadway play, and was transformed into a

movie seen in the United States by an estimated 23 million people. Nor was this a singular example of the infatuation with China in America's popular culture. For later generations, the popular film *The Sand Pebbles* portrayed the confusing experience of the U.S. Navy and missionaries in a bewildering China caught between the old ways and the new, while *The Last Emperor* pictured Pu Yi's and China's twentieth-century journeys.

The images of China created by the missionaries were reinforced by America's trading ties. The romantic stories of China clippers, exotic lands, and vast fortunes to be made—or lost—captured America's imagination. Unlike Europeans, Russians, and Japanese who grasped territories from disintegrating Qing China, U.S. Secretary of State John Hay stood for an "Open Door" that would allow all to prosper from the "great China trade."

The romantic, missionary view of China has had important implications for U.S. policies. When the Chinese have embraced the United States and its ways, Americans have been smitten. So Americans admired and committed themselves to Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, the Soong family, the Flying Tigers, the YMCA and YWCA in China, Christian schools, the stoic dignity of enduring peasants, and, in a later era, ping-pong diplomacy and the modernizer Deng Xiaoping.

But when China refused to be as Americans imagined it, or worse, rejected America, the United States responded with the combination of fury and hurt reserved for heretics. Whether Taiping rebels, Boxers, "Red" Chinese, "human wave" assaults in Korea, or the gray old men who crushed the young demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, America could not understand why these Chinese would not be like the United States or would even attack it. So the pendulum of attitudes would swing, from embrace to rejection and back again. Meanwhile, the Chinese, who for centuries viewed themselves as living in the "Middle Kingdom", a place above the rest of the earth if still short of heaven, must have had a terrible time figuring out the all-too-earthly Americans.

Thucydides, Napoleon, and the Realists

THERE IS another view of China—that of the realist. Realists have been concerned with China's power, not its soul. They trace their perspective to Thucydides, the great historian of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides wrote that the war among the great city-states of his day was the inevitable result of the growth of Athens' power, and of the fear it inspired in Sparta. Centuries later, another student and practitioner of power, Napoleon, noted that China was a sleeping giant, and that the world would quake when it awoke.

During the Second World War, the United States hoped to arm and train huge Chinese armies to help fight the Japanese invaders; regardless of the ideologies of Chinese Nationalists or Communists, these realists concluded that America's interest would be served by a unified Chinese effort against imperial Japan.

After 1949, when the Communists established control over mainland China, some American realists recognized that China posed a new force with which the United States must reckon. This power appeared allied with the Soviet Union by reason of a shared ideology, and the Korean War then led to a bloody encounter with this Chinese enemy. But President Eisenhower and General Omar Bradley sought to avoid an expanded ground war with China because of the priority they placed on defending Europe from the Soviet Union. According to General Bradley, a military contest on the Asian mainland would be "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."¹ This assessment of ends and means prevailed.

It took President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, however, to recognize that

¹U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, hearings on the military situation in the Far East (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), pt. 2, p. 732.

China's power might be balanced against that of the Soviet Union. Ignoring America's fundamental differences with China's political system, Nixon and Kissinger applied the realist's dictum: The enemy of my enemy is my friend. The strategic rapprochement between the United States and China that began in 1971 was based on a common interest in countering the power of the Soviet Union.

Over the past ten years, however, the Soviet Union's collapse and China's amazing economic development have presented a new challenge for realists. China is no longer a "card" to be played in a global game against the Soviets. In a sense, the "card" has become the new game. Napoleon's prophecy is coming true: China is now stirring, shaking established foundations for policies in Asia and the world.

In some respects, China today is analogous to Germany at the end of the last century. As rising regional powers with potentially global influence, Germany then and China now are characterized by a mixture of arrogance and insecurity. Germany expected, and China expects, to be taken seriously. The challenge, now as then, is to demonstrate to the rising power that it will benefit from integration within regional and global systems, but also that it must accept the rules of those systems or face negative consequences. The failure to deal effectively with Germany's rise led to seventy years of conflict, followed by the forty-five year division of Europe just recently overcome. America needs a strategy toward China that avoids similar mistakes. In the words of Senator Sam Nunn, "History should teach us that established powers must provide consistent and credible signals about their expectations and set forth reasonable terms on which they are willing to incorporate the rising power into the international system."²

It is time to stop the pendulum of policy positions toward China. We need to recognize China for what it is—a huge, complex country, heir to an ancient civilization, in the midst of enormous transformations. At the

same time, we need an approach that recognizes America for what it is—and what it stands for. We need the wisdom of realpolitik, wedded to the goals of America's exceptionalist tradition.

Ad Hoc Engagement Isn't Enough

AS THE CLINTON administration struggled to rework its policy toward China, it turned to the label "engagement" to describe its strategy. Engagement points in the right direction, but it is not enough. Indeed, ad hoc engagement between the United States and China, without an integrated strategy to manage the inevitable problems, is likely to lead to a short-term and short-sighted policy of merely coping with crises, which will lead to increased political friction in both countries.

Consider, for example, the prospects for economic engagement. China's ongoing transformations are likely to create problems in the Sino-American economic relationship. China still lacks an effective system to protect property rights. It must deal with the problems of reforming a large state-owned sector. Because its macroeconomic policy instruments are only now being developed, China has lurched through stop-go growth cycles, with concomitant surges of inflation. Given its Mandarin heritage, the Chinese state also remains far too willing to interfere by changing the rules (even retroactively) if it does not like a result.

Even absent these problems, China's very size would make it a challenging economic partner. When the Chinese economic elephant changes course, those in the way may easily get trampled. For example, China is already the world's largest importer of sugar and cooking oil, and before long it could become the biggest importer of wheat, corn, barley, and cotton. Governmental

²Senator Sam Nunn, "The Relationship Between the United States and China", speech to the floor of the U.S. Senate, Feb. 23, 1996, p. 1.

actions, or even market disruptions, affecting these imports could throw global markets into turmoil. Similarly, imagine the ramifications of a Mexico-style financial crisis in China, or a breakdown in Hong Kong that triggers capital flight.

The point of citing these possibilities is not to denigrate China's amazing movement toward market economics, its astounding record of growth, or its positive potential. Indeed, the United States can benefit significantly from trade and investment with China. Much of China's import demand is a good match for sectors in which the United States has a comparative advantage—such as capital goods, machinery and equipment, chemicals, and aircraft. China's exports to the United States, in turn, enable the United States to pay less for products—such as light manufactures, toys, footwear, and apparel—that in significant part it would import from other third countries.³ In addition, the economic reform process is likely to increase pressure to develop the rule of law in China, expand the scope of private sector activity, and enhance freedoms associated with both those developments.

Nevertheless, ad hoc economic engagement, in the context of China's difficult adjustment process, is likely to trigger a host of highly specific complaints from U.S. interests, and, as usual, the "squeaky wheels" will get the most attention. The standard U.S. government response, absent an integrating strategy, will be to make narrow case-by-case demands through bilateral channels. This combination is likely to lead to a series of public, acrimonious disputes in one-on-one face-offs, leaving all parties frustrated and angry. Ongoing conflicts could have larger consequences: If two of the largest economies fail to get along, the effects are likely to be damaging both to one another and to the rest of the world.

The United States and China face similar risks in the area of security. China can influence security issues as diverse as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and

missiles, North Korea, regional security arrangements, territorial disputes over land and sea in Asia, the effective working of the UN Security Council, Mideast conflicts and peace processes, and global climate change—to name just a few topics. But a policy of security engagement is likely to produce conflict if it just takes the form of a long laundry list of actions the United States would like China to take.

A Strategic Approach

THE UNITED STATES needs a strategy for engagement that will integrate China within regional and global security, economic, and political systems. This strategy should have two elements at its core. First, the United States, China, and others need to maintain a stable security context in the Asia-Pacific so that states do not resort to armed conflict or threats of force to resolve disputes with peaceful countries. Second, the United States and others need to demonstrate to China the mutual advantages that flow from full participation in world market arrangements. In effect, the security objective is to maintain the peaceful balance that has been a prerequisite for achieving dynamic economic growth, which in turn can strengthen the development of common interests, broaden networks of private ties, and promote a civil society premised on basic rules of behavior. Over time, the economic connections may create political and private ties that establish a basis for moving beyond a security balance toward cooperation and partnership. In the meantime, however, the balance in security relations meets everyone's baseline interests.

To reach an understanding with China on the nature of security and stability in the Asia Pacific, the United States needs discus-

³Marcus Noland, "U.S.-China Economic Relations", Institute for International Economics, working paper on Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, pp. 3, 7, 16-19.

sions with China that differ from the interactions of recent years. The United States should initiate this dialogue by explaining its security interests and strategy in the region and by inviting China to do likewise. More specifically, the United States should explain its interest in avoiding the domination of East Asia by any power or group of powers hostile to the United States. We also want to preserve the freedom of maritime and air transit across, around, and beyond the Pacific.

The United States should explain to China that it has entered into defensive treaty obligations with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to support this interest in stability, not to pursue aggressive ends. To be able to carry out its obligations as a Pacific power, the United States has maintained a naval and military presence in the region for almost a century. Over time, China may expect the United States to seek to increase the mutual commitment of, and to share the responsibilities with, allies and other friendly states. America welcomes efforts by other Pacific nations, such as the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum, to encourage cooperation, reduce suspicions, and resolve disputes.

The United States should point out to China that U.S. commitments to Japan are designed to assure Japan that its security is linked to that of the United States. The U.S.-Japan alliance precludes a need for Japan to develop a unilateral approach to its security. The United States expects to work closely with Japan as that country increases its contribution to the security system from which it benefits.

The United States should reiterate to China that U.S. security arrangements with the Republic of Korea have been, and remain, defensive. One of America's current challenges is to promote cooperative relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan, China, and Russia, so that if there should be a crisis in North-South relations, the international context would be conducive to a constructive response.

China's interests should not be threatened by this security strategy. A flexible policy of balancing provides the conditions for cooperation; it is vastly different from a rigid effort at containment, which would not succeed. Indeed, as China concentrates on its internal development, it should welcome regional stability and the avoidance of contests for dominance.

The prerequisite for China, however, will be a continuation of the American "one China" policy. China's fundamental interest is its territorial integrity, including Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong. The United States should reassure China on this key point, as long as China acts peacefully. With Taiwan in particular, the United States will meet its obligations and will want to continue peaceful economic and private ties. These contacts are not a threat to China, and in fact provide an assurance that enables China and Taiwan to pursue a closer relationship.

The United States should also address its concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially to countries threatening their neighbors. To the degree the United States can demonstrate multilateral support for its proliferation policies, China is more likely to be receptive, as it has been with the nuclear test ban treaty. Where the United States is compelled to act alone, it should brief China privately as to why it is doing so. The habit of serious consultation will minimize the likelihood of Chinese miscalculations about American purposes. A pattern of serious, high-level security discussions also grants China the respect it believes it deserves. By paying attention to China, the United States will be better positioned to indicate to it which security matters are especially important and which Chinese actions will trigger a strong American response.

THIS STRATEGY for security engagement with China depends principally on bilateral contacts, although it has multilateral dimensions. It should be complemented by a strategy for economic engagement that relies principally on multilateral

diplomacy, supported by certain bilateral actions. The United States should work with Europe, Japan, and others in the Asia Pacific to bring China and Taiwan into the institutions and regimes of the international market economy. We want China to accept the rules. We want China to perceive that adherence to norms of behavior will benefit it as well as others. And we want China to recognize that these requirements are not a form of American political diktat, but rather are the principles of a system designed for mutual advantage.

China's acceptance of these rules and norms will also shape its internal development, including the advancement of the rule of law. By linking self-interest to certain policies, the United States and others might strengthen the arguments of China's reformers. China's membership in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank has already helped it to move toward a market economy. Opening up the world to more of the Chinese people will have the effect of enabling more Chinese to see the advantages of liberty and tolerance.

At the same time, the terms of China's entrance into the international economic system need to recognize China's protracted transition. As Americans have learned through bilateral agreements with China on market access and intellectual property, the United States will be best able to affect long-term policies there by working with China to accept both core principles and an *ongoing* system to apply those principles. The targets of attention will evolve as its economy adapts, as we learn more about impediments to trade, and as it develops internal constituencies with interests in the application of the principles. Given this ongoing process, it would be prudent to have terms of accession to international organizations that reasonably phase in China's participation and benefits. In effect, the United States and others in the world need a series of mutually beneficial "executory contracts" with China, so that all

sides have interests in performance, adaptation, and the custom of working out an agreed response to the inevitable bumps in the road.

China and G-7 Summits

THE UNITED STATES can draw together the security, economic, and political dimensions of its strategy by promoting China's phased membership in the G-7 summit process. This overture would signal America's strong commitment to integrating China into the global system as long as it accepts international economic and security norms. China would welcome the acknowledgment of its genuine accomplishment and status, especially since Russia has already had a special seat at the summit tables.

Indeed, China's participation with the G-7 might strengthen the hand of the reforming modernizers who want to ease it into a cooperative relationship with the rest of the world. In contrast, the recent pattern of conflicts has played to the advantage of Chinese leaders who are stirring the pot of fiery nationalism as substitute fare for the legitimacy that communism no longer offers. These leaders assume that China can set its own rules, or at least play a good game of global power politics by manipulating the interests of others against U.S. demands. China's gradual introduction to the G-7 might be employed both to convince the Chinese that World Trade Organization (WTO) membership really does require a commitment to meet basic trading system standards, and to maneuver Europe and Japan into a unified presentation on WTO requirements. If the United States, Europe, and Japan sit down together with China regularly, the democratic threesome is more likely to develop a united position and stick to it.

The nature of China's relationship with the G-7 would depend on its degree of cooperation and commitment. For example, initially it might participate with Russia in the political discussions by heads of governments. Once China and the WTO worked out

terms of accession, it might also participate in the economic discussions at the summits. As it approaches world financial and trade standards, it might take part in the more extensive G-7 finance ministers' process.

Adding China would also have the benefit of making the G-7 less of a Eurocentric gathering. Not surprisingly, the presence of Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and the European Commission at summit meetings leads to a European bias in a group that is supposed to be examining world economic—and frequently political—problems. China's participation might prod Europeans to broaden their outlook and weigh the implications of their actions—or inaction—for regions outside their continent.

China, Taiwan, and the WTO

THE UNITED STATES also should adjust its approach toward the accession of China and Taiwan to the WTO to fit this overall strategy. All parties would benefit from China's accession to the WTO if the parties could determine acceptable "executory" terms. Unfortunately, it appears that the United States has unintentionally transformed WTO accession into a bilateral Sino-American conflict. Moreover, the tension has been exacerbated by trading partners who have emphasized their support for China's early accession, instead of focusing on the standards that China needs to meet. Even Chinese economic reformers now maintain that WTO accession is a "political", not an economic, question. They believe that the United States alone is keeping China out of the organization in order to secure political leverage or to punish China. These misconceptions have created dangerous possibilities for miscalculations on all sides, as well as for widening fault lines among current WTO members.

Working with the WTO's leadership, the United States should reach agreement with the European Union, Japan, other North Americans, and ASEAN and other

APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) members on a core set of principles that China must accept in order to accede to the WTO. These might include, for example, transparency of the trade regime, uniform nondiscriminatory application of trade rules, national treatment (applying the same rules to both foreigners and nationals), the minimum international protections for investment, reasonable opportunities for market access, adequate and effective protection of all forms of intellectual property, and use of dispute resolution mechanisms. If China accepts such a core set of principles, the WTO can be more flexible in phasing in China's obligations. In the meantime, the WTO would need to have processes in place to work with China to identify and address problems of implementation. The WTO might maintain certain provisions that have been used with non-market economies, which could be phased out as China's reforms enabled it to adhere effectively to the principles.

The United States should not let itself become the sole advocate of this accession regime. On the contrary, we should be the catalyst for organizing ongoing common efforts. American diplomacy should make clear to allies and partners that this effort has significant strategic implications, and that therefore the United States values and expects cooperation.

This effort should also seek to bring Taiwan into the WTO as a developed economy. There is ample precedent for membership in economic groups by both China and Taiwan as "an economy." Both belong to the Asian Development Bank. In 1991, with U.S. help, Korea managed to negotiate the APEC membership of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Obviously, this effort can succeed only if the United States assures Beijing that it is not seeking to dismantle China and that it stands behind the commitments of the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. Again, the United States would be wiser to pursue this

approach to China and Taiwan in concert with others, and on a systematic rather than episodic basis.

APEC and ASEAN

THE APEC group, first convened in 1989, is a fledgling body that is still developing cohesion and a sense of purpose. Nevertheless, it offers another forum for the United States and its economic partners to engage China on the benefits and responsibilities of integration in international economic systems. As a promoter of "open regionalism", APEC should encourage China to develop internal and external reforms in a multilateral context. APEC's message should reinforce other communications about the WTO accession process. And until China joins the WTO, APEC could serve as the primary vehicle for introducing China to the norms of the multilateral market economy.

The United States will need to work, preferably discreetly, with the other APEC nations to persuade them to take on these tasks. Most APEC nations are looking to accommodate China, which they perceive as the rising power in the region. But many Asians also recognize the strategic importance of persuading China to accept security and economic rules. Moreover, these nations would like the United States to remain as the "balancing wheel" in the Pacific, and at least some could be persuaded that the integrationist approach outlined here serves mutual purposes—especially in contrast to the recent pattern of Sino-American conflict.

ASEAN's Regional Forum (ARF), recently initiated by ASEAN to discuss security issues with other nations in the region, offers a means of engaging China on collective security topics. This approach can be useful for the United States in three respects.

First, the discussions can communicate to China the benefits of abiding by the core security norms that underpin the U.S. strategy of engagement in the region; alternatively, China may see firsthand that aggressive

actions are likely to generate group condemnation and perhaps even opposition. Second, ARF may usefully press others in the region to recognize that security, including that involving China, is a mutual responsibility—necessitating their contributions as well as that of the United States. Over time, for example, the United States may persuade ASEAN and others in ARF to address the dangers of proliferation, creating a regional multilateral context that could encourage China's cooperation as a member. Third, ARF offers a vehicle for gradually involving Japan in security questions to a greater degree and in an open fashion.

Bilateral Battles

INSTEAD OF catalyzing multilateral efforts to draw China into international economic groups, the United States has drifted into a campaign of bilateral battles. The United States is bearing alone the burden of contentious disputes with China, even though the issues are of interest to many countries. Even when America's leverage is great, this approach can be risky and counterproductive because China's leadership, jostling in the succession struggle, is vulnerable to nationalistic pressure against yielding to American demands. What is worse, if the United States makes threats it is unwilling to carry out, China will sense weakness and be emboldened to confront America.

In 1993-94, the linkage of most favored nation (MFN) status to human rights improvements fell into this trap, and the administration then had to crawl out. The United States has now granted annual extensions of MFN in 1995 and 1996. The president and Congress should reconsider whether this annual excoriation continues to serve U.S. interests. Despite the appellation "most favored nation", this status is in fact not a favor at all; it is the baseline trade relationship accorded to virtually all countries. A debate each year on whether to terminate this status certainly does not accord with a long-term strategy of engagement with

China. It draws America away from the more promising multilateral approach, and the reality is that even when the United States has objections to some of China's policies, it is highly unlikely to terminate MFN status. Moreover, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on which this exercise is based only requires presidential certification that a non-market economy is not impeding emigration. (Deng Xiaoping once offered to permit ten million Chinese to emigrate to the United States in order to prove the absence of restrictions.) In sum, as a practical matter the annual MFN exercise produces ineffective criticism of China and serves as a stark reminder that the United States is not willing to take the extreme step of ending MFN to address its concerns.

If the U.S. government wants to end this diversionary exercise, there are several options available. First, the president could certify that China does not restrict emigration. Second, the president could certify China as a market economy, perhaps as part of the phase-in process with the WTO. Third, Congress could change or repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, recognizing that while it played an honorable role during the Cold War, that conflict is now over and the old formulation no longer suits our interests.

There are, however, forms of bilateral engagement with China that could help the United States achieve its goals. The U.S.-China Joint Economic Committee, chaired by the Treasury Department, could play a more active role in providing technical assistance for China's reforms. In the past, this committee has stressed mutual interests in China's integration into the world economy. It has helped reformers learn from international experience, stimulated constituencies for reform, and identified impediments within China in a non-adversarial context.

Many Chinese recognize that the establishment of the effective rule of law is in their economic interest. This is the field Americans should cultivate in order to plant and nourish the seeds of economic and political liberaliza-

tion. In doing so, the United States must clarify, by words and deeds, that legal developments should be in our mutual interest, and not interpreted solely as a Western imposition.

America's bilateral actions in other areas—intellectual property rights, market access, human rights, prison labor exports, corruption, and exchange-rate practices—are likely to be more successful if they are designed to accord with the strategy outlined here:

- Seek to develop an international coalition to promote international standards.
- Stress China's self-interest in adhering to the rules.
- Find and help develop internal constituencies.
- Learn how the issues are handled within China (including within different provinces) so as to tailor solutions to specific problems. And while pursuing these approaches, continually stress to Chinese officials that their credibility is also an asset that China should value; China must keep its word and abide by agreements it has made.

Facing Facts

IN CONSIDERING the future course of Sino-American relations, we should keep in mind the distance already traveled. China has moved far toward developing a market economy, although this particular "long march" still has many mountains to climb.⁴ As capitalism has spread through China, living conditions have improved for hundreds of millions of people. The Chinese enjoy more freedom, choice, and opportunity to learn about the world than they did when the United States re-established ties with China a quarter century ago.

The United States should also acknowledge the effect of its own changeable role over time. As the pendulum of

⁴See Henry Rowen's "The Short March: China's Road to Democracy", *The National Interest* (Fall 1996).

policies toward China has swung toward, away, and now again toward China, Americans need to learn from their experience. The United States should recognize China for what it is, not what Americans imagine it to be.

The China of today is rushing toward economic development while its government struggles to reconcile momentous tensions: between Beijing and the provinces; mainland China and Hong Kong and Taiwan; urban and rural citizens; private and state-owned enterprises; decayed political legitimacy and an increasingly pluralistic public; and different generations looking to a new era of leadership. China's leaders are highly sensitive to the risk that these tensions could spin out of control, because they have witnessed—and many have suffered through—times of turmoil. They also resent China's past humiliation—and territorial dismemberment—when it was weak.

It is particularly important to recognize this history and present reality if the United States is to pursue its interests effectively. Most important, the United States needs a long-term strategy—and outlook—appropri-

ate for dealing with a China that will be in a condition of flux for decades, not just years.

The pursuit of a realistic policy toward China can and should also include the promotion of principles that are based on America's special national identity. The advancement of these principles will be most effective if the United States faces facts, instead of proceeding in terms of romanticized images of China that mirror American images. The United States will accomplish more if it employs the power and attractiveness of its capitalist economy and free market ideas in order to integrate China into regional and global groups—groups that have already helped extend core U.S. principles.

The recent failure of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself is a reminder of the tremendous force of the political and economic freedom that America represents. Yet the effectiveness of that force as an agent of change in the rest of the world is not automatic and guaranteed. The United States must be smart as well as confident and proud. America must employ its advantages and influence to shape the future it wishes to achieve. □

The Third Side of the Triangle

The China-Japan Dimension

—Charles Horner—

OF ALL THE relationships in the world that do not directly involve the United States as one of the parties, the one between China and Japan is likely to have the greatest effect upon us in the first half of the twenty-first century. Indeed, it has already much influenced the depth and the range of our Pacific involvements. Important strategic decisions yet to be made will be based on assumptions about relations between these two, but those relations are not very well understood. If our grasp of intra-European relations has been seriously hampered by a propensity toward provincialism, imagine what awaits as we try to plumb the relationship between two countries that are culturally much more distant and foreign. Forced to rely on “Pekingology” or the competing models of “Japan, Inc.,” we have trouble enough fathoming just one of these ancient and complex countries in isolation; divining what connects them and what they mean to one another takes us to a level of much greater difficulty.

Many will argue in favor of analyzing the China-Japan relationship as we would any other, employing the customary constructs of international relations and strategic analysis, and discovering perhaps that there is nothing very mysterious here after all. It is always a sensible injunction to Westerners in general to hold their fascination with “orien-

tal stratagem” in check. We are also well-advised to remember that China and Japan are aware of the West’s cult-like fascination with the Orient’s ancient wisdom and may use it as a way of keeping us permanently uninformed—or misinformed—about their business. We should assume that there are those in Tokyo and Beijing who are occasionally bemused by our invocation of the pithy aphorisms of their ancient sages to explain what our interlocutors in China and Japan are “really” up to.

On the other hand, there are aspects of Sino-Japanese relations that should make the invocation of standard Western international relations theory equally suspect. There is nothing, for example, in our Western understanding of even so rudimentary a term as “bilateral relations”—nothing provided by the “models” we know best from the study of European history, like Britain-France or France-Germany—that adequately prepares us for the mixture of respect, disdain, emulation, and rivalry that has characterized the relationship between China and Japan for many centuries.

In the first place, it is hard for us really to grasp China’s historic influence on Japan. We know something about it, of course: Chinese characters that form Japan’s written language; Confucianism and Buddhism that shape Japan’s political thought and religious sensibility; a grand cosmology that connects the natural and human worlds and places an emperor where the two intersect (though it is

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only in Japan that an emperor still reigns); the theory and practice of aesthetic and poetic that make representation in the arts mutually recognizable and intelligible. But these, for most of us, are only data. We are accustomed to think that only Western ideas have had, and will have, profoundly transforming societal effects. Yet in the centuries preceding the advent of Western intellectual influences in East Asia, it was Chinese thought that had unchallenged transforming power. The subsequent inroads of the West have been far from superficial, and we need not contest Japan's fundamental article of faith that both sets of influences work on something that is uniquely Japan's own. But for all that, nothing short of a thousand years of exposure could make Japan as Westernized as it has already been Sinicized.

Thus, when Western power began to establish itself in East Asia in the mid-nineteenth century, there was no obvious reason to anticipate that China and Japan would pursue seemingly different strategies in the face of a common danger. Our conventional rendering of each country's response to the West—that Japan “modernized” with a vengeance, whereas China dallied and resisted—emphasizes that difference, and one can trace much of the ensuing Sino-Japanese clash to these divergent responses. But well before Sino-Japanese rivalry came to dominate politics in East Asia the two had sensed a common predicament, and neither saw itself as sufficiently powerful to deal on its own with the Western onslaught.

The Japanese, for complex reasons of their own, decided to place the imperial institution at the center of their effort at national revitalization: the Meiji reform. The Chinese, led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, opted to junk their imperial system, replacing it with a “republic” that was Western in appearance. These contrasting responses reflected a verdict on the utility of certain inherited traditions, the Japanese leadership deciding to make some use of “Confucianism”, broadly understood, the Chinese elite concluding

that it had outlived its usefulness. At first, there was a mutual respect for the passionate intensity each country brought to its own course of action. In particular, Japan's early successes were inspiring to Chinese revolutionaries, and Japan provided practical models for the mainland in nearly every realm. But in the next generation, the Japanese invoked Asian and racial solidarity in an ultimately futile effort to unite Asia and to marshal Asian resources against the enemies Japan had chosen for itself.

The Sino-Japanese dimension to this undertaking has receded from our view, but it was the seminal occasion for the engagement of the United States in Asia's affairs in the twentieth century. There is, first of all, “the fifty-year struggle” that began in 1895 with what the Chinese like to call the first Sino-Japanese war; among other things, it resulted in China's ceding Taiwan to Japan and in the displacement of China's influence in Korea with the Japanese annexation of the peninsula in 1905. There followed the “thirteen-year war” (1931-45) that began with Japan's detachment of Manchuria from China proper and the establishment of Manchukuo, and ended with Japan's capitulation. It was the second phase of that war, beginning in 1937, that finally drew the United States into the struggle. For it was China that was the principal issue between the Americans and the Japanese. At the end of the day, the United States could not acquiesce in China's incorporation into a Japanese empire.

Of the various theaters of World War II, the second Sino-Japanese war can be likened only to Europe's eastern front in its intensity and destructiveness. It was, of course, a rather one-sided ferocity. Beyond the brutal hands-on war crimes of every description, Japan's war in China caused enormous collateral damage, compounding the already deep misery resulting from a century of internal decay. But at the same time, the protracted war on the China mainland worked to America's advantage; two million Japanese

soldiers were tied down by it, so that America's acquisition of Japan's Pacific holdings was comparatively easily gained.

On the other hand, it is now generally understood that the war fatally debilitated the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek. Ironically, it was his promising initiatives in the early 1930s that had prodded the Japanese to attack when they did, before China could become too strong. As for the ultimate inheritor of Japan's mainland holdings in China, the People's Republic, its leaders have never been shy in acknowledging that the Japanese gave them their chance to seize power. China's President Jiang Zemin, speaking at a rally commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Japan's surrender, reminded younger comrades that before Japan's invasion the Chinese Communist Party was hemmed in, and that it was China's war against Japan that allowed the Communist Party to spread its influence throughout the country and, ultimately, to build the enormous military and political organization that made its victory possible when China's civil war resumed.

Residues and Explanations

JAPAN'S DEFEAT and the extension of the Cold War into Asia abruptly severed the enforced Sino-Japanese intimacy that invasion had created, but there were important residues. The scale of Japanese involvement in China had been enormous. Beyond its field armies, Japan had deployed a vast array of administrative functionaries, businessmen, students, and other intermediaries. It ran the government of Manchukuo, and as an occupying power had a wide range of relations with a collaborationist government based in Nanking that had effective jurisdiction over at least one hundred million people. In Manchuria, especially, the Japanese left behind a substantial industrial and transportation infrastructure. There, and in some other areas, Japanese was widely used as a language of instruction, and there

was a sustained and expensive effort at what would now be called cultural imperialism. The Japanese were also a major player in organized crime, and for a time ran what was then probably the biggest narcotics trafficking operation in the world. Now, even more than French life under Vichy, Chinese life under Japanese occupation has been relegated to history's Never-Never Land, something substantial in its impact but little remarked on. (But awkward reminders do surface occasionally. Taiwan's fifty years under Japanese rule ended with the island's retrocession to China in 1945. Lee Teng-hui, 73, Taiwan-born and recently elected president of Nationalist China, is reputed to speak better Japanese than he does Mandarin. Indeed, his occasional interviews in flawless Japanese with Japan's media have had the effect of rekindling some sentimental affection for Taiwan amongst the Japanese.)

It is understandable that both Chinese and Japanese would seek some explanation of how it was that their essentially benign interactions across the centuries, and their initial common sense of danger in the face of Western expansion, resulted in such mutual destruction. Intra-European wars had become routine over the centuries, and explanations for them abounded. But the *Pax Sinica* had also become routine, and there was nothing in the traditional Sino-Confucian view of international affairs that could explain the Sino-Japanese struggle. There were no real precedents. China had not threatened Japan since 1281, when Khublai Khan, as emperor of China, launched a failed invasion of Kyushu. Japan had not rebelled against traditional Chinese hegemony in the region since Toyotomi Hideyoshi, as Japan's dominant warlord, launched two failed invasions of Korea in 1592 and 1597.

The Chinese felt themselves well prepared for a re-evaluation. In their new state-supported ideology, "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought", Japan's behavior could be explained by "imperialism."

Nothing personal here: The Japanese had merely done what History made them do, given the unequal levels of socio-economic development of the two countries. In attempting to usurp the position of the European imperial powers in China, Japan was doing only what a properly educated person (that is, a Marxist) would expect of it. Similarly, capitalist America's resistance to Japanese expansion was seen to be equally low-minded, and the previous decades of American support for China needed to be understood in this light.

For the Japanese, the matter could not be this simple, for they too had to rally around a new state-supported ideology, the one imposed by the American occupation. Through their new adherence to representative democracy, individual rights, and the rule of law, the Japanese were now supposed to understand how they had become similar to, say, the Americans, but remained different from, say, the Chinese. The new postwar regime in Japan, insofar as it was parliamentary and democratic, was thought by many to represent a return to the "natural" course of the 1920s. Then, as Japanese remembered, their country was part of the post-World War I trend that saw the apparent advance of Western-style parliamentarism in places as far apart as Central Europe and China. In Japan, of course, the trend was interrupted by the collapse of civilian government in the wake of the Great Depression, when a kind of militaristic, xenophobic, and expansionist radicalism came to the fore.

For a decade and a half, modern-minded and internationally-oriented intellectual and cultural elements had thus been silenced and suppressed, and the Japanese welcomed the re-establishment of an internal parliamentary order, even if American-imposed. But, as for many of their cousins in the West, the anti-communist, anti-Soviet stance of their new government was another matter. Many of them, too, felt the need for a new interpretation of the relationship between Japan and China, one that, while radically different

from the pan-Asianist outlook of the discredited Japanese militarists, somehow made sense of the cataclysmic changes that had so rapidly come to both countries in the preceding decades.

What had gone wrong? How was it that the Japanese had so thoroughly misunderstood their closest and most significant neighbor? The Japanese were, and remain, the world's most industrious, meticulous, and methodical Sinologists, and there is more information to be had about China in Japan than in any other country. The Japanese penchant for bibliography, collation, filing, indexing, sorting, and referencing had been put to use by the various parts of the Japanese imperial enterprise in China. Now it fed interminable, dense, indeed impenetrable debates among Japanese Sinologists about the nature of Chinese society and the course of Chinese history. But, as one might have anticipated, these discussions, which began by trying to understand how Japan's centuries of study of China had yielded a portrait of a country ripe for easy conquest, soon flowed into larger ruminations about Japan itself.

The discussions harked back to a much older debate, begun in the late nineteenth century, and still highly relevant today. As far back as 1885, when Japan's modernization was gathering steam, the country's most Western-oriented and cosmopolitan intellectual, Fukuzawa Yukichi, published a famous appeal to his countrymen to "leave Asia." He maintained that Asia belonged to the past, and that Japan's future lay in the closest collaboration with, and emulation of, the advanced countries of the West. The rest of Asia, he thought, would more or less have to fend for itself and do the best it could in the great struggle for survival. The contrary case was also made the same year by another commentator, Tarui Takichi, who put a different gloss on Japan's growing material advantage over the rest of Asia. Tarui thought Japan was obliged—fated, in fact—to encourage its neighbors to concert

their efforts against the West, and ultimately to lead and then dominate a pan-Asian campaign to dislodge Western influence altogether.

Europe's Means, Asia's Ends

C RITICS OF JAPANESE behavior, both in China and Japan, would later come to note the entanglement of both points of view, in that Japan ultimately employed techniques perfected by the Western imperialists to pursue ambitions supposedly rooted in a higher Asian sensibility. Originally, however, the hope of the "liberals" was that China would be inspired and edified by Japan's successes as a constitutional monarchy that blended the best of the traditional and the modern, thus sparing itself untoward upheaval and dislocation. The two nations were not presumed to be rivals as such, and thus this outlook might be deemed "pro-Chinese" in the better sense. More militant "pan-Asiatic" elements might also have claimed to be pro-Chinese and to have China's larger interests at heart, but they were also more cynical and vainglorious and, in the end, too imitative of the worst behavior of the Westerners they claimed to despise. In the event, having promoted "Asia consciousness" and "China awareness", Japan came to be undone by these very monsters of its own making. As one Japanese historian ruefully summed it up, "in the end what was produced was Asian disappointment, Western animosity, and Japanese self-destruction." Chinese commentators return repeatedly to the same hortatory tale: To the degree that Japan thinks of itself as "Western", it will pursue policies that will unite its neighbors against it. To the degree that it remains "Asian"—knowing its place, which is to say, deferring to China—it can enjoy material prosperity, help improve the material lot of others, and enjoy the high regard of all.

The interplay between these themes has had much to do with the theory and practice

of Sino-Japanese relations since the end of the second Sino-Japanese war. Even within the context of the Cold War, the two nations continued to deal with matters that had been the substance of their prior relationship. After all, China's return of Japan to its former, and very "Asian", pre-Meiji dimensions was not quite complete. Whatever else may be said of Chinese intervention in the Korean War in 1950, for example, one explanation had to do with the reassertion of China's traditional hegemony on the peninsula, which had been usurped by Japan. Similarly, Taiwan's de facto independence from China and the re-establishment of Japan's commercial presence in Southeast Asia were reminders that China's war aims had not all been fulfilled.

The dispute about sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which flared up this past September, reminds us that, as much as Japan and China are at peace, the Chinese still see possibilities for a contemporary "cold war" based on earlier hostilities. The islands are eight bits of uninhabited rock, about 125 miles northeast of Taiwan, and about 200 miles southwest of Okinawa, the largest island in the Ryukyu chain (and itself intermittently a Chinese "vassal state" until annexed by Japan in 1879). It is the relationship between these two larger islands that, of course, actually matters. In late imperial times, China held the eight islets within Taiwan's jurisdiction, so that when the Japanese acquired Taiwan in 1895, they also acquired the islets. The Japanese then came to include the islets within Okinawa's jurisdiction, so they passed back to Japan when Okinawa itself was passed back to Japanese administration by the United States in 1972. The Chinese never seemed to make much of this bit of historical sleight of hand, and even in the early 1970s, when it was already apparent that ownership of this otherwise inconsequential real estate could have implications for the control of both marine and sub-seabed resources, the Chinese were willing to set the matter aside.

Yet the issue was there, waiting to be picked up by the Chinese whenever it suited them. Why now? Perhaps because the Chinese wished merely to remind Japan that, despite the prospect of “enhanced security cooperation”—a widely bruited by-product of President Clinton’s visit to Tokyo in April 1996—the new Japanese-American declaration on security issued when Clinton was there was worth less than it seemed. (Indeed, the United States has since declared that it has no position on the sovereignty over the islets; the invocation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in response to a Chinese attack is therefore moot.) Or, perhaps, Beijing decided that residual dislike of Japanese by all Chinese provided a way of enlisting Chinese patriotism in easing its recovery of Hong Kong and, later, Taiwan. (The Republic of China on Taiwan also asserts sovereignty over the islets; as a claimant of the legacy of Chinese nationalism, it can hardly afford to be outshouted by Beijing on this question. And, for good measure, Sino-Japanese controversy has helped further solidify China’s relations with increasingly influential Chinese people around the world.)

Strategic Design, Political Theater

SEEN ACROSS a longer term, the Senkaku/Diaoyu episode should remind us that one high priority of “rising China’s” strategic policy is the restoration of the historic balance in Chinese-Japanese relations—scarcely an easy task. Japan is wealthy, successful, technologically sophisticated, a potential military power of some consequence, and a political influence in the world in its own right. How then to assure that Japan does not acquire strategic influence commensurate with its economic strength?

In 1972, when Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations were formally re-established, the Chinese said there were two issues that would retain pride of place: “historical awareness”, that is, Japan’s past conduct in China; and “Taiwan”, meaning China’s recovery of the

remaining piece of territory that had been lost to Japan. The two are certainly related, but it is noteworthy that the first question, that of history, has remained surprisingly effective in keeping the Japanese psychologically intimidated and politically subordinate. It is as if the Chinese understood better than the Japanese themselves that, properly handled, the memory of Japan’s wartime conduct could be made to shape the relationship for decades to come, that Japanese politics would somehow contrive to make the issue so difficult to confront as to place substantial inhibitions on Japan’s freedom of action.

The problem of “historical awareness” has lost none of its power to roil Japanese politics, and there is no end to its influence in sight. It is not that the Japanese do not know how to appear contrite. They are renowned for assuming responsibility. Corporate executives and government ministers resign routinely when egregious conduct is revealed. Just this past March, Japanese newspapers printed a photograph of some pharmaceutical executives kneeling on the floor, prostrating themselves in apology to dead victims of AIDS-tainted blood their companies had purveyed. This particular instance of overwrought sentimentality and stylized grieving happened to fit nicely into that wonderfully Japanese obsession with the gory details of disease. Nevertheless, the rituals are so well-established, so customary, that it is the absence of exaggerated displays of remorse that compels attention.

It was widely noted in Japan that Emperor Akihito’s 1992 visit to China to mark the twentieth anniversary of Chinese-Japanese normalization was especially significant for him because his late father had long wanted to visit China but had never done so. Still, Hirohito, in 1984, had managed to speak of “extreme regret concerning the unfortunate past.” In 1990, Akihito’s phrase was “a feeling of great sorrow.” When he got to China in 1992, he said he felt “deep sorrow. . . . I deeply reflect that we should never again go to war.” It had taken twenty years to get to that

particular point, for the Japanese had indeed committed themselves to “deep self-reflection” in the joint declaration of 1972. Now, Akihito could say that he had reflected on the matter and was able to report on the results of his own introspection. Of course, these are all carefully wrought terms of art, hard to render into other languages, and perhaps chosen for precisely that reason. But for all the attention to rhetorical detail, high-ranking Japanese officials will, every now and then, engage in what we might call “Rape of Nanking denial”, or reflect publicly on the deeper purity of Japan’s motives in the Greater East Asian War. They will then be compelled to resign and recant.

It is easy to make too much of this kind of political theater, even though it has been running for fifty years now. But what it does reveal is that there is little basis for the reassertion in Japan of a “great power” consciousness, especially the kind that is supposed to make it a genuine rival of China for strategic hegemony in Asia. There is surely no principle of “Asia consciousness” that could serve as a basis for such a dramatic turn in Japan’s behavior, and the idea that Japan might come to invoke a “Western” principle for this purpose is even more farfetched. The notion that Western standards of both international and domestic practice will somehow be asserted by Asian states against a growth in Chinese power, and that Japan will be the leader of such a coalition of principle and interest—or will even cynically exploit such concerns to its own advantage—is, for one thing, too hard to reconcile with Japan’s conspicuous lack of interest in performing such a role.

What Shape the Triangle?

JAPAN IS SUPPOSEDLY the great test case for the applicability of Western values and practices in Asia, but so far the Japanese are not satisfying the high expectations that some Westerners have in this regard. Even rhetorically, the Japanese are not involved in the great contemporary

debate about Asian and Western values, and despite the fact that they are regularly congratulated for the growing “normalization” (that is, Westernization) of their politics, they show no inclination to become so involved.

In this one respect, there has been no Japanese prime minister more cosmopolitan than Hosokawa Morihiro, distinguished by his descent from one of the country’s great modern-minded nobles and by his distance from the corrupt practices and factions of the ruling party. In advance of what turned out to be his eight-month tenure during 1993-94, he was supposed to represent the best in liberal, internationally-minded Japanese politics. Yet even he was not prepared to make his nation’s case when a conspicuous opportunity arose. In the spring of 1994, at a high point of international attention to China’s human rights practices and their effect on Sino-American relations, Hosokawa was in Beijing, meeting with the same Chinese officials who had recently finished giving Secretary of State Warren Christopher a very hard time. Hosokawa talked about human rights as universal principles, but also expressed the view—surely an ironic one, coming from a Japanese—that democracy could not be imposed by one country on another. True, it is only fair to concede that few really believe that the Japanese model that is up for emulation in Asia is the political one—the freely elected parliamentary democracy. More compelling, supposedly, is the economic one. But that, too, looks more dubious as the Japanese economy, at least by its previous high standards, seems less overpowering, and as capitalism, which in the Orient was once confined to Japan alone, establishes vigorous roots in other Asian countries.

In practical terms, both the security and commercial aspects of Japan’s international relations are changing. Russo-Soviet power once dominated the high politics of national security, and trade with North America still dominates day-to-day politics, economics,

and commerce. But, inexorably, Japanese attention is shifting to China in both cases. The security aspect has become prominent, especially since the widely publicized bellicosity of the Chinese in the Taiwan Straits early in 1996. But tectonic shifts in the world economy are also being measured, and they indicate that Japanese trade and investment are being drawn away from the West and channeled toward Asia, especially China. Sino-Japanese trade is expected to grow markedly over the next twenty years or so, fundamentally transforming a host of previously well-established relationships. Talk of Sino-Japanese "economic convergence" abounds because the two nations are now on a course to create the largest economic agglomeration in the world. Moreover, there are others—Taiwan and South Korea most notably—whose trade and investment are also being increasingly drawn into it. Taken together, all this will bring to fruition the grand vision of Sino-Japanese cooperation articulated in Japan decades ago—except that it is China that will dominate the second coming of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere.

If any of this is even remotely accurate, then the dilemmas that the United States currently faces in its conflicted relations with China will appear as nothing when compared to what Japan will experience. This is but one rendering of "greater China"; somewhat different versions already inspire dread in many of the world's chanceries. Given the history we have recounted, any variation of it in China will have a profound influence on how the Japanese evaluate their "China policy." For the past twenty years have turned out to be the easiest and most straightforward in that history. Japan and China were both members of a worldwide coalition directed against the Soviet Union. Both were free to indulge in the visceral animosity they had developed for the Russians, an animosity rooted not only in old-fashioned national rivalries but also—and let us not be afraid to say it—in race. Indeed, race was long

assumed to be a basic fault line in the relations between West and East in general, though today we seem to hear little about it. The Chinese, for their part, obviously submergered their consideration of it into their anti-Russian accommodation with the Americans. Neither did the Chinese urge Japanese to object to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, once all three countries were lined up on the same side. And yet. . . .

In the meantime, we would be well-advised to reflect on how the more mundane facts now before us ought to guide our future hopes. In particular, we should hope and seek to ensure that Japan will play an increasingly larger role in a U.S.-designed effort to balance China's growing power. There are some implicit assumptions here: that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty's anti-Soviet purpose can somehow be converted into a new anti-Chinese one; that Japan has untapped resources for regional and even global leadership that may be activated; that despite the indications of public anxiety and the instances of institutional incapacity, there is a stable political consensus inside Japan, a consensus tough enough to allow a hardening of Sino-Japanese relations; that the Chinese cannot, in the end, fundamentally alter the nature and content of the Japanese-American connection, even if they were determined to do so and worked hard at it; that the relationship between the Chinese and the Japanese is more amenable to manipulation by us, to our advantage, than it is by either or both of them to be used against us.

Interestingly enough, it is difficult to find many Japanese who will say that they believe *any* of these assumptions to be valid. And if they are made skittish by the history of the last century and a half—especially by their own failure to come to grips with their great neighbor, which is in fact the origin of the rest of their problems—we should not be surprised. But beyond this, we also overlook (because we seem already to have forgotten) that an effort directed against China even remotely analogous to the one we led

against the Soviet Union would be long, difficult, expensive, and taxing. We learned during the Cold War that even our closest and most compatible friends and allies would show the wobbling effects of psychological and political pressures directed against them by the common enemy. Yet such pressures are negligible compared to what the Chinese would be able to bring to bear against the Japanese, were it to emerge that Tokyo was even thinking about becoming our key and necessary partner in some anti-Beijing arrangement.

But is there sufficient reason to believe that things will even get to that point? Past history, contemporary politics, and economic projections all suggest that the revival of a strategically meaningful Sino-Japanese competition is a chimera. Like some of the intra-European hostilities that have dissolved into history, this great intra-Asian one will go the same way in due course. It will have its ups and downs, to be sure, yet it now seems that Japan's efflorescence as the driving force in the relationship must be judged a brief one. When it offered itself to the rest of Asia—and to China especially—as the embodiment of a certain imperial idea, it turned out that its doctrine was too weak, its culture too unfathomable, and its resources too limited to generate the requisite staying power. When, later, it offered itself, even to China, as an example of the operations of capitalism in an Asian setting,

the Japanese version of capitalism, with its emphasis on gigantism and conglomeration, began to look less impressive as other variations—more chaotic and less aesthetically pleasing, perhaps—began to thrive. And not surprisingly—given its origin in defeat and shame—the Japanese seem not to believe strongly enough in their Western-style system for it to provide a philosophical basis for renewing a sustained strategic rivalry with China.

The division of Europe ended suddenly with the collapse of the Iron Curtain, thereby reviving older ideas about Europe (a place) and "Europe" (an idea), and also creating new visions both for intra-continental relations and for the continent's relations with the rest of the world. A comparable reconstitution of Asia and "Asia" is also underway, as that continent's Bamboo Curtain dissolves, more slowly than its European counterpart, but no less surely. The United States, which had much to do with defending those lines and then breaching them, should not now expect that the very divisions it worked so hard to end can still be easily called upon in support of some new self-interested grand design in East Asia. And, moreover, if we expect that Japan, whose interests and principles were never wholly ours, will nevertheless help us define and maintain a new and congenial intra-Asian division of interest and principle, we shall be disappointed. □

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Africa's Murderous Professors

Michael Chege

IN HIS MUCH-PRAISED *History of the Jews*, Paul Johnson reminds us that through the ages European “anti-Semitism was fueled not just by vulgar rumor but by the deliberate propaganda of intellectuals.” This was a pattern that reached its apogee in the murderous mind of the Nazis, whose genocidal impulse was amply decorated and abetted by a phalanx of “scientific” and intellectual justification. Indeed, this is one of the reasons that the Holocaust still exerts a dark fascination over us, for it represented a “civilized” barbarity on a scale that had hitherto been thought impossible.

The phenomenon is not merely historical, nor is it limited to Europeans and Jews. Sub-Saharan Africa is today the site of genocides recently attempted, as well as those in what may be their planning stages. But, it is widely assumed, these matters are different—primitive “tribal” affairs, carried out with spears or garden tools, not gas chambers. While, certainly, there are differences, there are also striking similarities. Conspicuous among these is the key role played by intellectuals, and the active complicity of the most sophisticated strata of several African societies in fomenting, planning, supporting, and participating in mass murder.

This should not surprise us. Barrington Moore pointed out thirty years ago that, under

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approximately similar social conditions, proto-fascist ideas and their institutional attire could be found in less industrialized societies as well as in modern Western ones.¹ He pointed to the Black Hundreds movement of czarist Russia, the Nohon-shugi movement in turn-of-the-century Japan, and similar, if more feeble, movements in imperial China and colonial India.

On the African continent, South Africa's white supremacist Afrikaner Broederbond—whose stormtroopers marched to the drum of the Hitlerian Brown Shirts in the late 1930s and '40s—and its doctrine of apartheid were instances of this political phenomenon. Eventually, too, black African leaders, their intellectual propagandists in tow, made their own contributions to infamy. Today, there is genuine cultural diversity in the gallery of twentieth-century political demonology, the late arrival of black fascism providing the ultimate testimony that political sin, as with all other kinds of sin and virtue, truly knows no color.

A Rwandan Autopsy

RWANDA, a small, hilly, agricultural country tucked in the middle of the African continent, is composed of two main ethnic groups: Hutus, who until recently made up 74 percent of the population, and Tutsis, who

¹Barrington Moore, *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

made up 24 percent—the total estimated at 7.6 million in 1993. (What the precise figures are today, it is impossible to say.) Two of the most authoritative sources on the events leading to the 1994 genocide of the Tutsis show clearly that the most effective mobilization tool for the killings was the propagation of a mythology of Hutu ethnic supremacy and supposedly innate Tutsi evilness, spread mostly through radio and a variety of mass-circulation publications.² This mythology rested on a pseudo-science of local ethnic stereotypes and African eugenics—the Hutu version of Nazi “science”—propagated by Rwanda’s Hutu intellectual elite.

Other factors clearly played a significant role in the catastrophe: a menacing insurgency, population pressure, external arms deliveries to rival sides, chicanery and lack of nerve by leading Western states, and dereliction of duty by international civil servants supposedly responsible for peacekeeping in the country.³ But none of these factors, many of them present elsewhere where no mass murder has occurred or is likely, explains the Rwandan genocide: a clear case in which a carefully packaged and widely disseminated doctrine of ethnic hatred played the major role.

The background to the Rwandan genocide is not hard to describe. In 1959, rural Hutus mounted a revolution, overthrowing the Belgian-backed, colonial-era Tutsi monarchy, forcing many Tutsi monarchists and loyalists into exile in neighboring Uganda and Zaire. Local elections in 1960 cemented a Hutu majority in the National Assembly, and a 1961 referendum formally abolished the Tutsi monarchy. Then, in 1973, a coup d’état installed Juvénal Habyarimana as president, leading to rule by a predominantly Hutu ethnocracy.

Hutu rule was first threatened in 1990, when the offspring of the Tutsis exiled to Uganda in the 1959 revolution organized an insurgency in the north. The corrupt and demoralized Rwandan National Army was no match for the growing Tutsi guerrilla

forces—the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)—as they drew closer to the capital, Kigali, and briefly occupied the second largest city of Ruhengeri in January 1991. Reluctantly, the government was forced to the conference table with the rebels. Negotiations might have ended in a compromise in October 1993 but for the determination of a group of Hutu intellectuals and extremists to keep the Tutsis out of power at all costs.

The catechism of the madness that soon overtook Rwanda was authored not by some African magician extolling the supremacy of the Hutu race in ancient “tribal” wars, but by accomplished Rwandan professional historians, journalists, and sociologists at the service of a quasi-traditionalist and genocidally inclined cabal. Composed of the Akazu faction of the Hutu ruling class, from President Habyarimana’s Gisenyi region, this elite group was hell-bent on resisting the liberalizing effects of a nascent democratic pluralism that had raised the level of individual liberties and free enterprise in recent years—but that had in so doing threatened Akazu power.

The Akazu’s resistance to that threat was sufficiently persuasive and sophisticated to mobilize for murder otherwise genial Hutu peasants, with shrill calls for Tutsi extermina-

²*Rwanda: Death, Despair, Defiance* (London: African Rights, 1994), and *International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience* (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996).

³There was, for example, the perfidy of the Mitterrand government in abetting the extremist Hutu element, providing them with military support, and with the illusion that the French-speaking family of nations would stand by them against the uncouth English-speaking rebels invading their land from Uganda. On the opposite side of the conflict, the Ugandan government—also viewed as pro-Anglo-Saxon in the relevant offices at the Quay d’Orsay—fueled the conflict by providing armaments to the Rwandan Patriotic Front, open evidence of which became grist for the Hutu propaganda mill.

tion disseminated via the print and electronic media.⁴ Under the editorship of one Hassan Ngeze, the newspaper *Kangura* listed the “Hutu ten commandments” that decreed social isolation of the “evil” Tutsis, and abominated cross-ethnic marriage for polluting “pure Hutu.” “By the way”, mused the Hutu-edited *La Medaille* magazine in February 1994, “the Tutsi race could be extinguished.”

The most virulent and effective incitement to hatred and violence, however, was repeatedly broadcast by Radio/Television Libre des Mille Collines, and was commissioned by Hutu extremists with official connivance in July 1993. By early 1994 the Hutu propaganda mill was requesting that its sympathizers “reach for the hatchet” in order “to fill the unfilled graves with yet more Tutsi” bodies. Incitements to kill were spiced with “history lessons” of “well-known” Tutsi treachery and exploitation of the Hutus. The radio’s intellectual braintrust was made up of Ferdinand Nahimana, a professor of history at the Rwandan National University at Butare, and Casimir Bizimungu, the articulate multilingual foreign minister of a former government, and the manager of this “independent” radio station. Indeed, so strong was the academic input in these writings and broadcasts that, after the massacres, Emmanuel Busingo, the new and irreproachable rector of the Butare campus, confessed that “all the killing in Rwanda was carefully planned by intellectuals and those intellectuals passed through this university.”⁵

ONCE KNOWN AS the Astrida Research Center, the Butare campus was founded in the early 1950s as the official think tank of Belgian colonial policy in Rwanda. As colonizers of what were then the territories of Rwanda-Urundi and the Congo (now Zaire), Belgian authorities engaged scholars—Europeans and a few Africans—to map out the sociological and cultural attributes of the African peoples they ruled. The Tutsi-Hutu distinction in particular was an enduring obsession of the Belgians, one that generated grand intellectual fantasies about

the Tutsis. Some maintained that they were descendants either of ancient Egyptians or the “Tibetan Magi” (whose other branch supposedly headed for Iceland!); others argued that they were survivors of the lost continent of Atlantis; most concluded, erroneously, that they were early immigrants from Ethiopia. As for what to do about the Hutu-Tutsi divide, the Belgian authorities took a blatantly pro-Tutsi position, extolling the sophistication of Tutsi traditional aristocrats and proclaiming their innate cognitive superiority to the Hutus and other Africans—though not, of course, to the Belgians.

By the early 1990s, however, the question of government policy toward Hutu-Tutsi ethnic relations that engaged Belgian colonials in the 1950s had come full circle. Particularly interested in these questions were professors Leon Mugesira and the aforementioned Nahimana, both national historians in good standing at Butare, and faculty member Vincent Ntirimana. Their solution for Rwanda’s 1993–94 crisis, and the manner in which they spread it, would have impressed Joseph Goebbels. Working with the extremist Akazu faction that enjoyed the patronage of the president’s wife, Agathe Habyarimana, the professors manufactured doctrines of Hutu ethnic supremacy depicting all Tutsis as a malignant cancer in the nation’s history that deserved to be excised once and for all. As Mugesira told an extremist gathering in November 1992, “The fatal mistake we made in 1959 was to let the Tutsi get out. . . . We have to act. Wipe them all out!”⁶ They also recycled the fallacy that the Tutsis were originally immigrants from

⁴See Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).


⁵Quoted in Robert Block, “Labor of Love at a School of Hate”, *The Independent* (London), January 8, 1995.

⁶Taken from *Rwanda: Massive and Systematic Violation of Human Rights from October 1990* (Paris: International Human Rights Foundation, 1993).

Ethiopia who had overstayed and abused Hutu hospitality, and that it was time to “ship them back home” via the Nile, dead or alive. Since the Hutus were a “sociological” majority, they argued, such a resolution of the problem would be democratic.

With these intellectual preparations as background, the orders to commence the killings came via the Radio Mille Collines, not long after Habyarimana’s death on April 4, 1994 in a still-unexplained aircrash at Kigali airport. Though not party to the Akazu plots, Habyarimana had shown extreme indecisiveness in the 1991-93 negotiations with the RPF.

The Hutu extremists’ fear that he might agree to a constitutional compromise with the Tutsi rebels may have cost him his life. Be that as it may, in death he became an instant Hutu martyr, a victim of supposed Tutsi treachery. The flow of mutilated bodies in the Kagera River, televised worldwide during the rest of that month, was testimony to the effectiveness of the Hutu extremist message. The Kagera empties into Lake Victoria, the source of the Nile, one of whose tributaries rises from the Ethiopian highlands. Thus were the Tutsis “shipped back home” as planned, a point that eluded Western media coverage.



It was not just naive rural peasants who answered the call of what Mille Collines' propaganda had told them was an ethnic patriotic duty. In April 1994, organized Hutu militia under various noms de guerre—"Unified Assault" (*Interahamwe*) and "Response to Patriotic Battlecry" (*Ipuzamugambi*)—went to work with military assistance and ammunition. As the violence spread, Colonel Theoneste Bagasora (now one of twenty-one persons under indictment for crimes against humanity by the UN War Crimes Tribunal) and his colleagues in the defense ministry opened armories to the militia, providing them with weapons and ammunition. Also incited by repeated exhortations of Radio Mille Collines were the teeming urban unemployed, composed of itinerant vendors, laborers, criminals, and assorted hangers-on, who would get drunk and take to arms looting and raping Tutsi women before killing them. The weapon of choice in the elimination of the Tutsis was the garden machete, but hoes and garden forks were also used. The Hutu perpetrators of this mayhem drew support from nearly the entire Hutu population.

It was all over in a matter of weeks. The swift and savage elimination of some 850,000 Tutsis—close to half their Rwandan population—reveals the elaborate execution of the genocide undertaken by the extremist wing of the ruling Hutu elite. The organizers thought of mass murder in terms of a dirty but necessary preliminary business, required to usher in the millennium of a happy and morally pure Hutu commonwealth, cleansed of every living Tutsi and, by inference, all social evil. As with the Nazis in their genocide against the Jews, special emphasis was placed on eliminating Tutsi children in order to forestall any resurgence of the Tutsi gene.

In the end, however, the Hutus failed in their effort to create an ethnically pure paradise for themselves. Under the command of American trained Major Paul Kagame, the Tutsi RPF launched an assault that took the

capital in May, driving the rump Hutu government into exile.⁷ The world watched, courtesy of CNN and the major world television networks, as nearly a million self-exiled Hutu refugees trekked to Tanzania and the Zairean towns of Goma and Bukavu in the spring of 1994 to avoid Tutsi retaliation. At least sixty thousand of these, most of them perpetrators of the Rwandan mayhem, were to die from thirst, dysentery, cholera, hunger, and exhaustion before international aid arrived.

By the end of 1994, Rwanda's morbid tale seemed over, but it was not. The Hutus in their refugee camps in Zaire continued their anti-Tutsi campaign, partly by operating para-military operations into Rwanda and Burundi, partly by proseletizing their anti-Tutsi venom among ethnic groups of eastern Zaire.⁸ Those Zaireans, already resentful of the local Tutsis—called *Banyamulenge* by the locals—began a campaign in early September to oust the Tutsis from Zaire. The Tutsis fought back successfully, and the Rwandan government took advantage of the situation to clear out the Hutu refugee camps that had been causing them such trouble. With the defeat of the Hutu militias in mid-November, half of the roughly one million refugees were repatriated within Rwanda and Burundi. But with eastern Zaire in revolt, Zaire and Rwanda still stood on the verge of open warfare. The juggernaut of horror set in motion by Hutu intellectuals at Butare had thus produced its antidote: an unforgiving Tutsi force determined to settle scores with the 1994 Hutu extremists and their sympathizers in Zaire.

⁷While in the Ugandan Army in 1990, Kagame trained at Fort Leavenworth for four months.

⁸The UNSC's unpublished Third Report of the International Commission of International Inquiry (Rwanda) shows that illegal arms purchased through Zaire and Kenya—sometimes with excess food aid rations—by the exiled Hutu leaders had been traced to the refugee camps in Goma and Bukavu.

Kenya: A Horror to Come?

THE CURRENT Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government of Prime Minister Paul Kagame has provided human rights groups with the names of some 463 surviving ringleaders of the 1994 genocide. This list was intended to hasten their arraignment before the Rwanda court of the UN War Crimes Tribunal, whose cash-strapped African operations are based at Arusha, Tanzania.

As it has turned out, many of these 463 have been traced to Kenya, where publications such as *Kangura*, which had been prominent in inciting initial Hutu hatred of the Tutsis, continue to operate with impunity.⁹ In October 1995, Kenya's president, Daniel arap Moi, threatened to arrest the international tribunal members who were intent on pursuing these well-heeled Hutu exiles into his country. At the University of Nairobi's Chiromo campus, Charles Nyandwi—number 35 on the Rwandan government's list of war criminals—was appointed in 1995 to teach applied mathematics. His erstwhile colleague Charles Nzabarageza—number 52—a self-described “intellectual”, operates on behalf of the Hutu cause from Heron Court Hotel, not far from downtown Nairobi.

Professor Nyandwi and his colleagues are in good company. The Kenyan government has been repeatedly accused by Amnesty International of the systematic torture of its political opponents.¹⁰ Amnesty also cites local doctors for complicity in the fabrication of medical records to disguise evidence of torture. Worse, as in Rwanda, Kenya in 1992-93 witnessed state-sponsored violence directed against ethnic Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya farmers who had migrated to the Rift Valley—President Moi's home province—and then voted for parties opposed to his Kanu Party, which is associated in the main with Moi's own Kalenjin tribe and its allies. The perpetrators of the violence—window-dressed as “Kalenjin

warriors”—attacked wearing uniform T-shirts and shorts. With faces concealed, they conducted Klan-style night rallies and vowed to cleanse the Rift Valley of the baleful “Kukes.” Use of guns, bows and arrows, and nighttime firebombing of homesteads, Christian churches, and Kikuyu businesses were standard procedures. Firebombs by the phantom militia were planted in those newspaper and human rights offices in Nairobi that dared to publicize the ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley.¹¹ Some fifteen hundred people—mainly Kikuyus—perished in these pogroms, while about three hundred thousand others became, and remain, internal refugees.

On the official propaganda front in Kenya, the ethnic bogeymen have been the Kikuyus, the largest of more than three dozen black ethnic communities (although they represent only 23 percent of the country's twenty-six million population). The Kikuyus have distinguished themselves in commerce, farming, and education, an achievement that has given rise to a protracted campaign in which the ideology squad of the Moi regime has accused them of waging a “conspiracy to dominate” the country. “Evidence” of Kikuyu “crimes” fit the classic mode of politicized bigotry: their numerical dominance in business, local banks, commercial farming; migration and settlement outside their homeland; a lead in acquiring “alien skills” (read: Western education); and disproportionate representation in the professions.

⁹The October 1995 issue of *Kangura* denied there was a genocide in 1994 and claimed the Hutus had been massacred by the Kagame government. Said its editor, Hassan Ngeze, to the press in Nairobi: “Show me what I wrote that was not good.”

¹⁰*Kenya: Torture, Compounded by the Denial of Medical Care* (London: Amnesty International, 1995), and *Women in Kenya: Repression and Resistance* (London: Amnesty International, 1995).

¹¹*Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993).

THE KIKUYU are also guilty of hoping for better government. But their high-profile demands for multi-party rule, the rule of law, a free press, and public appointments based on merit have been interpreted by Moi's intellectual supporters as a bid to "grab" power. The regime has been busy in recent years formalizing such interpretations into an ideology. Democratic and meritocratic values are depicted as impersonal and "foreign", polluting allegedly pristine African communal relations, social "cohesiveness", and the "sharing of our wealth" through ethnic quotas. In alliance with intellectuals on the government's gravy train, ruling party apparatchiks denounce individual enterprise as a combined Kikuyu and foreign ruse to accumulate the wealth of others. Responding to the German ambassador's 1994 recommendation to close the "moral deficit" with more accountable governance in Kenya, President Moi said, "Moral standards in Africa and Kenya particularly were much higher than in Europe . . . where moral decadence had set in . . . [due to] . . . perversion and other unnatural acts. . . . Any degree of immorality that had crept into Africa was due to the decadent influence of the West."¹² Left unsaid, but clear to all Kenyans, was the implication that the Kikuyus constituted the agent of the foreign menace. Addressing his Kanu parliamentary group caucus on September 30, 1996, Moi was reported as saying that, should he depart from the political scene, "this country will be just like Rwanda."¹³

Does all of this mean that a genocidal attack on the Kikuyus is a possibility? It does. Indeed, as far back as 1991, the intellectual directorate of the Moi regime—boasting the full spectrum of Ivy League and Oxbridge alumni—started down a path that could very well lead to such an attack.¹⁴ Since then, anti-Kikuyu propaganda has risen steadily in the government-run electronic media, and in the pages of the ruling party newspaper *Kenya Times* and the supposedly independent *Weekly Review*. The former minister of information

and broadcasting (that is, propaganda), one Burudi Nabwera, told his constituents that the new Kikuyu-led opposition Democratic Party was "the Kikuyu devil (*shetani*) . . . which you should not allow into your house."¹⁵ The official policy of "willing buyer, willing seller" in the land market, under which many Kikuyus had purchased farms in the Rift Valley, has been portrayed in a landmark publication by law professor (and Berkeley J.D.) Arthur Eshiwani as part of a gigantic ethnic plot, secretly hatched in the 1960s, to steal land—a plot that allegedly stretches into education, the banks, commerce, and public service.¹⁶ In a blitz of hate articles pursuing the same theme in the ruling party newspaper, history professors Henry Mwanzi and Eric Aseka Masinde railed against Kikuyu "greed", "grabbing" of land, and "love of money." With Mwanzi seated on his side, the fiery local government minister William Ntimama pontificated to the press in 1993 on the theft of Rift Valley lands by the Kikuyus. Earlier he had warned the Kikuyus "to lie low like envelopes" or else be "cut down to size like the Ibos of Nigeria", the widely dispersed entrepreneurial group of that country that suffered massacres in 1966. In August 1995 the ruling Kanu Party accorded Professor Mwanzi the fitting title of director of research and propaganda.

As in Rwanda, the Jim Crow American South, Nazi Germany, and apartheid South Africa, Kenya's pro-government intellectuals and their acolytes share the crowning phobia of extreme rightists: miscegenation, which is habitually associated with moral laxity and sexual promiscuity. Pursuing the Kikuyu devil into the bedrooms, in mid-1993 history pro-

¹²*Nation* (Nairobi), March 7, 1994.

¹³*The People* (Nairobi), October 4-10, 1996.

¹⁴Yale J.D. holders—professors Onesmus K. Mutungi and Hastings W. Okoth-Ogendo—sit on the showcase Human Rights Committee, which claims it is waiting for evidence of human rights violations from the public.

¹⁵*Nation* (Nairobi), August 10, 1992.

¹⁶*Nation* (Nairobi), November 8, 1991.

fessor William Ochieng—an associate of Mwanzi and Aseka—wrote in the widely read *Sunday Nation* that the racial complexion of the Kikuyus had been wholly adulterated as a result of interbreeding with immigrant groups. He cited no evidence or sources. And as befits this era of gender sensitivity, Professor Ochieng and then-*Kenya Times* editor Philip Ochieng repeatedly gave Kikuyu women backhanded compliments for the reportedly high incidence of prostitution among them—which they attribute to Western values and capitalism. Kenyan “eating and sexual habits have greatly been influenced by the Kikuyu”, William Ochieng claimed, but without specifying how.¹⁷

By the time the December 1992 multi-party elections were held—the first since 1966—sections of Kenyan academia had become dedicated to the rationalization of dictatorship as an African “fourth branch” of government, the defense of human rights violations, and the fabrication of “documents” proving the dangers of political pluralism. A supposed 1991 petition by one hundred local scholars opposing multi-party elections—published in the *Weekly Review*—was the handiwork of the then-vice chancellor of the University of Nairobi, Philip Mbithi (Cornell Ph.D., class of 1971), “and one or two other leading dons.”¹⁸ Even as the Rift Valley militia went into action, the pro-government professoriate was organizing lobbies to root for its political patrons: Professor Chris Wanjala’s “Operation Toroitich to Year 2000” (Toroitich being Moi’s middle name) was one example. By the time the 1992-93 massacres were fully revealed internationally, William Ochieng and Mwanzi were writing—mimicking the quintessential response of the anti-Semite—that the Kikuyus had brought it on themselves by their clannish behavior, and by moving into and prospering on other peoples’ lands at local expense. In a *Kenya Times* column William Ochieng asked the Kikuyus to quit whining about being treated “like the Ibos or Jews of Kenya.”

One-Size-Fits-All Stereotypes

RWANDA AND KENYA are not isolated examples. Similar words to those just quoted from the *Kenya Times* were used against the Kasai-Luba, another entrepreneurially-minded group, as it suffered pogroms and expulsions in Zaire’s Shaba province in 1991-92. As in Kenya, prospects for genocide are real in Zaire, as they are in Nigeria and elsewhere. And yet, while neo-fascist ethnic extremism is widespread in Africa today, it is also true that Africans in ever greater numbers favor ethnic and racial tolerance, the rule of law, the sanctity of individual rights, and a role for free markets in reviving their derelict economies. The world saw a striking manifestation of this in April 1994 as voters waited patiently in lines that stretched for miles to cast their first ballot in a democratic South Africa. This scene has been repeated in Mozambique, Malawi, Sierra Leone—virtually everywhere that a peaceful transition to democracy has been offered.

But most fine distinctions about Africa tend to be obscured by the one-size-fits-all stereotypes of “African states” and “Africans” common both to the Western media and the pan-African rhetoric of African politicians themselves. Other distinctions fall victim to academic chicanery. At one extreme, committed Africa-bashers present all black intellectuals as incompetent—willful and irresponsible partisans in the self-destructive chaos sweeping the continent. At the other extreme, represented by uncritical Western admirers of mythical Africa and the self-styled “Afrocentrist” school, African elites appear as innocent victims of colonialism and Western racism, a group not sinning but sinned against—a position that is unsustainable given the “achievements” of Rwanda’s university-bred propagandists.

This specious dichotomy fosters double standards—particularly those applied in judg-

¹⁷*Kenya Times* (Nairobi), September 27, 1993.

¹⁸*Sunday Nation* (Nairobi), March 10, 1996.

ing African development and academic programs—that obscure real dangers lurking in many African countries. For the sake of avoiding yet more bloody catastrophes, African intellectuals must be held to objective professional standards of performance and responsibility in the generation and dissemination of political ideas; the condescending attitude toward African institutions and peoples represented by the phrase “good by African standards” must go. As the Rwandan genocide tragically demonstrated, tolerating such activities within universities can conceal and abet new African disasters waiting to happen. For years Rwandan extremists received Western aid even as they spoke of decimating “cockroaches” in the same vein that Holocaust deniers in the West have written of “lice” elimination in Dachau.

From Auschwitz to Rwanda, Bosnia to Kenya’s Rift Valley, the pattern of made-to-order bigotry is depressingly familiar. Only the reluctance to include Africa in the discussion—a kind of reverse racism—is different. In June 1996, the proto-fascist brigades under Vladimir Zhirinovsky used the term “hyenas” to describe Russia’s new “Westernized” capitalists; it is exactly the same word (translated locally as *nyang’au*) used by the ruling circles in Kenya to describe the Kikuyus. But whereas in Moscow Western diplomats and reporters single out Zhirinovsky for criticism, diplomats in Nairobi characterize the Kenyan regime’s rhetoric as just another example of African “tribalism.” But “tribalism” is clearly a misnomer when applied to the electronic-age strategies of the Rwandan, Kenyan, and Nigerian professoriate and the pro-government pressmen who hold their own on the internet against their best Western counterparts. Hate-mongering in Africa is an

acquired skill; it does not come with the territory any more than it does elsewhere.

The fraternity of Western governments and multilateral development agencies charged with aiding African economic and institutional recovery must take this truth to heart. Yet in Warren Christopher’s high-profile October 1996 visit to Africa to drum up support for local peacekeeping, not a word about the intellectual origins of ethnic conflict was mentioned. So far, the West’s stock-in-trade policies for responding to the dismal conditions facing African universities and intelligentsia have been neutral sounding notions of “capacity building”, “cost sharing”, and “structural adjustment of the educational sector”—whatever all this means.

The weakness of the Western approach lies in its inclination to submerge all ethical criteria, particularly the need for a demonstrated sense of vocation on the part of African clients, under a deluge of technical computations. But if money, institutional capacity, Ph.D. faculty, and libraries were what truly counted, then Butare, with its fine buildings and flowerbeds, would have been a world-class campus in 1994 instead of another Rwandan killing field—and the universities in Nairobi, Kinshasa, Lagos, and Yaounde would not still be the derelict, faculty-short institutions external donors know them to be, tens of millions of Western aid dollars later.

In the end, of course, it is up to Africans themselves to put their own house in order by raising the alarm against the scourge of hate speech and arbitrary rule directed against their most vulnerable. But non-Africans should at least avoid making bad situations worse by providing excuses and explanations for the behavior of murderous African intellectuals. □

Dayton, Bosnia, and the Limits of Law

Alfred P. Rubin

IN AN ATTEMPT to create an American-style, multi-ethnic democracy in the Bosnia-Herzegovinian rump of the formerly multi-ethnic dictatorship of Yugoslavia, American negotiators brokered a complex series of formal undertakings known collectively as the Dayton Accord. This Accord was initialed by representatives of the Muslim-dominated Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose authority is rejected by its Serbian minority; by the Serb-dominated Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which denies that it is involved in the Serb resistance to the nominal government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but which was authorized by the leaders of that resistance to speak for them; by the Republic of Croatia; by a representative of the European Union; by the United States; and—apparently redundantly since they are members of the European Union—by France and the United Kingdom as well. This great abundance of initialing occurred on November 20, 1995, at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, and was later rendered legally binding by a formal signing in Paris on December 14 of that year.

As written, the Accord presumes that a legal authority resides in the United Nations Security Council to act in cases of internal conflict. It assumes further that enforcement of the international laws of war by the community of

nations is consistent with the current international legal order of separate states. Both bases for supposing the Dayton Accord to be legally binding are dubious.

Under the United Nations Charter, itself a binding treaty, the Security Council can require action from the members of the United Nations in accordance with judgments rendered by the International Court of Justice (Article 94.2), as well as in reaction to a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (Article 39). But the war crimes tribunal at The Hague is not the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Aside from a preliminary judgment in July 1996 accepting jurisdiction in a case against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to be argued in substance until 1997, the ICJ has uttered no judgment whose implementation in the Balkan area is in question. Moreover, unless the Security Council itself makes a determination relevant to international peace and security, no organ of the United Nations is authorized by the Charter to “intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (Article 2.7).

Suppose the military struggle within the Bosnian “state” were legally a “civil war”, as indeed seems to be the case. To assert that a civil war is by its nature a threat to international peace and security—however distasteful its rationales might seem to those standing outside the struggle, and however much governed it may (or may not) be by the laws of war observed internationally—is to try to make

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revolution illegal. If all states were well-governed today, or if stability were the overriding aim of international politics, such a proposition might be desirable. But as things are, that seems ill-based. Certainly, the Bosnian armed struggle itself cannot be called “international” by those who argue that a Bosnia-Herzegovina that incorporates its former Serb population with its designated territory preserves a historical unity. Nor, except in an inconsistent attempt to gain legal control over it, have the parties to the Dayton Accord accepted the international personality of the “Republika Srpska”, the Serb organization fighting for independence in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and that organization is not represented in the United Nations, except by the very government against which it is rebelling. The government of the Serb-dominated Federal Republic of Yugoslavia denied that it represents the Bosnian Serbs in the United Nations, and says that it does not want to expand at the further expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Nonetheless, the Security Council acted. It determined that the conflict in Bosnia was a threat to “international” peace and security.

If the Security Council, by its own vote, can categorize events in such ways as to avoid limits on its own authority placed there by those submitting to that authority, a radical change in the structure of the United Nations will have been achieved. It is a change that few members of the United Nations would agree to, other than the five great powers that have the protection provided by vetoes in the Security Council. If the Security Council were to use the case of former Yugoslavia as a precedent, defections from the United Nations might well result, threatening collapse of the organization as a whole. The alternative—regarding the case of the former Yugoslavia as unique—undermines the universality of the rule of law and the notion of the sovereign equality of states on which the organization is based (UN Charter, Articles 1.1 and 2.1). It is very difficult to understand how the authority of the Security Council to determine that a

civil war constitutes a threat to international peace can be supported by people interested in the rule of law.

The War Crimes Issue

MEANWHILE, the Security Council authorized a complex new organization centered in The Hague whose function is to bring “war criminals” of the military struggle in Bosnia-Herzegovina to “justice” (Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993). Why it did so is unclear. There is no evidence that holding “war crimes” trials will limit existing threats to international peace and security; making “war” less atrocious (even if that were possible) is not likely to limit the causes of or impetus to “war”—if anything, the opposite would more likely be the case. Instead, the creation of a war crimes tribunal seems to have been aimed at making lawyers the “guardians” of a violent society, in which war is all right as long as it is played by rules to which the concerned lawyers can agree.

Since lawyers are not elected and represent only their clients, and since the selection of judges is subject to the same political pitfalls that line the route to all elected legislative and political positions, it is hard to understand why setting up the tribunal would be a step toward a future less threatened by violence. Indeed, it seems obvious that the politically chosen members of the Security Council regarded their action in authorizing The Hague tribunal for Bosnia as a strictly political act. They made sure that only atrocities by participants in the actual struggle in the former Yugoslavia would be within the tribunal’s purview; their own activities, even as armed “peacekeepers” there, are not. It is likely to the point of certainty that the political leadership of none of the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—would submit its own political-military decisions, including possible atrocities committed by members of its armed forces, to the judgment of outsiders. Would Russia agree to allow a “neutral” tribunal to

judge the conformity to an asserted international law of the acts of individual Russians relating to Chechnya? Chinese to Tibet? United Kingdom officials to Northern Ireland? U.S. officials to the Branch Davidian compound in Texas?

Does the international legal order then leave us helpless to ameliorate the evils wrought by the participants in a civil war? The answer is clearly no. But the ameliorations cannot be wrought by third party intervention, even if they are called "community" action.

In using the Security Council to erect a war crimes tribunal at The Hague, the U.S. government not only agreed that the authority of the Security Council extended to "war crimes" committed in a civil war, but also that "war crimes" were direct violations of "international law", and could be tried by an international tribunal set up by international authority. The parties to the Dayton Accord agreed "to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law" not only in the traditional ways that law is applied, but as "otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council" (General Framework Agreement, Article IX). As noted above, the Bosnian Serbs, now calling themselves the Republika Srpska, are not parties to the Framework Agreement; their supposed commitment to it is derived from a separate agreement dated August 29, 1995, under which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was reportedly authorized to sign on behalf of the Republika Srpska those parts of the peace plan concerning the Bosnian Serbs. Since the Republika Srpska is not considered an international person by any of the parties to the Framework Agreement, it is not at all clear why anybody regards that Republika as legally bound by anything concluded internationally, or why an internal document of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, if that is what the "agreement" is, is regarded as governed by international law. What the U.S. negotiators wanted is clear; whether the law would permit them to achieve it in this way is more than doubtful.

But things get worse. In annexes to the Framework Agreement, too, cooperation with the Security Council's efforts was promised, "including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (Annex I, Article X): "All competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina" must "cooperate and provide unrestricted access to . . . the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; and any other organization authorized by the UN Security Council with a mandate concerning human rights or humanitarian law" (Annex 6, Article XIII.4).

Presumably, the annexes' expression "Bosnia and Herzegovina" was intended as a geographical expression, not a political one, so the undertaking should be binding on whoever (other than United Nations forces) controls the territory. The parties to the annexes quoted are the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Muslim-Croat part of the Republic), and the Republika Srpska (the Serbian organization regarded by the framers of the Dayton Accord as part of Bosnia-Herzegovina). Of those, only the first is a party to the Framework Agreement. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the existing Serbian state) is an "endorser", a term left undefined in the published documents.

The agreement as a whole was apparently intended to bring the political leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the authority of the tribunal at The Hague, thus establishing a "community" authority on war crimes superior to a nation's traditional authority to define and administer criminal law under its own constitution. But it is legally unclear that the parties to the Framework Agreement, who have no rights or obligations under the annexes, can claim any special role in their implementation. Moreover, the failure of a party to an annex to fulfill its apparent commitment is not a "crime" under international law; it is only a possible "breach of contract." As in our own domestic law, the remedy for a breach of contract lies with the party injured by the breach; that party can bring suit. It does not, and cannot, lie with

a non-party who would like to supervise the performance of a contract to which it is itself not bound.

The attempt to use the forms of law to bring peace to the Balkans has apparently seized the imagination of experienced and superbly competent statesmen like Cedric Thornberry, a British lawyer, former assistant secretary-general of the United Nations, and deputy head of mission of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia during 1992-94. In his recent *Foreign Policy* article "Saving the War Crimes Tribunal", Thornberry notes some of the weaknesses of the process, such as targeting some Bosnian Serb leaders—but not the equivalent Croat and Muslim leaders whose followers have committed atrocities. He argues nonetheless that the process itself is sound. But it is doubtful that the process is sound, and he seems unaware that the legal order provides more effective alternatives.

A Failed Precedent

THERE IS A frequently cited precedent for using a legal tribunal and the notion of war crimes to bring "justice" to a legal order that seems incapable of enforcing the rules outsiders regard as vital: Nuremberg. But the precedent fails because the two situations are not analogous.

Nuremberg was a victors' tribunal; there were no "neutrals" involved in the prosecution or on the judges' bench. The Hague tribunal is supposed to be "neutral."

Nuremberg was in the middle of Germany and its greatest success was in exposing to the German people themselves the atrocities that had been done in their name by their government; it was part of a course of education that has had an enormous impact on German society. Contrarily, the Hague tribunal is about 750 miles from the scene of the atrocities and is widely viewed in the former Yugoslavia as a game being played by outsiders lacking a firm grip on local reality.

At Nuremberg, the Nazi archives were open to the defense as well as to the prosecution, and the need for Allied secrecy barely

inhibited the ability of the defense to present evidence; indeed, some acquittals were based on that evidence. At The Hague, the documents and testimony needed for an effective defense are hard to expose and bring to the tribunal; there is no reason to expect the Bosnian Serbs to publish their internal records, and no reason to think that the Serbian Serbs would want those records, or their own Cabinet minutes that might reflect those records, exposed. Nor is there any reason to expect the Bosnian Muslims or Croats to volunteer their own records, which might exculpate some low-level defendants by incriminating higher-level officials.

It is also frequently forgotten that a series of trials equivalent to Nuremberg was held in Tokyo, resulting in a major dissent (by the Indian judge), partial dissents (by the Dutch and French judges), and a separate opinion (by the Philippine judge). For fifty years now, the Nuremberg "precedent" has not been followed. Before the precedent is revived, it would be wise for those arguing for it to check the reasons why it was not deemed persuasive to some at Tokyo, or to many people for fifty years afterwards. The weakness of the Nuremberg precedent was certainly seen by the defendants at The Hague, even if not perceived by the prosecution.

The defendants' first line of defense was an attack directly on the authority of the Security Council to establish the tribunal, which was predictably rejected by the judges of the tribunal itself, who based their opinion on the presumed authority of the Security Council. It is hard to imagine anybody being surprised by the judges' attitude.

On a deeper level, one may question the assumption that the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia are violations of "international law", which by treaty and custom requires belligerents to forbid and punish defined military atrocities, but does not directly apply to individuals or authorize third-party tribunals to pass judgment on them unless submission to such tribunals is agreed by the belligerents themselves. The point is that international law is not directly enforced by criminal process, but international law can be said to

require national criminal law to forbid and punish some particularly atrocious acts by individuals acting for a political purpose as part of an organized military force.

The international laws of war derive from state practice and from treaties. Until now those laws have been enforced only by tainted victors' tribunals and national or factional tribunals conducted by the belligerents themselves. The U.S. trial of Lieutenant William Calley over the My Lai massacre also treated some violations of internationally agreed rules as crimes under American military law. His immediate superior in the Army, Captain Ernest L. Medina, was acquitted. No third party tribunal was considered competent to hear any aspect of either case. The "international community" might be disgusted by the facts in the former Yugoslavia (or might not—most members have atrocities in their own recent history that they prefer be ignored). But disgust is not a basis for "jurisdiction to enforce" or "jurisdiction to adjudicate" in criminal matters in any country or in the international community.

"Jurisdiction to enforce" is a legal concept that requires that arrests be made within the territory or ship or aircraft or other similar place that can be assimilated to the territory of the arresting state. That is why, when U.S. agents "arrested" Fawaz Yunis, a Middle Eastern "terrorist", on board a Cypriot vessel, the agents first dragged him off the vessel, performed the formal "arrest" in an American ship, and then claimed that he had been apprehended on the high seas, as if clinging to a driftwood raft.

"Jurisdiction to adjudicate" means that there must be some national interest in the trial to support a state's application of its own criminal process to the facts: either the nationality of a victim, the location of the offense, the nationality of the accused, a substantial impact within the territory of the state purporting to run the trial, or some similar link. It was by this principle that the United States strongly protested West Germany's refusal to extradite Mohammed Ali Hamadei to the United States in 1987 to face trial for the 1985 murder of an American in a hijacked, American-registered

aircraft on the ground in Beirut. Although Germany asserted that his offense was "universal" and a trial there would be legally proper, no particular German interest had been involved in Hamadei's offenses.

The analogy between war atrocities and "universal offenses" such as "piracy" or the slave trade does not relate to jurisdiction to enforce or to adjudicate, but only to the applicability of national criminal legislation: the reach of so-called "jurisdiction to prescribe." And, even there, the extension of a national jurisdiction to make criminal the acts of some foreigners outside the territory of the prescribing state has been much exaggerated by scholars unfamiliar with the actual cases and equally unaware of the dismal record of failed attempts to codify the supposed international criminal law relating to "piracy" or the international slave trade.

The tribunal at The Hague seems to translate the laws of war into a universal criminal law system. The reasons why this is unprecedented have nothing to do with lack of desire on the part of the powerful to impose their views of law on others. The reasons are related to the structure of international society, namely to the refusal of any state to submit its own troubles to the judgment of outsiders who refuse to apply the same processes to themselves.

A Better Way: Four Suggestions

SO WHAT SHOULD be done by civilized humanity when it is faced by atrocities perpetrated in a foreign civil war?

There are at least four alternatives. The *first* is to bring our notion of the existing international legal order closer to the realities of the existing international system. If, for any reason, international tribunals are not acceptable or not feasible, then policy can still be influenced by exposure. Exposure, through "truth commissions", if properly constituted and publicized, can provoke outrage. Outrage can trigger moral suasion and economic sanctions of the sort that reformed Germany and changed the constitution of South Africa. The Dayton Accord can be better attuned to reality by dropping its insis-

tence on punishing war crimes under a hypothesized but non-existent international criminal law, and reconstituting it to be persuasive in the international moral order. The impact of this approach on the accused "war criminals" is not to submit them to a misconceived "criminal" process, but to confine them to territory controlled by their constituents; the "Kurt Waldheim" solution—by which the former secretary-general of the United Nations and president of Austria, a possible but not proven war criminal, is effectively confined to the territory of Austria—works not because he is threatened with arrest and prosecution, but because nobody he respects will grant him a visa.

Second, erect a criminal law tribunal that can be supported by the belligerents and can supply the safeguards necessary to assure the "human rights" of the accused, including their right of access to whatever evidence is necessary to mount a rational defense. That can be done within the existing legal order, although not by the Security Council of the United Nations. To establish such a tribunal, the cooperation of the Bosnian Serbs would be necessary. Rather than including only the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs and the lower-level villains of Croatia and the Bosnian Muslims, the cooperation of all should be sought so as to make possible the indictment of the equivalent leaders of the Serbian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims, and the Croatians. It might be very distasteful to deal with people whom our negotiators regard as villains, but a consistent effort stands a better chance of ameliorating the miseries of the former Yugoslavia than the current hypocritical attempt to criminalize the acts of some but not all of them.

Third, reinstitute the traditional legal remedies for atrocities in war: hand over accused "war criminals" to one or another of the parties concerned in the struggle, those whose legal orders clearly have "jurisdiction to adjudicate." Each side should, in its own moral and legal interest, punish its own villains. Each side has an interest in observing human rights safeguards when trying accused villains of an opposing faction. Provision can be made in accordance with the 1949 Geneva

Conventions to "hand over" an accused villain to one of the belligerent powers and to assure that human rights safeguards, "protecting power" observers, Red Cross visitations, and other humanitarian institutions are put and kept in place.

Fourth, do nothing. It is just possible that some of the parties necessary to effect any real settlement in the former Yugoslavia are not yet ready for peace. If that is so, then any "peace" that we impose can be no more than a facade. In the meantime, humanitarian aid can continue to be rendered to the victims of the conflict and other pressures maintained to encourage a stable settlement.

The insistence on using the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia as a reason for establishing an international court seems to rest on the assumption that peace is impossible without justice. But "justice" is itself not assured by any human tribunal. It might be useful to remember that Plato wrote in Book I of *The Republic* that good people would not want to be "guardians", that they would rather have to be compelled to perform such a role (although by whom and how are not made clear). Those who believe that a legal tribunal is useful to assure justice, and that justice is a prerequisite to peace, would do well to ponder the alternatives and whether all those who speak publicly of the need for such one-sided "justice" really have in mind justice as seen by outsiders. The tribunal's role seems much more closely related to a struggle for authority over parts of the former Yugoslavia, or, indeed, control by Great Power or UN officials or lawyers over international affairs, in disregard of the imperatives and risks of representative democracy.

In sum, whatever one thinks of it in other respects, the Dayton Accord's emphasis on Security Council authority and an international tribunal to enforce a misunderstood version of the laws of war should not be supported. The tribunal in The Hague should be disbanded. It is time to move on to things that might really help develop peace and a sense of responsible order in the former Yugoslavia. □

Volkogonov's Journey

Neil McInnes

THE “park of fallen heroes” is the ironical name Muscovites have given to the patch of waste land across Krymsky Val from Gorky Park, where the statues of Soviet leaders are dumped. Here lies a Stalin in polished red granite that once stood twelve feet high; but it was broken while being taken down, and the big red boots lie yards away in the long grass. Unable to stand, Stalin rests on his side on a makeshift bed of concrete blocks. The tyrant has his right hand stuck between two buttons of his great coat in the familiar Napoleonic pose; his nose has been smashed off.

Towering intact over him is the gigantic metal statue of Felix Dzerzinsky, banished hither from the square that once bore his name and where he used to contemplate the house of his creation, the Cheka (later the KGB). Now “Iron Felix” contemplates a massive marble torso of Brezhnev, stranded in the grass and looking very dead, just the way he did when he was propped up to make his last official speeches. Nearby lie this year’s novelties in the park, two discarded white busts of Lenin.

Compared to what I saw here last year, the place has been spruced up to look more like a garden and less like a tip, and an effort has been made to alleviate the crude political symbolism. There are busts of nineteenth-

century worthies that no one remembers anymore, and some egregious examples of socialist realism in sculpture, mainly workers with hammers. Mysteriously, someone has dumped here a bust of William Shakespeare. The creator of Richard III and Macbeth looks to be quite at home among these assassins and buffoons.

If those two marble Lenins are a sign of things to come, even these spacious grounds between the New Tretyakov and the President Hotel will not suffice, for there could be many more to follow. Bolshevism suffered from what Georges Sorel diagnosed in the Third Republic as *statuemanie*, the compulsive reproduction in stone, marble, and bronze of its heroes. Lenin’s latest biographer has discovered an order he put out when his new government was still struggling to survive, requiring that all monuments to czarist figures be removed and replaced by statues of Bolshevik leaders. When that was not done as fast as he wished, Lenin put out another order demanding that those responsible for “this criminal inactivity” be identified. Russians had already learned that when Lenin muttered “criminal” someone was going to get shot, so the busts and statues soon began to multiply. “In a country convulsed by civil war it was judged ‘absolutely necessary’ to have busts sculpted of Lenin and Trotsky, Kalinin, Radek, Chicherin, Rakovsky, Litvinov, Ioffe, Krasin, et al. . . . These mass monuments were the shameful landmarks of idolatry.” Krupskaya, his widow, later protested at the plague of

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marble Lenins but to no avail; the bald head and wild eyes continued to sprout across the land and most of them are still in place today. Trotsky's abundant likenesses had disappeared by 1927 when he lost the power struggle to Stalin and in turn Stalin's, which numbered in the thousands, began to go soon after his death in 1953, and I doubt if any have survived outside his native Georgia.

How quickly the Lenins are dumped will depend in part on the reception being given to the work of the biographer just quoted, Dmitri Volkogonov, who died some months ago. A posthumous work entitled *Seven Leaders*, which is an account of Soviet leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev, appeared this year in Russian and will be out in English in early 1997. Volkogonov had already published a *Stalin* (1990), a *Trotsky* (1992), and a *Lenin* (1994).¹ Obviously, he believed that history can be told as biography. I wonder if he realized that his own biography would tell us as much about the Soviet Union as the lives of more famous men.

VOLKOGONOV WAS born in a godforsaken corner of Siberia in 1928, the son of an agronomist and a rural schoolteacher. His father was declared an enemy of the people during the great purges and shot; his mother died in exile. The sixteen-year-old orphan joined the Red Army toward the end of the war and became a brilliant servant of the regime that had destroyed his family. That happened more than once in the Soviet Union, and Volkogonov managed to make it sound like a good thing about the regime. In his so far unpublished memoirs (which his daughter, Olga Volkogonova, has kindly shown me), he says, "I do not look back [on the Soviet Union] with bitterness, for although I was the son of an 'enemy of the people', I became a general, a scientist, and a deputy." Trained at the prestigious Tank School and then at the Lenin Military Academy, he specialized in "philosophy", which meant the mumbo-jumbo of dialectical materialism. He stayed on at the Academy as a

professor of that subject, before transferring to the Political Administration of the Soviet army and navy, a somewhat sinister organization in which he rose to be number two. He now was a specialist in propaganda, disinformation, and counterintelligence. A book from that period, *The Russian Soldier*, glorified Soviet militarism.

Volkogonov had acquired a reputation as a hardline Stalinist, but somewhere along the way doubts began to gnaw at him. In notes for his memoirs he says his doubts began during foreign service in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and Angola. There he saw total poverty equipped with Soviet tanks and missiles, corrupt leaders armed to the teeth being generously fed by Moscow because they had adopted its system—and yet this was a system that in seventy years had failed to feed and clothe its own people. Why then was it so unremittingly hostile to others? Until 1984 he clung to the belief that the system could be reformed but then he began to agonize over the thought that everything that had happened since 1917 had been a fatal mistake.

A colleague of his from those days, Alexander Orlov, who is now a professor at the Institute of Military History, told me how one day Volkogonov came to him with the news that he had been offered a promotion that would entail working for a man who had been Beria's assistant. How could he accept, now that his doubts were entrenched and festering? Not unreasonably, Orlov replied that when you are working the system you must take your doubts to the top with you, because they can be more effective there. Volkogonov accepted the promotion. But the three-star colonel-general was secretly collecting material for his massive life of Stalin, which would tell as much of the truth as was then accessible from his favored vantage point. Volkogonova says her father's downfall came

¹All three were edited and translated into English by Harold Shukman and published by the Free Press in New York: *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy* (1991), *Lenin: A New Biography* (1994), and *Trotsky: The Eternal Revolutionary* (1996).

when he proposed that all political organs (that is, the Communist Party and its commissars) be removed from the Soviet armed forces. He was dismissed from the Political Administration and demoted to director of the Institute of Military History.

It was an ideal slot for a very unofficial historian of the Soviet regime. Not that Volkogonov gained access to all the archives immediately. From the *Stalin* that began to be serialized in a Moscow magazine in 1988 to the *Lenin* that appeared in 1994, one can see how his access gradually increased (as did his hostility to communism) while the Soviet state was crumbling. Even in the later books he sometimes had to apologize for failing to provide precise references because he had obtained the material illicitly. Still, his access was enough to arouse complaints from younger professional historians that this amateur old interloper with a questionable past ("His past was always being thrown at him", says Orlov) was hogging the archives. Actually, their real grievance was against American research teams, better organized and better financed, who were beating the Russians to publication—even though some of them were still tarred with the "Sovietology" brush. Access is now governed by law, and a declassification committee meets every fortnight to consider requests; I understand there are no long queues of researchers seeking material.

To digress a little further on this matter of access to Soviet sources: Publishers are currently running something of a stunt on the "secrets from the archives" theme. Edvard Radzinsky's *Stalin* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1996) shouts from its dustjacket, "The first in-depth biography based on explosive new documents from Russia's secret archives", when it is actually a playwright's somewhat fanciful restatement of familiar material. Yuri Buranov's *Lenin's Will: Falsified and Forbidden* (Prometheus, 1994) is hyped up as coming "from the secret archives of the former Soviet Union", whereas it contains little of political significance that was not revealed in Max Eastman's 1925 book *Since Lenin Died*—name-

ly, that Stalin managed, with the willing assistance of all the leading Bolsheviks except Trotsky, to limit the minor embarrassment caused by Lenin's tart but inconsequential comments on his lieutenants. For that matter, some of the notices of Volkogonov's books are too heavy on the "secrets from the archives" theme. His *Lenin*, for example, turns up new facts about the Jewish and German strains in Ulyanov's ancestry, and about the *ménage à trois* he ran with Krupskaya and Inessa Armand, but these are hardly significant politically.

The fact is that—to date at least, but don't hold your breath for the future—precious few secrets have emerged from the archives. Soviet society was always more porous than its leaders wished, certainly for us foreigners if not for Soviet citizens. Emigré mensheviks, expelled exiles (Trotsky was the most famous of many), relatives (Max Eastman was married to the sister of Krylenko, the Bolshevik minister for justice), defectors of every stripe, and even just plain honest visitors like Bertrand Russell and André Gide contributed to our knowledge from the 1920s and 1930s. Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin (the speed with which this "secret speech" became available illustrates my point) opened many taps, providing confirmation for us and samizdat for the Russians. The Soviet system was leaking furiously for the last thirty years of its existence. As Walter Laqueur said in *Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations* (Scribner's, 1990), by the time the regime collapsed, there were not a lot of important secrets left. (Knowing the main facts is of course compatible with being grossly mistaken and perfervidly prejudiced about the regime's legitimacy and solidity.)

WHAT MATTERS about books like Volkogonov's is not the "explosive new documents" of the blurb-writers but the fact that Russians are being told the truth about their lost twentieth century by the favored sons of the old regime. Just consider: Volkogonov, a Stalinist prodigy, a professor of dialectical materialism, a general who was active from Angola to Afghanistan, becomes

baptized into the Russian Orthodox faith in 1988 at age sixty and sets out to write huge rambling lives of the Soviet leaders, giving chapter and verse for the awful truth that for seventy years a sixth of the earth was ruled by irresponsible tyrants. (Harold Shukman, to whom we owe the excellent translations of Volkogonov's books, had to edit and shorten them by about one quarter, because they contained so many digressions and so much material "excessively familiar to a Western reader.") Coming from such a quarter, such books have had arresting political implications for Russians. Which brings me back to Volkogonov's career.

His serialized *Stalin* had made him a pariah among his military colleagues, but what led to his second dismissal, this time from the Institute of Military History, was his draft for a collective history of the Second World War. The outline of the first two of ten volumes was enough to enrage the party leadership as well as the army brass, for it proposed to tell the truth about the degeneration and the defeats of 1941. In his draft memoirs he recalls how the high-level committee set up to supervise the work (he calls them "the mastodons of bolshevism") met to pronounce anathema: how they swore at him, told him to get out of the army, screamed to stop him from talking, while he shouted above the din the questions they would not abide. Were the Germans not in Minsk on the sixth day? Were not six hundred thousand killed or captured in one early engagement? Did not three million men let themselves be taken prisoner? Volkogonov was thrown out, and was probably headed for more serious trouble. But this was 1991, and within six months his enemies were defeated and discredited when the USSR deliquesced. Having been expelled from parliament for criticizing Gorbachev and supporting Yeltsin, Volkogonov found himself on the winning side. He was a natural choice to be Yeltsin's military adviser, as well as chairman of the commission to handle the release of the Soviet archives, once again a plum job for the historian he had become. (He had taken a doctorate

in history at this late stage, as though to make an honest historian of himself.)

By then, however, cancer had him in its grip. He was in Oxford being operated upon when the regime fell (he was able to intervene by way of BBC interviews in his hospital room), and returned to his task like a man possessed. He would work eighteen hours a day, writing standing up to relieve the pain, working without research assistant or computer, scrawling out in longhand those great baggy books that denounced the lies Russians had so long believed—adding each time "including the present writer." When the transition to democracy was threatened in October 1993 he rose from his sickbed and went to the Kremlin, whence he spoke several times during the night of October 3-4, on the one television channel left operating, in support of Yeltsin; politicians here say he made a real contribution to the Russian way to freedom. He managed to finish *Seven Leaders* and to put together material for his memoirs before he died last December. Truly *une vie dans le siècle*, a life that exemplified an age, an illusion, a tragedy, and a rebirth.

Isaac Deutscher, who was a belated sufferer from *statuemanie* (as well as from a belief in socialism), thought that the Russia of his dreams would be realized the day each Russian town square had statues of both Stalin and Trotsky. We already have something better, a Russia without statues of either and where Lenin is tottering on his countless pedestals. Dmitri Volkogonov has a monument that will outlive them all: his massive biographies are right now going into new editions, making a third for *Stalin*.

NATURALLY Volkogonov's books have been subject to criticism, and not only from the fundamentalists (as unreconstructed communists are called around here). One line of attack is to deplore the reduction of history to biography because it entails overlooking social forces and bringing everything back to personalities. (Put that argument to a Russian intellectual today and he will smell the Sovietology under it instantly,

those grand theories and historical analyses that were deflated six years ago.²) Sovietology had political motives for insisting on theories rather than personalities. For instance, take the October “revolution” itself, the actual events in Petrograd in 1917. Volkogonov proves beyond doubt that Lenin indeed found power in the gutter, and was the only man, even among the Bolsheviks, with the guts to pick it up, thereby taking his clique to a leading, and soon an exclusive, role. Sovietology sought to deny this and argue that great social forces were in play as the Russian working class seized power. From that proposition it could be argued that the Soviet Union was a workers’ state, a historical power based on a populous class; and from that, in turn, one could derive all sorts of comforting propositions about its legitimacy and longevity. Lenin’s gamble or proletarian revolution?—that is not a question of historical method but of fact. Volkogonov showed that Trotsky was correct when he said, “No Lenin, no October.”

Of course that does not mean that a Great Man outwitted History or outweighed social forces. The success of Lenin’s insolent coup d’état required the greatest war in history until then, the collapse of an empire, the abdication of an ancient dynasty, plus the greatest soldiers’ mutiny and peasant uprising ever known. Martin Malia says of that constellation, “There are times when contingency itself is structure”, and October 1917 was such a time.³ It saw the victory of an illegitimate clique with a proletarian ideology, not the triumph of a proletariat realizing “the logic of Russia’s social history.” Nor does it mean that the consequences were of personal or individual interest only. Again Malia:

Nonetheless, this coup did in fact shake the world in an unprecedented and world-historical manner; for, although the empirical proletariat largely sat out Great October, the metaphysical proletariat was catapulted into power, and this political-ideological entity would prove to be far more revolutionary than all the real workers of the world united.

In other words, Lenin’s gamble led to an ideocracy, the omnipotence of a social illusion, rule based on lies and pretense.

Or take the case of Josef Stalin’s quite preternatural beastliness, which Volkogonov details in all its horror. Sovietology was always anxious to change the subject, to get away from mere personalia to the “great historical forces” at work in modernization *à la russe*, the cultural revolution of the Russian working class, the vast facts of urbanization and social mobility, the construction of a mighty economic and military power. As to the tyrannical brute who oversaw all this, Sovietology had two strings to its bow: it could deplore him as an aberration from the Leninist norm (that is, the system could still be redeemed, maybe already had been); or it could accept him as the price that was paid for stupendous successes. Now that neither of these arguments stands up anymore, some American Sovietologists have swung over to a personal, individualist account of Stalinism that even Volkogonov would find unhistorical. Moshe Lewin describes Stalinism as “personal despotism” and says, “It all stemmed in part from the traits of his psyche and his mind which could not accept reality. . . . It was generated by the psyche of a man whose vanity was insatiable (Volkogonov), coupled with a constant worry about his own security . . . a deeply psychological urge.”⁴ On the contrary (and despite Lewin’s parenthetical appeal to Volkogonov’s authority), Volkogonov maintains that Stalin operated the Leninist system in the only way possible, in the same way that Trotsky or Bukharin would have operated it had they won power instead.

²For Russian views of Western Sovietology see Walter Laqueur, *The Dream That Failed: Reflections on the Soviet Union* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

³Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia 1917-1991* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 106.

⁴Moshe Lewin, *Russia/USSR/Russia: The Drive and Drift of a Superstate* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 217-18.

For Russians who sit amid the ruins and see that those “stupendous successes” were built on sand or did not even exist, and could in any event be achieved by Third World countries in Asia at infinitely less cost—for them there is no need to change the subject when Volkogonov shows the moral degeneration that produced Stalin and which he in turn spread like a pandemic.

I RECENTLY PUT this argument about biography versus social history to Alexander Yakovlev in Moscow. Yakovlev is another who carried his doubts to the top (and on the way befriended Volkogonov). In his case it was right to the top: After a career in the Communist Party’s propaganda department he became its head, and then after ten years as ambassador to Canada (1973-83), he was secretary to the central committee and finally a member of the Politburo from 1987. Somewhere in there he lost the faith, and began meeting Volkogonov to share dissident thoughts. When Stalin had become indefensible, he says, the Party appealed to the authority of Lenin, so Yakovlev encouraged Volkogonov to gather the proof that Lenin was no savior of the people but “one of the greatest killers of the twentieth century.” Was this too personalized an approach to history? Yakovlev replied,

Volkogonov was right to lay the stress on documents and to leave historical analysis for later, to others. Russian leaders, even long before the revolution, always have claimed to be perfect, and Volkogonov set out to show the real face of the Bolsheviks. He was brilliant at character analysis and his books would have lost value if he tried to be theoretical. Anyhow, we are all tired of American Sovietology and its theories. At international congresses nowadays, American Sovietologists show up as dogmatic as we communists used to be. U.S. Sovietology is bankrupt.

Besides, Yakovlev claims, the people the fundamentalist communists hate most are not the new politicians, but the historians and

intellectuals who condemn the old regime with facts in hand, as Volkogonov and Yakovlev have done. He says that before this year’s presidential elections the Communists had prepared a list of people to be shot if their candidate won: “I was number two on that list and Boris Yeltsin was only number five.” I rather spoiled the effect of this story by asking who was number one; it was Gorbachev. Still it is something to have the Communists hate and fear you more than they do Yeltsin. Without impugning Yakovlev’s sources, I must note that more or less paranoid anecdotes about lists of people to be shot in the event of a Communist victory abound in Moscow. I heard of one list compiled by Communists so uneducated as to put Yeltsin first and not to mention any intellectuals.

Actually in his own books, Yakovlev goes beyond Volkogonov’s biographical approach, arguing that it is not enough to push guilt back from Stalin to Lenin, but that one must go back to Marxism itself, as so many Russian writers are doing now. He has written: “I see the point of the current scientific and moral criticism not in dumping responsibility on Marx for everything we have suffered. Such an approach to criticism would actually be a step along that same flawed spiral of enslavement by authoritarian consciousness.” Nevertheless, he adds,

Civilization and life itself rose up against Marxism. They rose up against its messianism, which promised miracles through simple solutions. They rose up against the willfulness and pride of Marxism, which arrogated to itself the right to determine the fates of classes, peoples, the destiny of civilization.⁵

Yakovlev, who is vice-chairman of that declassification commission I have mentioned, also heads the International Democracy Foundation here, which has ambitious plans to publish documents on Soviet history.

⁵Alexander Yakovlev, *The Fate of Marxism in Russia*, trans. Catherine Fitzpatrick (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 82, 99.

He notes that the communists' chief criticism of Volkogonov's biographies, when they rose above abuse and nit-picking, was that he had gathered, for example, in *Lenin*, all the bad things he could find against Ulyanov and ignored the material that showed him as a friend of the people.

Yakovlev says, "I reply that the good story about Lenin has been put out in billions of copies for seventy years. It was time for the other side." In reality it is not only communists who find that Volkogonov demonizes Lenin; Robert Service has said: "Volkogonov offers us an uncomplicatedly demonic figure: Lenin the megalomaniac, state terrorist and class warrior." Indeed there are moments when, as you close this bulky book, you have a vision of Lenin as a demented sadist yelping, "Shoot them! Shoot them!" But then, the documents prove that this was often the case.

Again and again Lenin's response to a political problem was: shoot more people. Consider his situation. His clique had stolen power, ousted its few allies, and was determined to rule alone. For a time Lenin thought it would take six months to install socialism in Russia. He had concocted a theory (one part Marxism, two parts People's Will voluntarism) that justified coercion to attain that goal and that dismissed compassion as the sentimentality of the "pathetic Philistine, slave to the prejudices of the bourgeoisie." Fanatically determined to attain an illusory, impossible, utopian goal without moral support from the people, murder became his method. His first actions in government were to found the Cheka (secret police), to tell his followers that "a good communist is a good Chekist" (that is, an informer), to open the first concentration camps, in 1918, and then—after Dora Kaplan took a shot at him—to unleash the Red Terror.

Volkogonov documented all this in his *Lenin* and it is hypocritical of the communists to pretend to be shocked, because they always knew that Leninism meant unbridled lawless force. In condemning Stalin's crimes (some of them anyhow), Khrushchev in 1956 did not

hide the fact that Lenin's methods had been the same, but claimed they were permissible because they were directed at "the real class enemy." And the ninety-six-year-old Molotov responded to stories of Lenin's brutality with a cynical shrug: "It cannot be said Lenin was soft. He didn't spend his time wiping children's snotty noses. Lenin should not be portrayed like that."⁶

Come to that, Volkogonov's *Lenin* did not exhaust the tally of Lenin's villainies and new examples are still surfacing. In his posthumous *Seven Leaders* we find an order previously omitted from biographies: "We must mobilize all the Cheka troops in the provinces and shoot all those who did not show up to work because of St. Nicholas Day."

Again, Anatoly Latyshev has published a letter Lenin wrote to Trotsky who was then commissar for war, dated October 22, 1919, which contains these lines:

If the offensive has already begun, can't we just mobilize another 20,000 workers from Petrograd plus 10,000 bourgeois, and march them against Yudenich at gun point? We can shoot a few hundred of them, and that will force the rest of them to attack Yudenich.

(Stalin used this method regularly in the war against the Nazis.) Another memo from Lenin, to Slyansky as deputy head of the Revolutionary War Council, in August 1920:

This is an excellent plan. Follow it through with Dzerzinsky. Disguised as anarchist partisans (we will blame them for this later) we'll go in 10-20 kilometers deep and hang rich peasants, priests, and landowners. There will be a prize of 100,000 rubles per head of every hanged man.

⁶Albert Resis, ed., *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), p. 270. Some 300,000 copies of this fascinating and appalling book were published in Moscow in 1991 in the last days of the USSR, apparently as a rallying cry for the neo-Stalinist conspirators.

This ruthlessness has been excused as the necessity of war and revolution, but Lenin was in the same frame of mind years before the civil war. In 1891 a famine developed in the Volga region and the twenty-year old Lenin opposed giving aid to the starving peasants because he argued that the famine was "progressive." Latyshev quotes A. Belyakov in *The Leader's Youth* applauding this "courageous" attitude and the reasoning behind it: "Famine ruined the peasant economy while at the same time destroying faith not only in the Czar but in God too, and with time undoubtedly will push the peasants

to the path of revolution." Therefore the way to deal with committees set up to help the starving was, said Lenin, "Knock them to the ground and strangle them."

How can you demonize a demon? Or what other word do we have for a man who thinks that those who help the starving should be strangled for getting in his way? Volkogonov's biographies of men who thought that way may not be the whole history of Soviet Russia, but they explain large parts of it. As he quotes Trotsky, "If personalities do not make history, then history makes itself by means of personalities." □

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Corridors of Silence

Roland Flamini

WHEN I WAS a correspondent in Rome in the early 1980s I regularly did the rounds of four centers of political power. First stop was usually the Christian Democrat Party headquarters in Piazza del Gesù, across the square from Giacomo della Porta's severe facade of the Jesuit church del Gesù, prototype of early Baroque churches all over Europe. Until 1992, the *Democrazia Cristiana*—or DC—had been the main party in Italy's fifty-six postwar governments, almost all of which were coalitions, and to a large extent Italy was run from the party's ancient *palazzo*. Dark blue Alfa Romeos drove in and out of its cobbled courtyard. A continuous procession of politicians, diplomats, supplicants, and hangers-on filed past the portico, which bristled with police.

A block away, in the quaintly named Via delle Botteghe Oscure, was the base of operations of the DC's major rivals, the *Partito Comunista Italiano*, the powerful PCI. The solid, granite structure, built after the war with Soviet money, housed the party that for over twenty years, from the 1950s to the 1970s, gained the largest number of votes, but was consistently kept out of office by a succession of political alliances cobbled up by the Christian Democrats with a varying collection of bedfellows. The exclusion of the PCI from

the government at all costs was the central fact of Italian postwar political life, imposing limits on the country's democratic system; but the vigorous comings and goings at its headquarters reflected the party's undeniable influence.

The entrance to the Italian Socialist Party's headquarters was through a *galleria* of fashionable stores. In the main hall there used to be large pictures of the Socialist leader Bettino Craxi. When Craxi was prime minister of Italy at one stage of the eternal political choreography, banners with the Italian Socialist emblem of a red carnation fluttered from the balcony, and the waiting blue Alfas blocked the busy street.

The fourth power center, of course, was the one inside the stone embrace of Bernini's circular colonnade in St. Peter's Square. With an Italian pope on the Throne of Peter, Vatican backing of the Christian Democrats was automatic. Italian bishops issued regular directives to the faithful on how to vote before every election, and threats to excommunicate those who supported the Communists were frequent. The late William Colby once told me that when he was CIA station chief in Rome he worked as closely with the Pope's substitute secretary of state, Monsignor Giovanni Battista Montini (later Pope Paul VI), as with any political leader.

I went back to Rome in September. The pace was slowly picking up after the long summer vacation. Clouds of scooters raced like gnats through the streets. Wall posters advertised the Rome Opera season's performances

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in the Borghese Gardens. Until the summer of 1995, opera in the famous Roman Baths of the Emperor Caracalla was one of the city's main tourist attractions. But environmentalists protested that the audience was damaging the archeological site, and the opera was forced to move to the park. Meanwhile, the Colosseum, enclosed behind massive scaffolding and green net, was being cleaned, perhaps for the first time in its long existence.

On a whim, I telephoned an old Christian Democrat contact. A decade ago I would have had to wait a week for an appointment. Now, I was immediately invited to visit him at Piazza del Gesù. The single, bored policeman hardly looked up. Inside the portico, the cobbled courtyard was deserted, and on every floor of the building there were empty offices. The corridors of power had become corridors of silence. My contact said, "If you think this is quiet, you should visit the Socialists' graveyard."

The old seat of the Socialist Party was deserted. The pictures of Bettino Craxi had long since vanished, of course. Craxi, the Ozymandias of this ruined empire, was living in self-imposed exile in Tunis to avoid being brought to trial on charges of graft and bribery in connection with government contracts in Milan.

THEN ON TO the Vatican, where I saw no slackening of activity. Swiss Guards in their colorful uniforms stood at the Bronze Door, the main entrance to the Pontifical Palace to the left of St. Peter's Basilica. They carried their ornate halberds, or sixteenth-century pikes, but hidden in the big, brass umbrella stand beside the door were two sub-machine guns. The main topic of discussion was not so much Pope John Paul II's forthcoming surgery for appendicitis as the broad implications of his declining health. He may not be a dying pope, but as far as the professionals in the Vatican are concerned, John Paul II presides over a dying papacy, and a lively "dialogue" (ecclesiastical speak for fight) on the papal succession has

been going on quietly behind the scenes for some time.

The choice of the next pontiff will be decided by the 120 or so cardinal electors, locked up in the Sistine Chapel. Before each ballot the cardinals invoke the aid of the Holy Spirit, but divine inspiration is helped along by a process that would be instantly recognizable to the likes of Dick Morris and Mary Matalin, namely political campaigning. The list of *papabili*, or likely papal candidates, includes cardinals from Latin America, where the majority of Catholics live today, and Africa. But in the Vatican itself the consensus is that the next pontiff is more likely to be Italian. If so, he is not expected to reverse the Catholic Church's current policy of staying out of Italian politics. There are two reasons for this detachment. One is the steady decline of the Catholic Church's influence in Italian society. Church attendance is down, and the Italian birth rate is lower than the death rate despite the Church's continued ban on contraception. The image of *mamma, bambini, and pasta* is today truer in Queens than in Torino. Secondly, the Polish-born Pope John Paul II does not share his predecessors' personal concern for political developments in Italy, particularly since communism has collapsed. To him, the main threat to Christianity comes from the new materialism, a concern to which he returns often in his speeches.

Continuing my political tour of Rome, I went around to the Communist Headquarters in Via delle Botteghe Oscure, and here the story was somewhat different. The sign on the door reads *Partito Democratico della Sinistra* (PDS), the born-again Communists' new name. Inside, the atmosphere was one of contained satisfaction. Of Italy's three mainstream political parties, only the former Communists, the eternal outsiders, survived the political upheavals of the past five years, and they are now in government. Although the prime minister is Romano Prodi, the low-key economics professor who carved a new center

out of the debris of the Christian Democrat ranks and their former allies, the only party with a national organization in place in Prodi's coalition is the new Democratic Party of the Left.

The arrival of the former Communists in government is yet another aftershock of the break-up of the Soviet Empire. The long-standing American argument against the Italian Communists gaining political power was, of course, rooted in Italy's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. A NATO country with communists in the government was unacceptable to Washington. In the late 1970s Enrico Berlinguer tried to change that by pronouncing his party independent of Moscow. The party's first priority, he said, was Italy's best interest. But Berlinguer's Eurocommunism—as it immediately became known—failed to remove the American interdict. As one wobbly government followed another, usually in quick succession, Washington continued to invest millions of dollars to ensure that the Christian Democrats and other politically acceptable parties maintained a viable edge, to keep the Communists at bay. An American diplomat, who was a consular officer in a major Italian city during one of the elections in the 1980s, recently recalled how astonished he was to see the amount of money being channeled to the parties in his area from U.S. agencies and other American sources.

Today, Washington views Italy in a different light. My Christian Democrat contact said some senior members of his party were disappointed at the haste with which—in his words—"Italy disappeared off Washington's radar screen", and felt that the United States had forsaken the mainstream parties when they most needed support. The conventional wisdom is that, without American underpinnings, the old political system collapsed under the weight of its own corruption. This is only partly right. The other important factor leading to today's political reality was that the leading lights of the 1968 student unrest in Italy did not go into politics when they grew up. They became journalists and lawyers.

Former *Settantottisti*—literally '68ers—now hold senior editorial posts in the Italian media and the judiciary, and this alliance was behind *Tangentopoli*, the catch-phrase for the crusade against top politicians and leading businessmen allegedly involved in illegal political campaign contributions and payoffs to officials for government contracts. The magistrates brought the court action, the press cast them as heroes.

It is not known exactly how many young, left-wing activists helped Italy's Red Brigades terrorists operate with their logistical support in the late 1970s—giving shelter without asking questions, passing on messages—but the number is known to run into the hundreds. For that generation, says Rome University sociologist Franco Ferrarotti, striking at the heart of the Italian political establishment fell into the category of unfinished business. It was no coincidence either that the Communist Party was largely immune from this onslaught, first because it had been kept out of power, and also because campaign funding came largely from rank-and-file party dues—and from Moscow—not from big business.

FOR A WHILE it seemed that the devastation left in the wake of *Tangentopoli* had left the road open for the reconstructed Communist Party to speed into power in the 1992 elections. But it had not reckoned with the appearance of Silvio Berlusconi, the Milan builder turned media baron, turned politician. With a rousing slogan borrowed from the soccer stadiums—*Forza Italia*—a well packaged campaign on his own television networks (which the Italians immediately dubbed "American style"), and promises to reform Italy's huge bureaucracy and stem the hemorrhage of deficit spending, Berlusconi edged out the Democratic Party of the Left, forming a government alliance of his own with the other big winner, the Italian Social Movement, Mussolini's political descendants. The rehabilitation of the neo-Fascists, after decades of being cold-shouldered by the Italian electorate, was the other notable development of that election.

But the novelty of a fast-talking businessman in office soon began to wear off. Berlusconi made the mistake of trying to curb the powerful, free-wheeling magistrates when they were investigating tax evasion in his own organization, allegedly involving his brother, and within two years his government had run out of steam. Berlusconi is still politically active, but he has been put in the shade by Romano Prodi and Prodi's left-wing coalition partners, the *Partito Democratico della Sinistra*, making its delayed move into government under its new leader, Massimo D'Alema.

As if Italian politics were not complicated enough, there is now the noisy political sideshow created by Umberto Bossi and his separatist *Lega Lombarda*—the Northern League. Bossi's call to establish an autonomous region centering on the fertile, prosperous Po River Valley, so that the industrial north will stop having to support the economically depressed south, appeals to some northern Italians. Still, the idea of dismantling the 130-year-old nation into something close to its pre-1865 component parts is not considered likely to gain enough support to become a major issue.

For one thing, and although the circumstances are very different, neighboring former Yugoslavia provides a compelling example of how regional extremism can run amok. But there is another reason. Except under Mussolini, and when Italy is doing

well in World Cup soccer, the Italians have never been ones to go overboard on nationalism. Ask a Frenchman where he comes from, and he will almost certainly answer "France." Ask the same question of an Italian, and he is more likely to name his hometown. But Bossi's separatist campaign has for the first time made many Italians appreciate the unification they had long taken for granted.

Since last year's election, the furor over *Tangentopoli* has died down largely due to new government measures designed to rein in the magistrates. D'Alema gets credit for closing down the anti-corruption campaign, which—in the cynical view—has in any case served its purpose. But D'Alema comes under attack from the Italian extreme left wing, which also supports the coalition, for trying to broaden his party's appeal by courting the middle class. D'Alema's model is Tony Blair, Britain's Labour leader, who has also worked hard to tone down Labour's working class image.

The Italian leader's fervent hope is that Blair wins the forthcoming elections in Britain, and wins big. Such a victory will bolster his own strategy. As left-wing sources see it, the current period of political transition in Italy will be resolved in the next election, when the Left will become the dominant coalition partner. As his left-wing allies see it, Romano Prodi had better not give up his teaching job. □

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The New Mandarins

Robert M. Pease

A PRIM TWENTY-ONE year-old with a perpetual smile, Yumi is quick-witted, energetic, and thus, one would think, eminently employable. But the Japanese job market, tough for a young woman in the best of times, has been downright forbidding in the past few years of economic slow-down. So Yumi has ventured to multilingual Singapore to improve her job prospects, betting that foreign language skills will raise her chances.

There are many young Japanese women with similar intentions at Yumi's language school. There are also students—teenage, college-age, and middle-aged—from around the world. A thirty-something husband and wife from Korea; a pair of middle-aged sisters from the Philippines; academic exchange participants from the United States, Australia, Europe, and even Russia. But when these foreign students pass in the hallways it isn't with the typical English greetings *hello* or *what's up* but rather the Mandarin Chinese *ni hao* (are you good?) or *zenmeyang* (how's it going?). For these individuals, like thousands of others in university and commercial classes throughout Asia, are betting that Mandarin Chinese will be the next business language of the Pacific Rim.

Will the economic transformation of China spread the use of Chinese language

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throughout the Asian region, as these students expect? Could the increasing utility of Mandarin erode English as the second language of choice in Asia? And now that the sushi, sumu, and karaoke crazes have subsided, is the world turning not Japanese but Chinese after all?

Despite the growth of Mandarin language instruction in Asia and elsewhere, these questions may still seem farfetched from an Anglo-American point of view. We have become so accustomed to English as *the* global language of commerce, science, and entertainment that no alternative seems practicable. English can be heard, read, and spoken from Buenos Aires to Brussels to Beijing, and it is commonplace to overhear a Thai and German, or Indonesian and Japanese executive conversing in English within the lobbies and lounges of Asia.

But commonplace is not always commonsensical. The initial momentum toward English as a global language was provided by two conditions no longer evident: the British Empire and U.S. postwar economic predominance. The language itself is a frustrating one to master through study. Compared to most languages, English uses an enormously large vocabulary. It has numerous phonetic and grammatical inconsistencies. As one Chinese professor in Beijing confesses, "I have been studying English for fifty years, and still I'm afraid of your prepositions."

Chinese is no picnic either. Spoken Mandarin may have relatively simple grammar and an economical use of words. But the read-

ing and writing of 2,500 to 3,500 essential characters or ideographs is a daunting task even for native speakers. In any post office in China one can hear appeals for help: Hey, how do you write Harbin (a northern provincial capital)? Which is the Shan of Shantou (a southern coastal city)?

In many respects, however, computerization of Chinese will facilitate commercial functions, and the race is already on, among start-up firms and corporate giants alike, to produce the software of choice for the Chinese language market.

THE ENGLISH term “Mandarin” refers to the northeastern Chinese dialect that China’s rulers have long promoted as a unifying language. Within China this dialect is referred to as “standard speech” (*putonghua*); outside China, it may be called “country language” (*guoyu*) or simply “Chinese” (*huayu*). Most Taiwanese speak fluent Mandarin, as do most educated mainlanders. Large numbers of Hong Kongers, who traditionally speak Cantonese dialect, are brushing up their Mandarin for post-1997 PRC rule. Similarly, business and cultural ties with China and Taiwan are reinvigorating Mandarin usage among the twenty to twenty-five million ethnic Chinese throughout Southeast Asia.

Mandarin has always been the language of high culture among the Chinese within China and abroad. It is now becoming the language of pop culture as well. Taiwanese and Hong Kong movies, television shows, and music formerly produced in dialects, like Cantonese or Hokkien, are increasingly made for distribution to the wider Mandarin market. The international success of Chinese artists such as filmmakers Chen Kaige (*Farewell My Concubine*) and Zhang Yimou (*Raise the Red Lantern*; *To Live*) adds to the allure of Mandarin among the young.

Until recently the designation of Mandarin as the world’s most spoken language was mainly due to the size of the population of China itself (1.2 billion and climb-

ing). But now Mandarin may be poised to spread beyond the Chinese world as a language of commerce and influence among the elite and professional classes of Asia. The economic impetus is clear: Trade within the region is expanding twice as fast as Asia’s trade with other regions. And if reformist policies are sustained, the growing China market stands near the center of those trade flows. China could also become Asia’s largest source of tourist revenue. In 1995 PRC citizens represented the third largest group of Asian tourists, a relatively new and growing phenomenon.

The potential for Mandarin as an Asia-wide language rests on historical as well as economic foundations. Japan, after all, was the major source of finance and tourist revenue in the region for two decades until its recent recession. Yet the Japanese language never did catch on. The legacy of the Second World War threw up some obstacles, as did the peculiarities of the language itself. More fundamentally, however, Japanese language offered other Asians access only to Japan, not the wider region. Japan is a unique cultural entity centered on itself; by contrast, Chinese influence has long circulated throughout East and Southeast Asia. Classical Chinese characters provide the foundation for written Japanese and, to a lesser extent, Korean languages. The Korean President Kim Young Sam has called for efforts to standardize Chinese character usage in East Asia, thus facilitating document translation and second language study. While Chinese characters no longer occur in written Vietnamese, spoken Vietnamese still contains a large percentage of Chinese loan words from the many centuries (111 B.C. - 939 A.D.) of Vietnamese tributary status. This means that native speakers of Korean, Japanese, and Vietnamese may find the study of Mandarin easier and more stimulating than that of English.

In Singapore, where 78 percent of the population is ethnic Chinese, the government’s “Speak Mandarin” campaign has been in force for seventeen years. Originally

intended to unify the many Chinese dialect groups in Singapore, both culturally and politically, the campaign now touts Mandarin as the key to business success in Asia. Not surprisingly, a growing number of minority citizens in Singapore (Malays, Indians, Eurasians) are petitioning to have their children admitted to Mandarin courses.

The potential for Mandarin elsewhere in Southeast Asia is still problematic and yet is progressing. Chinese minorities have long been viewed with suspicion by the dominant ethnic groups for their cliquishness and business acumen. Indeed, suspicions have intermittently erupted into hostility, as with the post-coup chaos of mid-1960s Indonesia. However, this has not prevented Southeast Asia from having two national leaders of partial Chinese ancestry in recent years—former President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines and former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of Thailand. Similarly, while private Chinese language schools were barely tolerated in Southeast Asia three decades ago, now they are prospering. Commercial Mandarin study is on the rise in Thailand and the Philippines among students of both indigenous and ethnic Chinese backgrounds. The Malaysian government is expanding the study of Mandarin as a third language (after Malay and English) in government schools. Even in Indonesia, where resentment of Chinese commercial influence runs deepest, there has been a relaxation of long-standing Chinese language prohibitions. Two Indonesian universities now have Chinese language departments, and a wider circulation of Chinese newspapers and tourist brochures has been permitted to stimulate commerce and tourism.

The mates down under are also in on the trend. The Australian government has launched an Asian language campaign as part of an ambitious effort to integrate Australia with the Asian economies. Their target is for 60 percent of all secondary school graduates

to be functional in one of four Asian languages (Mandarin, Japanese, Bahasa Indonesia, or Korean) by the year 2006. The Australian military has also announced that it will use Asian language fluency as a promotion criteria.

The question of whether more Mandarin in Asia will mean less English is a complex one. Many societies pursue successful bilingual education programs, but trilingual communities are rare. A remarkable number of EU citizens do speak three or four languages with virtual fluency, yet these languages have basic similarities. Some Hong Kongers and Singaporeans function effectively in three languages, but many more fail in the attempt.

English will clearly remain the predominant global language, even as Mandarin usage spreads in the Asian region. There is too much momentum behind English for it to be easily displaced. Yet a growing number of aspiring young Asian professionals, like Yumi and her classmates, will be weighing the relative advantages of English against Chinese as they chart their careers. “Can I master both English and Chinese?” they will ask themselves. And for those who cannot there will be a further question: Which is more useful, appealing, and easier to learn?

At the same time, Asian government officials and educators will be pondering different questions around the same issue. And their assessments will be affected by geopolitical and macroeconomic trends. Is China becoming a more or less responsible actor in the region? A more or less coherent economy? Are the United States and other English speaking economies integrating more or less closely with Asia? And, last but not least, which language is least upsetting to the existing political and social order? The answers to both sets of questions, in English and/or Mandarin, will be heard in the hotels, airports, and classrooms of Asia for decades to come. □

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Huntington's Clash of Civilizations: I

Morally Objectionable, Politically Dangerous

Pierre Hassner

Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 321 pp., \$26.00.

THERE IS A Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in Samuel Huntington. He is perhaps the most brilliant, articulate, versatile, and creative living political scientist. He has written the most authoritative work on the consequences of social change on political order. Besides his own analyses, he has often usefully denounced the simplifications and contradictions of the theorists of "endism" and "declinism"; or, in earlier times, of the "state-centered" and "transnational" schools in the debate over multinational corporations; or of the theorists of modernization and political development who were compelled to take refuge from their own miasma of confusion in the innocuous term "change."

Yet Huntington's taste for generalization, his gift for striking formulations, his knack for provocation and, one must say, his lack of political common sense and responsibility, lead him time and again to commit the very sins of excessive simplification that he has so well castigated in others. He has by such excesses generated serious intellectual misunderstandings and, ultimately, moral and political misdirections.

Faithful followers of Huntington's work will remember the storms created by his formulations about the urbanizing, and hence modernizing, effects of the U.S. bombing and strategic hamlets policies in the Vietnam War; or about the dangers of excessive

democracy in post-industrial society. Readers of his great work on *Political Order in Changing Societies* will remember how his penetrating insights into the dialectics of mobilization and institutionalization led him to predict a bright future for Leninist parties—as opposed to individual dictatorships—in the Middle East. Others will recall how his recommendations in the 1970s of a NATO strategy made up of nuclear defense (through anti-ballistic missile deployments) and conventional retaliatory offense, while conceptually brilliant, could never be taken seriously due to their lack of economic and psychological realism.

The danger with *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* is, on the contrary, that it could be taken too seriously. Huntington's verbal fireworks have never been so dazzling. They often convey illuminating insights, but more often are incredibly one-sided and inflammatory: "The West's problem is not Islamism but Islam"; "People in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia and the subcontinent slaughter each other because they believe in different gods"; "Islam's bloody borders", and so forth. The most striking formulations—including the central one characterizing the nineteenth century as defined by the clash of nations, the twentieth by that of ideologies, the twenty-first by that of civilizations—were present in his original *Foreign Affairs* article (Summer 1993), and have already sent shock waves around the world. But contrary to the case of Francis Fukuyama, whose sensational article in *The National Interest* (Summer 1989) was succeeded by a more moderate and balanced volume,

Huntington's book is, if anything, more extreme than his article. It adds or expands a prescriptive and a predictive dimension that are the most disputable and dangerous parts of his argument. This is all the more regrettable because the analysis starts from very real and striking observations.

THE BOOK RESTS on two very solid pillars. The first—hardly a revelation but well worth the emphasis it is given—is that the balance of power is shifting from the West to Asia, and that China's economic power and the demographic growth of Muslim peoples together create a formidable challenge to the existing international system.

The second is that, today, identity and community are on the rise as mobilizing themes in comparison to political and economic ideologies; that ascriptive, particularly ethnic, affiliations are on the rise compared to functional ones; and that religion and nostalgia for the past seem to prevail over belief in science, progress, or utopian revolution.

Huntington is also right, and deeply original, in seeing a link between these two phenomena. In one of his most striking remarks, he points out that "no other civilization has generated a significant political ideology, and the West has never generated a major religion." The spiritual shift that he detects—moving from rationality and universalism to mysticism and tradition—coincides to some extent with the shift in economic and military power from West to East.

Where he seems to me to go deeply wrong is in fixing these phenomena on the primacy of one permanent factor, namely civilizations, interpreted essentially in terms of religion. Worse perhaps, Huntington assumes the closed and conflictual character of these entities as he tries to fit every conflict in the world into his scheme. And last but not least, he bases his prescriptions for Western policies on what amounts to a global segregationist scheme that negates the West's basic concepts and aspirations, and that ignores several of the imposing realities of modern society.

Huntington's search for a substitute for the two blocs or superpowers of the Cold War leads him to focus on what he calls civilizations, which are, by his definition, the broadest cultural grouping short of the world as a whole. But what is most characteristic of the search for identity and community is the multiplicity of its levels: the family, the tribe, the nation, and the sect are at least as lively and conflictual as the great religions, let alone the great civilizations that they have spawned. By Huntington's own count, heavily biased as it is in favor of the macro level, less than half of today's ethnic conflicts can be described as inter-civilizational. Rather than conflicts along the fault lines of his seven or eight civilizations, the really bloody wars of our time oppose Tutsi and Hutu, Pashtun and Tadjik, Shi'a and Sunni, Turk and Kurd, Iranian and Iraqi. Like nations and alliances, civilizations and religions are constantly torn between globalization and fragmentation, between the homogenizing forces of modernization (manifest in the evolution of consumption and demographic patterns or in the rise of feminist protest, even in a country like Iran) and the divisive forces of local traditions and new prophets or saviors (whose declared aims of overcoming division usually produce the reverse effect).

Civilizations are not substantive and permanent entities, nor are they necessarily closed and conflicting ones. Mutual influence and syncretism are the most frequent phenomena historically, particularly in our time of migrations and fluid communications. At the religious as well as at the ethnic and national level, the violent insistence on distinctiveness is more often than not a reaction against the perceived danger of losing it. Fundamentalism is an essentially modern and reactive phenomenon directed against the West, one adopting not only the latest tools but also much of the structure of Western ideologies, just as the latter usually bore the character of "secular religions." The new religiosity is a reaction to secularization and, in its own way, more often than not contributes

to the phenomenon it fights, in the sense that the tradition to which it looks back invariably gets reinterpreted, if not reinvented, in the process. Hence, Huntington's formulation that the world is becoming more modern and less Western, while true at a certain level, fails to distinguish between the declaratory (or subjective) and the substantive (or objective) dimensions of that process.

It also glosses too quickly over the differences between power and ideas and the complexity of the dynamics between the two. The world is certainly becoming more anti-Western but that does not prevent the non-Western world's form of modernity from being profoundly Westernized. When Singapore, founded by the British, raises the banner of Asian originality, it does so both to compensate for its origins and to resist an evolution toward an amalgam of individualism and anomie, corruption and consumerism, which threatens, in turn, the other successful Asian tigers as well as the West. It would be absurd to deny that the evolution of the non-Western world will trigger new demands for roots and for diversity, as well as new antagonisms arising from the "narcissism of small differences." It would be equally absurd not to expect that future combinations of the old and the new, in the West as well as in the East, will be increasingly influenced by the emerging centers of non-Western power. But it is indefensible to be as hasty as Huntington is in the first part of his book in dismissing the influence of, on the one hand, the Weberian "disenchantment of the world" and, on the other, the effect of computer technology and pop culture—as well as their Western, and particularly American-dominated, character, at least in the present period.

THE REASON WHY Huntington tends to forget or deny the obvious is that his new enthusiasm for the cultural dimension leads him to underestimate and underplay its continuing interaction with the economic and the political aspects. The war in Chechnya and the rise of the Taliban in

Afghanistan have, of course, an ethnic and a religious dimension, but they have been activated by concerns having more to do with oil routes and realpolitik than with a clash of civilizations. Both the classical game of the balance of power between states (with its resulting alliances between the United States and Pakistan, or between Iran and Russia, or the double game being played by the latter amid Georgians and Abkhazians, Armenians and Azeris), and "Fukuyama type" processes (with their linkages, imperfect but real, between prosperity, democracy, and peace) continue to affect ethnic and religious developments and be affected by them.

Inter-state politics, capitalist markets, and democratic institutions may be Western in origin, and they may be increasingly under attack in the twenty-first century, but to accord them only a marginal role in any description of the present world disorder, or in any prescription for a future world order, can only be a delusory exercise in caricature. Huntington's eagerness to use the religious label prevents him from distinguishing between real clashes of opposing faiths and cases in which religion is just a marker for the identity of historic groups, as between Irish Catholics and Protestants, or an instrument of opportunistic communist-era elites, as in Serbia.

In consequence, Huntington's descriptions and predictions are a collection of unilateral statements that have, at best, half a chance of being proven true. Thus, when China sells weapons to Libya, it confirms the alliance between Confucianism and Islam—but when the United States sells weapons to Saudi Arabia, what does that illustrate? Trade conflicts between the United States and Japan are signs of a clash of civilizations—but what are those between the United States and the European Community? The Europeans are said to follow the United States in its policies against Libya, Iran, and Iraq, while during the Cold War they are said to have refused to toe the Atlantic line; but, of course, just the opposite is true, as shown by European refusal to grant overflight rights for the U.S. bombing of

Libya, or to boycott Iran, or to identify with Israel—all of which contrast with the success of NATO in maintaining a reasonably united front against the Soviet threat. Germans are said to welcome Polish immigrants but not Muslims, although the statistics quoted on page 200 show just the opposite. It is maintained that China and Japan will align against the West, a prediction hardly made convincing by the current rise of opposing nationalisms over the Senkaku Islands, or by the preference of most Asian states for bilateral links with the United States over an Asian security system.

IT IS WITH RESPECT to Islam that Huntington's cultural case is strongest, and that is because Islam is the religion that is more static, more directly political, and more hostile to the West than others. Nevertheless, it is also the case where his specific analyses are the most distorted and dangerous. His eagerness to show Muslim bellicosity as the source of fault line wars leads him, for example, to underplay the importance of Russia's role in fueling conflict in the Caucasus and in Moldova in order to divide and rule.

More tragic and inexcusable, he gives a totally biased account of the conflicts in Kosovo and Bosnia. Huntington writes as if the initiative for war had come from the Muslims, who then "wrapped themselves in the victim's guise." He totally neglects the fact that the Bosnians, to begin with, did not even have an army; that the former communist leaders in Serbia (and, to a lesser extent, Croatia) developed a clear nationalist design involving the partition of Bosnia; and that this led, on the Serbian side, to clearly genocidal and systematic atrocities, qualitatively different from the crimes that undoubtedly were committed by the other sides.

The readers of *The National Interest* do not need to be reminded of the real story, so well analyzed in its pages by, among others, Noel Malcolm. But they will be surprised by the degree to which Huntington's culturalist lenses distort his historical account and his

moral judgment. They will be no less baffled by his descriptions of Western powers supporting Croatia (which will come as news to the French and British governments, as well as to their critics), of Russia's faithfulness to the Orthodox axis (a propagandistic myth challenged by historians and by the experience of Balkan rivalries and Russian betrayals of their smaller Slavic or Orthodox brethren), and of other Muslim states rising in defense of Bosnia. Of course, the sympathies of the Catholic Church and of Bavarians and Austrians did lay more with Croatia, and it is true that Iran and Saudi Arabia (in conjunction with the United States) have helped Bosnia, and have thereby contributed to making it more Islamic. It is also true that Muslims everywhere interpreted some four years of relative Western passivity as a sign of hostility to Islam. But the fact remains that the Yugoslav War—a fault line conflict—did not fulfill the potential claimed for it by Huntington of escalating into a global clash of civilizations.

Instead, what is striking is how careful outside powers were not to get too involved or risk their mutual relations, how little the masses on all the non-Yugoslav sides were mobilized, how readily all sides accepted an unjust peace based on de facto partition, and how strongly the ex-Yugoslav Republics expressed their desire to join the European Union. Fragmentation and consensus, gang rivalries and economic interdependence, conflicting reactions and converging behavior of outside powers—these are all much more characteristic of the situation in the Balkans than is anything having to do with an overarching clash of civilizations.

ERRORS OF THIS SORT also suggest why Huntington's prescriptions for world order are both morally objectionable and politically dangerous. They tend in the direction of solidifying existing fault lines and encouraging a world based on a kind of religious or civilizational Yalta. Huntington has imagined a revised "billiard ball" model of international relations based on civilizations

instead of nations, with civilizations regrouped around one or two “core-states”, and having, evidently, as little as possible to do with each other.

The theoretical implications and the practical consequences of Huntington’s doctrine of “non-intervention in other civilizations’ affairs” are equally appalling. According to Huntington, at the most general level “Western intervention in affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential conflict in a multicivilizational world.” Conversely, “an international order based on civilizations is the surest protection against world war.” These extraordinarily broad statements are, so to speak, operationalized in formulations such as this: “Multiculturalism at home threatens the United States and the West; internationalism abroad threatens the West and the world.” As for Europe, he asserts that the European Union and NATO “should include the Western Christian states of Central and Eastern Europe”, while the West “should recognize Russia as primarily responsible for the maintenance of security among Orthodox countries and in areas where Orthodoxy predominates”—hence leaving it in control of the Balkans (including Greece, which Huntington excludes from the West). Western powers would not even act as balancers there, as they did in the nineteenth century, according to his scheme of things.

All of this is quite surprising—even odd. Politically, Huntington has been one of the most articulate advocates over the years of an assertive American foreign policy and of its benefits for the world. Here he ends up as a civilizational neo-isolationist. Philosophically, he adopts the point of view of the most extreme radical critics of the West, as he interprets the West’s advocacy of universalism and a global human rights regime, and its use of international organizations, as entirely guided by its own parochial interests. He characterizes the notion of Western universalism as practically unsustainable and philosophically hollow.

By so doing, Huntington falls into two major traps, both caused by his newly-found cultural determinism. In one sense, his useful plea for diversity and modesty does not go far enough. His search for a unifying formula (“If not civilizations, what?”) is inconsistent with the fact, which he recognizes, that all conflicts are not ethnic and all ethnic conflicts are not civilizational—just as all twentieth-century conflicts were not ideological and all nineteenth-century conflicts were not national. Earlier searches for a single key to multiple conflicts led to disastrous misjudgments; indeed, such a search is simply absurd in today’s increasingly complex, changing, and multidimensional world. One may argue in each case whether the cultural, the economic, or the political dimension is more important; one may also accept that the first is on the rise; yet one may still be profoundly suspicious of a division of the world that would legitimize, enhance, and freeze the current cultural status quo by condemning civilizational shifts. This is all the more so since, as Huntington’s useful analyses of divided states and swing cultures confirm, cultural or religious and territorial divisions do not necessarily coincide, and do so less and less with modern means of communication.

It is certainly true that dogmatic multiculturalism threatens the unity and sense of common loyalty of the United States and of the West, but this is just as true at the global level. Similarly, while reckless interventionism in other civilizations is dangerous, so is reckless interventionism by self-appointed (or Huntington-designated) core-states in the affairs of their own civilizational domain. Religions and civilizations being intertwined within nations and continents, the search for perfect unity within and perfect separation from the outside can only lead to tyranny. For better or worse, Europe, including Western Europe, is also to some extent a Muslim continent; the United States is also to some extent an Asian country. The attempt to overcome this reality by fiat can only proceed

through inhumane and unrealistic ethnic cleansing. Nobody would accuse Huntington of being a friend of, or an apologist for, Slobodan Milošević or Jean-Marie Le Pen, but one cannot help being reminded of the latter taking Saddam Hussein's side at the time of the Gulf War, proclaiming as he did so that he was not against Arabs or Africans but merely wanted each culture to stay at home.

This illustrates the second of Huntington's basic errors, one which in a sense pulls in the opposite direction. Short of complete physical isolation, which is contrary to history in general and to modern society in particular, diversity can be peaceful only if it is leavened both by multiple allegiances and commonalities, by inner pluralism and external ties. Neither Mazzini nor Wilson had anything in common with Hitler, yet the myth of an "international of nationalisms", of a spontaneous harmony between nations, did lead to disaster, as did the line adopted in 1914 by respectable German thinkers from Max Weber to Thomas Mann, of a civilizational conflict based on the clash of German culture with both Anglo-American materialism and Slavic mysticism. If today Huntington can safely count Germany as Western, it is not because its inhabitants are Catholics and Protestants (two religions that have had their share of mutual slaughtering), but because the clash between civilization and barbarity has finally taken precedence over the clash between cultures, and because, with the help of American power, other ties and commonalities such as economic interdependence, democracy, and individualism bind Germany to the West.

IN THE LAST three pages of his book, Huntington seems to recognize the existence and importance of civilization as such (complete with its discontents), as well as the many commonalities between major cultures. Universality and pluralism seem all of a sudden to be more than mere tools of Western power. But this part of the volume is even more underdeveloped than the first. One is tempted to

suggest some further, more nuanced reading to the author of *The Clash of Civilizations*: for instance, *The Democratic Distemper*, and *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*.

For this is, indeed, the ultimate paradox: Nobody has refuted cultural determinism in the name of social evolution and political institutions more effectively than did Samuel Huntington in his earlier works. It is as if he had launched, in the skies of theory and prophecy, three rockets: call them SAM I, SAM II, and SAM III.

The first, SAM I, which seems to correspond to his most permanent inspiration, concerns the dangers that social evolution—from the condition of the Third World to that of post-industrial society—entails for democracy. Here Huntington stresses the necessity for a certain restoration of political authority, which he saw as threatened by the excesses of mobilization and anarchy, touched off by rapid changes.

The second, SAM II, contrasts with the first by virtue of its more optimistic message. This is *The Third Wave*, which extols the progress of democracy, from the fall of right-wing or military dictatorships in the 1970s to that of communist regimes in the early 1990s. In this book, Huntington does not neglect the likelihood of other periods of regression, nor the difficulty encountered by democracy in taking root everywhere. But his conclusions are nevertheless universalist and militantly pro-democracy.

That makes SAM III—the theoretical rocket launched in this book—all the more explosive: This rocket hits its target most spectacularly, but its fall-out is likely to be the least controllable. Between the three, there is a great danger of what nuclear strategists call the "fratricide effect", that is, mutual destruction in flight or upon successive impacts.

If, instead, they were organized in some kind of hierarchy, they could usefully complement each other and provide the best in-depth interpretation of the political sociology of our time. But to do so, one would have to return to the two familiar Huntingtonian dynamics:

that of technological, economic, and social change; and that of political and legal institutionalization (modernization and democracy). These seem strangely absent from the present book, yet the return to tradition and religion cannot be understood except as a reaction to modernization and its discontents, and its consequences cannot but be profoundly related to the viability of democratic beliefs and institutions.

Nobody would be better able to provide this synthesis than Sam Huntington himself, if only the subtle Dr. Jekyll could wrestle control back from the dark and distortive Mr. Hyde. So please: Play it again, Sam! □

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Huntington's Clash of Civilizations: II

A Machiavelli for Our Times

Wang Gungwu

IN HIS *FOREIGN AFFAIRS* essay on "The Clash of Civilizations?" Samuel Huntington offered a new paradigm for analyzing our increasingly multicivilizational world order. His provocative essay deserved the great attention it received, and so does the book he has now written refining and extending the argument. Huntington has put ample historical and political flesh on the civilizational frames he earlier identified, and the result is persuasive.

The key conceptual refinement Huntington has made en route from essay to book is making clear that he is talking not about civilizations as such, but rather about power groupings made up of nation-states and formed either around shared core cultural values or through a readiness to cohere in defense of common interests against challenges coming from different cultural systems. Once this clarification has been made, it is difficult to fault Huntington's basic premises, for we are back to the familiar realm of the clash between political structures as they compete for power and hegemony. What is novel, in his view, is that these structures will not be traditionally minded nation-states clashing

along conventional frontiers, but Civilizational States struggling along the much vaguer fault lines that separate them.

One need not quarrel either with the fuller picture of a "World of Civilizations" underlying Huntington's basic approach. His purpose in using this term, as I understand it, is to emphasize the increasing inadequacy of Eurocentric models of international politics in the contemporary world. Undeniably the world has been transformed by the West's impact on it over the past two centuries; indeed, the West brought modernization to virtually everyone, whether they wanted it or not. For nearly half a century the bipolar divide in international politics—the Cold War—largely disguised the significance of what was happening. But Huntington believes that the end of that divide has made clear that a new paradigm is required: The globalized universalism inherent in the Western way of thinking about global issues must give way to a view of a new multipolar world, one that is not universal or homogeneous but multicivilizational.

More deliberately than in his original essay, Huntington sets out to demolish any

residual sentimentality about the idealistic vision of a one-world future. As he points out, the Western utopian ideal—that of a single universal civilization that would ultimately absorb all other civilizations—reached its apogee at the beginning of this century. The two Euro-centered world wars that followed did much to disabuse Western (and other) intellectuals of this utopian hope, but it is still not entirely dead. Huntington is concerned to give it a final burial, and he does so maintaining that it represents the kind of overreach that destroyed past civilizations.

Huntington's basic argument—which may thus be characterized as a kind of conservative multiculturalism—holds that the balance of civilizations has now shifted, largely (and ironically) because of the success of Western science, technology, and the victory of capitalism in the open international market system. That victory does *not* necessarily make the users of originally Western concepts “Western” in the full civilizational sense; on the contrary, other civilizations learn all they can from the West partly in order to defend themselves against Western dominance. As they do so, new patterns of global development emerge, and novel factors come into play.

FROM THE COMPLEX array of variables that Huntington defines and describes in the new world of civilizational conflict, two merit special comment. The population explosion in the developing economies, notably in the Islamic world, will continue for decades. The rapid spread of high-tech weaponry and electronic communication will accelerate as well. The former points to chronic clashes and crises that will result as national borders are threatened and breached by substantial spillovers of peoples. The latter will so reduce the functional size of Huntington's multicivilizational world that the new order may end up as comparable in scale to the state system of nineteenth-century Europe. Both trends will work to weaken the integral, stand-alone nation-state.

In place of the dynastic and religious wars of the pre-Westphalian epoch, then, or the mercantilist and ideological struggles that followed, we shall increasingly encounter conflicts between integral value-systems, as represented by clashes between the core powers of each civilizational cluster. Just as the European Great Powers, along with their proxies and colonies, fought one another throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, so Civilizational Powers will now seek victories for themselves and dominance over others.

Because the political orientation of the actors is changing, future intercivilizational relations will require a new language both for understanding and for conducting war and peace. But the struggles among the major protagonists may well not be so different from the way Great Powers have acted in the past. Huntington is nowhere explicit about affirming the tenets of classical realism, but this may be inferred from his assertion that

the sources of conflict between states and groups from different civilizations are, in large measure, those which have always generated conflict between groups: control of people, territory, wealth, and resources, and relative power, that is the ability to impose one's own values, culture, and institutions on another group as compared to that group's ability to do that to you.

However, civilizations as power-oriented actors will have more serious problems with boundaries and will tend to be less manageable than the smaller polities of the more recent past. We know this because what Huntington sees as new finds at least some echo in aspects of what is old. In the roughly thousand-year conflict between Islam and Christendom—from the Battle of Tours to the siege of Prague—boundaries were rarely stable, even as political power within these civilizations shifted and reorganized itself over time.

Not surprisingly, Huntington has some difficulty in showing convincingly how the larger and mixed populations of Civilizational States can be politically coherent and loyal if their only common bonds depend on civilizational values. He comes close to defining identities for Asia (Sinic, Hindu, Islamic, and Japanese) entirely in terms of religion, which is unconvincing, especially as he draws away from this approach in dealing with the Western, Latin American, Orthodox, and African identities. In those instances, Huntington seems to assume that three of these groupings represent different faces of one religion—Christianity—while the potential African Civilization State might be torn between Christianity and Islam.

Although he is far from the first to have recognized it, Huntington is admirably frank about the relative decline of the West. In being so, he offers a major corrective to the complacency and arrogance that have dominated Western self-perception for the past century and a half. If his conclusions are widely accepted by Western scholars and commentators, a new language and vocabulary will have to be developed for coming generations, for to depict the values the West has stood for in the past two centuries as less than universal will call for a revolution of attitudes. This is courageous talk, not only in terms of what it means for Westerners themselves, but also for those from other civilizations who have been educated—and possibly converted, if not misled—to accept the supposed universalism of Western civilization. Indeed, many former colonials in Asia and Africa, including the nationalists among them, have for decades made a living from their mastery of supposedly universalist Western concepts.

Having defined this intriguing amalgam of conservative multiculturalism, Huntington then explains what he calls “the emerging order of civilizations.” He speaks of core-states and concentric circles in a way reminiscent both of the Chinese tributary system (in which the “Middle Kingdom” would be the modern equivalent of his core-state) and the concept of the *mandala*, derived from Hindu-Buddhist

ideas of the divine kingship, as a set of political relationships between core and periphery. Here the synthetic genius of Huntington as political scientist not only encompasses a wide range of political models from past and present, but in so doing demonstrates the interpenetration of the multiple civilizations that have survived the ravages of Western imperialism.

UP TO THIS POINT, *The Clash of Civilizations* holds closely to modern historical experience worldwide, and readers will have little difficulty in recognizing the landmarks that have shaped our age. Huntington’s conclusion, however, entertains what is perhaps an excessively apocalyptic vision of the future. The four chapters of his final section take us into the world of core-states and fault line conflicts, emphasizing, predictably, those between Islam and Christianity, as well as less dramatic quarrels involving Islam and Hinduism, and Islam and “Confucian” China.

The main objective here is to identify the cultural forces vying to replace political and merely national identities. Huntington believes that they manifest themselves increasingly through “kin identifications” between nation-states, and among related diasporas operating across national borders. He explains what he means by the “kin-country syndrome” this way:

When . . . communal conflicts involve groups from different civilizations, they tend to expand and to escalate. As the conflict becomes more intense, each side attempts to rally support from countries and groups belonging to his own civilization. . . . The longer a fault line conflict continues the more kin countries are likely to become involved in supporting, constraining, and mediating roles. As a result of this ‘kin-country syndrome’, fault line conflicts have a much higher potential for escalation than do intracivilizational conflicts and usually require intercivilizational cooperation to contain and end them. In contrast to the Cold War, conflict does not flow down from above, it bubbles up from below.

This syndrome may become an accurate

description of much global conflict in the future, but Huntington claims more for its present impact than seems justified. The few geopolitical examples that lead him to predict an anti-Western coalition between Islamic and "Confucian" forces are little more than the international politics of arms sales and rhetorical support. If these represent the scope of the new world civilizational order, we need not change our textbooks just yet.

Finally, Huntington calls on the West to eschew a hollow universalism and, instead, to unite around America to defend its uniqueness against challenges from the non-West. This is the least convincing part of the book. It fails to recognize that the essential singularity of the modern West resides in a combination of missionary zeal and positive science that made its sense of universalism not only possible but virtually inevitable. This combination is the secret of the West's moral and physical strength against the universal claims of less well-endowed others. To withdraw from the commitment that it implies and retreat to a defensive posture would be to remove some of the features that have been most distinctive of Western civilization for the past five hundred years. Such a new parochialism might not cripple the West's moral purpose, but it could lead Western leaders to behavior similar to that of those leaders in Asia and elsewhere today who appear to be dedicated to nothing more than simply preserving what amounts to their tribal power.

Huntington avoids predicting precisely how power will be distributed in a new world order divided according to civilizational differences. Yes, conflicts will most frequently occur between powers with distinct and opposing cultural values, and nation-states as we have known them in recent times will cease to be the dominant players in global politics. Indeed, it is Huntington's view that we already live in the age of intercivilizational relations. But he is careful to insist that what he has presented is a model and not a prophecy—a new paradigm that may best explain what happens, and help predict what is likely to happen,

when and where civilizational borders collide or intersect—and no more than that.

COMING FROM a leading political scientist in the most distinguished university in the world's most powerful nation—a nation that symbolizes (sometimes benignly, sometimes aggressively) the dominant civilization of the West—this new paradigm has surprised most scholars, Western and non-Western alike. Huntington's frank admission that the West is in relative decline, and will suffer greater threats and challenges if the United States does not take the lead in steering it away from its present arrogance, is particularly fascinating to the non-Western world. Indeed, the variety of reactions to his thesis outside the bounds of Western civilization reveals far more about these civilizations themselves than about Huntington and his paradigm.

To the Islamic world, spread across three continents, Huntington's thesis comes as confirmation of the prevailing conviction that Muslims are not destined to be Westernized. It is a good feeling, then, for Muslims to imagine the *umma*, the community of believers, again emerging as a major force in civilizational politics. If devout Muslims think Huntington's call for the West to defend its relative decline in power will be heeded, they may see in their future another Western crusade, against which *jihad* will be the inevitable defense. Huntington's theory essentially corroborates the classical Islamic worldview.

As for China, the Civilization State par excellence, the author's thesis invites the question of whether a future regional Confucian core-state is to be based on China. It is a question of interest not only to the Chinese themselves, but to their neighbors. From the way China is currently tying itself in knots trying to be a normal nation-state, it will be more likely to frighten its neighbors than inspire them. Southeast Asian nations, in particular, would feel exceptionally insecure in Huntington's larger scheme of things. Is that region's future to be a battleground of clash-

ing Confucian, Islamic, Buddhist, and Christian Civilizational Powers? If so, subordinate states and sub-regions will not fare well. Such has always been the case in world systems, whether based on civilizational criteria or more conventional ones.

Japan—the neatest and smallest of Huntington’s civilizations—could offer a good test for his paradigm. Japanese intellectuals are in fact intensely interested in what it means for East Asia; I have made more than a dozen trips to Japan since 1993, and each time I have been earnestly questioned about the Huntington thesis. They will no doubt find the elaborations in this longer version even more interesting, not least because Huntington’s thesis allows for several possible futures for Japan.

In one respect, the idea that Japan represents a distinct civilization of its own resonates well with most Japanese. They are flattered to find that, of the non-Western civilizations, they are closest to being acknowledged as crypto-Westerners by the West itself. But then comes the ambiguity. By being depicted as a distinct, stand-alone civilization, Japan is freed from the shadow of China without necessarily being placed under a prolonged Western tutelage. The charge that Japan’s modern system is derivative has been overturned by the recognition that Japan has a unique strength that transforms whatever it borrows into its very own. But this also means that the Japanese could be caught internally, so to speak, between two fault lines: between themselves and the West, and between themselves and Chinese civilization.

Huntington’s paradigm serves to confirm that globalization has the potential to transform Japan from a peripheral state into the new center of the Asia-Pacific region. The fault lines on either side will make life permanently interesting for the Japanese people. The paradigm thus usefully sharpens Japan’s choices: It could stay flexible and ally with one side or the other to avoid ever having to fight on both fronts; it could be a Fortress Japan, forever neutral in a dangerous world where the West and the Confucian-Islamic “alliance”

are vying for control; or, for geostrategic reasons, it could identify with the physically more distant West as the civilization that would remain less hostile to Japan than its nearer neighbors. Whatever choice Japan makes, it may be the first to persuade itself of the validity of Huntington’s paradigm.

AT THE END of my second reading of this engrossing book, I was reminded of Machiavelli. What Machiavelli did for the world of princely states, Huntington may well be doing for the multi-civilizational world order. The old political rules remain for the most part, but the protagonists of larger polities, or groups of polities, have been provided with a new logic and language of behavior. I reflected, too, on what Machiavelli’s contemporaries thought of *The Prince* when it was first published. The Church authorities who represented the universalism of the day were appalled, but was it because he had elevated the princely states above God’s plan, or for some other reason? Did his secular contemporaries think otherwise, that his image of the prince and his princely state represented the real world? Were they puzzled and a little frightened by the new paradigm that accepted the princes for what they were?

By analogy, the Western powers today might respond to Huntington like the Universal Church and reaffirm that universalism is an absolute good. But less powerful civilizations may be encouraged by Huntington to believe that they might become new princes, with greatly enlarged and elevated parts to play. In the end, this is what is so stunning about *The Clash of Civilizations*: It is not just about the future, but may actually help to shape it. □

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Presented at Court

John O'Sullivan

George R. Urban, *Diplomacy and Disillusion at the Court of Margaret Thatcher* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 206 pp., £19.95.

“ONE OF THE problems with kiss-and-tell books is that they tend to be written by those who were kissed once and never got over the experience.” When Mrs. Thatcher was Prime Minister, some such formula was suggested to her for a speech dealing with a spate of indiscreet memoirs by former ministers. And if she were reviewing Mr. Urban’s account of his appearances at her “court”, she might well be tempted to revive it.

For this book is a record of disappointment in love. The tale is an old one—a version of Faust in which Margaret and Mephistopheles merge. Mr. Urban, a high-minded intellectual specializing in culture and the Cold War, falls for the Iron Lady from afar. He is introduced and experiences a meeting of minds. Bliss! Asked to help with drafting speeches, he is soon invited to discuss high policy at Downing Street and Chequers, and is eventually admitted to the (moderately vast) circle of occasional outside advisers to the Prime Minister. Then—rejection! Mrs. Thatcher fails to take his advice on important questions. He smarts, they bicker, and before long he is back in his ivory tower lamenting that she never really understood him or the imperatives of History. Kissed once, he never got over the experience. Accordingly, the picture of Mrs. Thatcher that this book gives is a mixture of the amorous and the actionable. But it tends ultimately to be a hostile one.

Mrs. Thatcher’s willingness to listen to opposing views and to expose her own views to

criticism in turn is generously acknowledged. Her personal kindnesses to friends, allies, and subordinates are amply described. And her political courage, range of knowledge, quickness in argument, and other personal qualities are warmly, indeed lavishly, praised. Passages like this one are littered throughout:

‘In that interview with Walden’, I went on, ‘you came out magnificently.’

The PM looked pleased but remained unsmiling. . . . ‘I’m so glad to hear you thought so. That’s praise indeed.’

‘That’s what *everyone* thought’, I said, ‘the interview was a triumph.’ [*Italics in original*]

But they tend to be balanced by countervailing passages like this one:

Alas, the line between advisers and courtiers has always been a thin one. So it is now. There are courtiers in her environment (I shall not name them). . . .

Whew! What a relief. For—full disclosure—I have been on occasions a sort of intellectual valet to Mrs. Thatcher (one, moreover, to whom she is still a hero) *and* a friend and occasional ally of George Urban, who pays me a kind tribute in this book.

But there is a pattern to these reversals of emotional fortune. The flights of flattery occur most frequently in the earlier parts of the book when author and subject are in general agreement on the topic of the hour—resisting the Soviets. As communism collapses and German reunification and “Europe” (where the two differ) become the pressing questions of the day, Mrs. Thatcher appears in an increasingly unflattering light. She becomes “dogmatic”, “subservient” to Ronald

Reagan, "haranguing" over Europe, and the purveyor of "Alf Garnett" and "saloon bar" prejudice over Germany. (For the benefit of American readers, I should explain that Alf Garnett is the British precursor of Archie Bunker and that a saloon bar harbors very different prejudices to a salon.) Mr. Urban tries to arrest this decline. He requests and is given a one-on-one interview in her crowded schedule (on the day of an Anglo-Italian summit and only a week after the Brighton hotel bombing) to put the case that the Prime Minister should wander around European capitals giving a series of major speeches on how to shape a united Europe. Alas, in vain. On such occasions and at larger seminars at Chequers, Mr. Urban discovers that she is much less open to argument, tends to listen to "courtiers", is in the grip of outdated nationalist prejudices, and as a result disagrees with him. The final vignette is of Mr. Urban at a cocktail party, trying in a kind way to correct the ex-Prime Minister on such matters as Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* and the role of national self-determination in European politics, but naturally getting nowhere until he "gently" removes himself from her circle.

This account, of course, supports in the end the conventional left-liberal/Tory "wet" view of Mrs. Thatcher as mad housewife. If that were not so, the book would hardly have won cover blurbs from Hugo Young and Neal Ascherson, whom Mr. Urban would almost certainly have included in his gallery of weak sisters on the occasions, described here, when he was advising the Prime Minister on how to tackle media feebleness during the Cold War. But the fact that it comes from someone who had access to the Prime Minister and who apparently recounts conversations and debates verbatim gives it unusual plausibility. Hence the fuss it provoked in the British media upon publication. Mr. Urban was telling us what Mrs. Thatcher is "really" like.

But was he? Reviewing this book in the London *Spectator*, Sir Charles Powell, who was an infinitely superior servant in Mrs. Thatcher's Downing Street (Head Butler to

my Boots), pointed out that Mr. Urban's official dealings with the Prime Minister were extremely modest: help on a few international speeches and attendance at two Chequers seminars with other academics to subject the Prime Minister's thinking to expert criticism. His other meetings generally took place at lunches and dinners organized by the Center for Policy Studies, the think tank that Mrs. Thatcher used for ideological refreshment when the caution of Sir Humphrey and her "wet" colleagues was getting her down. At the Chequers seminars Mr. Urban was present to challenge her views, at the CPS to arm her with new arguments against the Leviathan she uneasily headed. But he did not know the Prime Minister all that well, and he accordingly misunderstands her behavior on both sets of occasions.

A story that went around Downing Street in the mid-eighties will illustrate the point. A new specialist adviser, summoned to meet the Prime Minister, went in nervously to find that she was really interested in his subject. In the ensuing cross-examination, he gave a poor account of himself. As the corpse was being removed, Mrs. T. was heard to say: "Why do people take everything I say so *seriously*?"

MR. URBAN TAKES everything that Mrs. Thatcher ever said to him very seriously indeed. (He apparently rushed home, wrote it down, and has been illuminating the manuscript ever since.) It never occurs to him that she might have been testing an idea, giving her forensic skills a workout, relieving boredom by provoking a row, or simply blowing off steam at the end of a frustrating day. Yet towards the end of many days, she did all of those things—with the result that some of her more fiery views are now quoted out of the context that they were opinions or policies she was about to discard reluctantly in the light of better information. She spoke with such freedom because she felt that those around her could distinguish between her considered opinions and her expressions of frustration at the intractability of things, and also that

they would respect her confidences in any event. In the main, they did both. It is a pity that the one man who did not grasp this distinction was also the one man keeping a diary.

A similar misunderstanding underlies his account of the Chequers seminar at which Germany was the subject of discussion. Along with some of the other historians invited, he has protested that the minutes of the meeting, written by Charles Powell and leaked by an unknown hand to the German press, reflect Mrs. Thatcher's suspicious questions about the German national character rather than the mollifying answers given by some of the other participants. (Others support the Powell account.) One partial explanation is the Rashomon effect: even participants remember events differently, or as the Russians say: "No one lies like an eyewitness." What magnifies this effect in Mr. Urban's account is that he has no grasp of the purpose of official minutes in Whitehall. They are meant to point to a conclusion rather than merely record the proceedings. And the plain purpose of the Chequers minutes, as Powell pointed out in his review, "was to demonstrate to Ministers and senior officials that [Mrs. Thatcher's] views had been thoroughly aired but worsted in debate." But Mr. Urban begins by misunderstanding the Chequers minutes in particular—and Mrs. Thatcher in general—and ends by retailing these misunderstandings as History.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS have consequences. Mr. Urban's status as an inside-dopester has won him an audience he might not otherwise have enjoyed (*vide* Young and Ascherson) on larger questions. He describes the British Prime Minister as isolated in her shrill saloon-bar nervousness of German power, defeated by the historic inevitability of reunification—and today as equally shrill, isolated, and doomed in her opposition to the historic inevitability of European unification. This account is either wrong or questionable on every count save one, namely that British opposition to German reunification "met with unambiguous failure", and Mrs. Thatcher her-

self agrees with that—the passage in quotation marks comes from her memoirs. But was she isolated? Both President Mitterrand and Mr. Gorbachev were also opposed to German reunification and flirted briefly with the idea of trying to halt it. The Poles were nervous, in part because Chancellor Kohl, for electoral reasons, delayed final recognition of the Polish border. And many Germans, including the mildly socialist leaders of the East German uprising, wanted a slower *anschluss* than in fact occurred. Only Chancellor Kohl and, to its great credit, the Bush administration, seeing that German unity would benefit the West, consistently acted to ensure that it would happen with deliberate speed and least risk to European stability. (I write as someone who at the time thought Mrs. Thatcher's policy mistaken—a missed opportunity to trade British support on reunification for German willingness to enlarge the European Community.)

Nor was Mrs. Thatcher's shrill suspicion of the German national character (changeable, untrustworthy, etc.) unknown elsewhere. The French, other Europeans, and the Germans themselves endorse European unity as a means of tying Gulliver down precisely because they are all afraid of what an over-mighty Germany might do left to itself. This fear is exaggerated—on present demographic and economic trends Germany will have an economy of about the same size as the French economy by mid-century, which will make it one of four approximately equal economies in the EU—but it illustrates that the iron link Mr. Urban sees between anti-Germanism and Euro-skepticism is in reality extremely fragile. There is a *general* nervousness about Germany that leads some, like Chancellor Kohl, to advocate a tight European straitjacket, and others, like Mrs. Thatcher, to fear that the straitjacket would be a German one constricting the freedom of other countries and to call instead for a permanent U.S. presence on the continent.

It is still uncertain which response is the wiser, but, on the evidence of this book, Mr. Urban enjoys no special insight into History's verdict. Even in his own account, Mrs.

Thatcher clearly has the better of her disputes with him on such topics as Gorbachev's moral character as a reformer and the fate of the Thatcherite reforms of the British economy (now generally conceded to have produced a permanent improvement). And what are we to make of his considered judgment that "her gender was the key to Margaret Thatcher's fame"? The Falklands War, the installation of missiles in Europe, the pioneering of privatization, the defeat of the miners' strike and the destruction of labor union power, the partnership with Reagan that blocked Brezhnev, Chernenko, and Andropov but did business with Gorbachev, the warning to Bush not to "go wobbly" over Iraq—would all these have gone unnoticed if Mrs. Thatcher had been a chap? Really, George, "one has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that. . . ." Mr. Urban can complete the quotation.

There are signs scattered throughout the book that Mr. Urban is uneasy about writing it. His excuse is that others have given their versions of events, and that removes any oblig-

ation of confidentiality from him. He complains further that the important role played by him and other outside advisers is given short shrift in Mrs. Thatcher's own memoirs. He is merely setting the record straight.

Alas, these arguments can hardly have convinced George himself. He was admitted into the charmed circle on the understanding that he would respect its privacy. There was no suggestion that this obligation was mutual since he had no secrets to keep. Indeed, he benefited from the "leaks" to the press that suggested to the world he was helping shape prime ministerial speeches and, by extension, official policy. Such outside help was only rarely needed. Most of the time Mrs. Thatcher relied on official advice, especially on foreign policy (which anyway was only a modest portion of her responsibilities). The influence of outside advisers is inevitably modest. It will be even more modest in the future if they write books about it. □

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Right the First Time

Jeffrey Gedmin

Michael Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996), 224 pp., \$19.95.

"We must fulfill the promise of our time: an undivided Europe of free nations. . . . NATO enlargement is on track and it will happen."

—Warren Christopher, *March 20, 1996 in Prague*

"The process of NATO enlargement has begun. . . . It is irreversible. . . . Our friends and partners in the new democracies can rely on us."

—Volker Rühe, *April 30, 1996 in Washington, DC*

EXUBERANT DIPLOMATIC pronouncements notwithstanding, NATO enlargement is far from secure. The German government—the key to the issue in Europe—remains divided between Volker Rühe's pro-enlargement defense ministry (controlled by the Christian Democrats) and Klaus Kinkel's hesitant foreign ministry (controlled by the Free Democrats). Chancellor Helmut Kohl has tilted toward Kinkel's more cautious approach. Like Kinkel, Kohl is nervous about the impact that enlargement would have on Russia. He ranks European Union "deepening" through the establishment of a single European cur-

rency as his top foreign policy priority—a troublesome project in its own right that is sure to devour Kohl's energy in the months ahead.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the ocean, the Clinton administration lost its hard charger on NATO enlargement with the departure of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke from government. While statements such as “the train has already left the station” are certain to continue, there is little in the current administration's record to suggest consistency or resolve, and the case against NATO enlargement has been gathering steam. American scholars, pundits, and former policymakers in this camp include Paul Nitze, Senator Sam Nunn, Russia expert Robert Conquest, former Under Secretary of Defense Fred Iklé, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock, and *The National Interest's* Owen Harries. Stephen Sestanovich of the Carnegie Endowment belongs to this group, as does Fareed Zakaria of *Foreign Affairs*, Charles William Maynes of *Foreign Policy*, the *Washington Post's* Jim Hoagland, and Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times*. Among the most vocal critics of NATO enlargement is Michael Mandelbaum, and his most recent book, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe*, is sure to become a major intellectual document in the ongoing debate.

An adviser to Bill Clinton in the 1992 campaign, Mandelbaum is Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University and director of the project on East-West relations at the Council on Foreign Relations. From those points of institutional reference, Mandelbaum has been an active voice in the debate between minimalists and maximalists over post-Cold War American foreign policy; clearly Mandelbaum belongs to the latter group. He has argued against the dissolution of the Atlantic Alliance and for a sustained American involvement in Europe on realist grounds: American power is ballast and insurance against Germany and Russia. He puts the two countries in different categories, to be sure. Germany is democrati-

cally secure and a trusted ally; nevertheless, contends Mandelbaum, “the withdrawal of the United States from Europe would lead to a more powerful Germany.” If Europe were to provide for its own defense, and the Germans concluded that British and French nuclear weapons afforded insufficient protection, Germany might acquire nuclear weapons. In Mandelbaum's view, such developments would constitute a dangerous renationalization of European security policy. Central to Mandelbaum's concerns about European security, however, is not Germany but Russia, since “the resumption of an aggressive, imperial Russian foreign policy cannot be ruled out.” Thus, Mandelbaum's purpose in keeping NATO intact is simple and clear: “To keep an eye on the Russians and a hand—friendly, but firm—on the Germans.”

But Mandelbaum does not suggest that the maintenance of NATO alone will suffice to safeguard the peace. Part two of *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* argues Mandelbaum's case for a “common security order” in Europe to replace “the grim imperatives of power politics.” This confessedly Wilsonian velleity is central to Mandelbaum's argument against NATO enlargement. Those who fear that a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe would constitute an irresistible temptation for Russia, argues Mandelbaum, have missed a major point: Both a floor-to-ceiling array of arms control regimes and a web of normative and institutional connections within Europe preclude such a vacuum. One can build on this, too; Mandelbaum envisages a series of inclusive security arrangements roughly analogous to the Concert of Europe—the informal understandings forged among the great powers in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars that, he argues, constituted, “the most successful postwar European settlement.”

Mandelbaum concedes that these “common security” structures cannot prevent all conflict in Europe. He makes no pretense of offering solutions to future Bosnias and, as with the Concert of Europe, common security does not “impose any particular definition of

justice throughout Europe.” Rather, Mandelbaum’s primary aim is a system that would prevent the circumstances that could give rise to another major war on the continent. “The voluntary acceptance of treaty-imposed restraints on their own forces by each European country”, he writes, “reassures all the others that none harbors aggressive designs.” A common security order built around an arms control regime can work, in his view, because of the more intrusive on-site inspection and verification that has evolved since the late 1980s. As for Russia, the cause of most concern in any security order, the best chance for sustaining its commitment to common security lies in the establishment of a working democracy. Even short of this, however, Russia is unlikely to abandon its treaty commitments, if only because of its own weakness. And if Russia were to withdraw anyway? A defection would destroy the arrangement, Mandelbaum acknowledges, but the common security order would buy the United States and its allies adequate time to respond—including expanding NATO *then* if necessary.

Mandelbaum devotes the final third of his book to speculations about the future of Russia and the United States. Both countries’ interests, he contends, will be advanced by the “common security” regime he sketches and injured by NATO’s enlargement. Opening the alliance to new members in Central and Eastern Europe, Mandelbaum contends, could produce “the worst nightmare of the post-Cold War era: Weimar Russia”, an ailing former power excluded from the normal dynamics of the balance of power and driven to domestic political crisis because of it.

FUNDAMENTAL to Mandelbaum’s new common security order are the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty and other arms control agreements negotiated during and just beyond the last years of the Cold War. And central to his affection for this option is the contention that common security can accomplish what NATO enlarge-

ment cannot, namely that it neither alienates nor excludes Russia while reassuring the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But in putting the case this way, Mandelbaum undermines at least one important aspect of his own argument. He underestimates the fears of the Central and East Europeans. After all, NATO enlargement became a topic of international debate mainly because the Central and East Europeans took pains to raise the issue, not because the West sought to extend its influence. The Visegrad states of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic have feared the Clinton administration’s 1993 Partnership for Peace as a substitute for actual admission to NATO, and there is little reason to assume that their concerns could be assuaged by the common security order Mandelbaum offers as a substitute. Mandelbaum himself acknowledges that these fears are real, noting, for example, that the repercussions of a Russian annexation of Ukraine (hardly a far-fetched scenario) would immediately be felt and legitimately feared in Poland—and in Germany, too.

Mandelbaum raises the supposedly prohibitive cost of NATO enlargement to bolster his opposition to it. But citing such grounds for refusing admission to new members can be misleading. As Jeremy Rosner has observed, current estimates of the costs of NATO enlargement suggest a U.S. contribution of about \$1 billion annually—a considerable sum, but still less than one-half of 1 percent of the current defense budget, and only a fraction of the \$7 billion Congress added to this year’s Pentagon request.

Mandelbaum also wonders whether the American public would be willing to “run the same risks for Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, as it did for Cold War Bonn.” Arguing that enlargement would find little popular support in the United States, Mandelbaum cites a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll finding that a mere 32 percent of Americans would be willing to defend Poland were it attacked by Russia.

But the utility of such polls is at best dubious (a 1978 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll found only 48 percent of Americans prepared to send troops to defend West Berlin in the event of a Soviet takeover). In early 1991, when the public was busy concentrating on how the United States should best spend its "peace dividend", who would have suspected that an American president could convince a majority of Americans to send their sons and daughters halfway around the world to liberate a tiny, unfamiliar country called Kuwait? Whether Congress and the American people will support enlargement, and on what terms, are legitimate questions. But the answer is more elusive than Mandelbaum suggests here.

Most compelling in making his case against NATO enlargement is Mandelbaum's concern about the Baltics, Belarus, and Ukraine. After all, it is these countries that are most immediately vulnerable to Russian neo-imperialist aggression, and NATO enlargement could well increase their insecurities. Ukrainian independence, Mandelbaum convincingly argues, is of utmost importance to Western strategic interest, for a successful reincorporation of Ukraine would mean that Russia would once again become "a multinational empire with a foreign policy of expansion westward, and thus a threat to Europe." But it is not clear that NATO expansion is the main issue, one way or another, in the future of Ukraine.

Particularly unconvincing is Mandelbaum's claim that the common security order can succeed where other arms control arrangements have not. It was hard to imagine at one time, for instance, that Iraq, a signatory of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, could nearly acquire a bomb within the treaty's safeguard system. What is more, as Mandelbaum understands, a common security regime depends on the perpetuation of NATO and on the American commitment to Europe. It is still not a foregone conclusion, however, that the perpetuation of NATO is possible in the absence of a clear mission—clarity that

enlargement, as well as out-of-area missions, could well provide.

Similarly, it is difficult to accept Mandelbaum's unqualified assumption that NATO enlargement is preordained to ignite Russian hostility. It is worth bearing in mind that Mikhail Gorbachev and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, initially rejected German unification, and later adamantly opposed a united Germany in NATO. And, for a time, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher insisted privately that NATO membership encompassing what had been East Germany would remain entirely unacceptable for Moscow. But the "two-plus-four" process succeeded in engaging Moscow constructively and convincing the Soviets that a united Germany in NATO would be not a threat, but rather a reliable partner and a source of stability in Europe. Since the same holds true of NATO enlargement, why assume perpetual Russian hostility to the idea?

Of course, Mandelbaum is right to contend that any security arrangement that fails to take account of Russian interests in Eastern Europe would be reckless and short-sighted. But that is precisely why some, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, have proposed enlargement in association with confidence-building measures, such as a formal treaty between NATO and Russia, complemented by a new mechanism for special security consultations within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Such proposals reflect the same constructive spirit that inspired NATO's establishment in 1991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in which former members of the Warsaw Pact were invited to participate.

Finally, Mandelbaum rejects outright the possibility that NATO enlargement might actually improve Russian behavior abroad, because such a prospect is unconvincing to "those who know Russia best: Russians themselves." Prior to July's presidential election, though, and presumably when Mandelbaum's manuscript was already at the

printer, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov was already suggesting that "Russia could live with NATO's enlargement" provided NATO's infrastructure did not move east. For that matter, in April, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, whose country is intimately and acutely attuned to Russian sensitivities, had already told NATO Secretary General Javier Solana that his country would not oppose NATO enlargement as long as nuclear weapons were not deployed on the soil of new members.

Even Boris Yeltsin gave his blessing—at least for a moment—to NATO enlargement

during a trip to Poland in August 1993. Back then Michael Mandelbaum was writing in the *Washington Post* that admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance was a good idea, provided that enlargement be accompanied by a clear definition of new NATO policy toward the former Soviet Union. Mandelbaum was right the first time. □

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The Company Man

Mark Falcoff

Richard Bissell, Jr., with Jonathan E. Lewis and Francis T. Pudlo, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 268 pp., \$30.00.

THE LATE Richard Bissell was a career intelligence officer known for his most colossal failure—the management of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. At the time he had already devoted nearly a quarter century to government service, yet the wider public first became aware of him only as he made his inglorious exit through the side door. As befits a serious professional, over the next thirty years Bissell maintained a discreet silence regarding the tumultuous events in which he had played a part. Only in death has he broken his silence, in this case with the joint assistance of a young historian and his former secretary.

Three aspects of *Reflections of a Cold Warrior* immediately impress themselves on the reader. The first is the tone—which in spite of the dramatic subject matter manages

to be consistently flat, gray, clinical, and self-effacing. The style faithfully reflects the man: Bissell was no sensational cloak-and-dagger spy given to bouts of self-dramatization à la Howard Hunt, but a career security bureaucrat who understood the importance of discretion, teamwork, and prudent assessment.

The second impression one gets is that of an absolute minimum of introspection. "Never apologize, never explain" might well have been his motto, and while at times his evaluation of some controversial episodes in which he was involved might invite more extended comment, this taciturnity, one feels, is what one really wants in an intelligence professional. Better that, at least, than someone who feels he knows better than our elected officials. There is no evidence here, *pace* the late Senator Frank Church, of a rogue elephant loose in the corridors of our intelligence establishment.

Finally, this is a book about someone who belonged to the foreign policy establishment when we really had one—that interlocking directorate of graduates of New England "prep schools" and Ivy League colleges who

moved in and out of government, all the while maintaining a remarkable sense of *esprit* and public service. Time and history have not on the whole dealt kindly with these people. No doubt they suffered from a certain smugness and a provincialism of their own, and may even have occasionally abused class and tribal loyalties. They were not always right on the issues. But how refreshingly idealistic they seem compared to those men and women on the make who have flourished in our more recent anti-elitist age!

Bissell was utterly emblematic of this class: the scion of a Connecticut Republican family, after Groton and Yale (where his classmates included Max Millikan and Eugene Rostow) he became a junior member of the economics department at the latter institution, teaching people like Walt Rostow, McGeorge and William Bundy, and Kingman Brewster. He spent the war years in Washington working for the Commerce Department and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. In the immediate postwar period he worked on the Marshall Plan before returning to private life, this time as an officer at the Ford Foundation.

Even while working outside of government Bissell was recalled for regular consultations, and it was in this context that Allen Dulles recruited him early in 1953 as his special assistant at the (then new) Central Intelligence Agency. Once inside, he discovered that our intelligence services were knee-deep in a conspiracy to unseat Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz, whose evident closeness to the local Communist Party profoundly disturbed the Eisenhower administration. In retrospect, Bissell admits that the threat in Guatemala “may have been less . . . than it appeared at the time”, and he goes on to say that “it is perfectly arguable that U.S. interests” there “over the years might have been better served if Arbenz had remained in power”, either to be thrown out by his own people or discredited by ineptitude, corruption, or other forms of malfeasance.

With the wisdom of hindsight, many would regard both remarks as breathtaking understatements—though not blots on the CIA alone. Bissell reminds us that his mandate was merely to dislodge an unfriendly regime; it was not the responsibility of the CIA but of other government agencies to follow through with providing Guatemala a more satisfactory alternative. More’s the pity that they didn’t see it that way. On the other hand, he freely concedes that easy victory against Arbenz eventually exacted a higher price than official Washington realized at the time. The celerity with which the Guatemalan president was dislodged encouraged the entire national security establishment in Washington to overestimate the potential of covert warfare. “For many policymakers outside the CIA”, Bissell writes, it “became a quick fix, an easy way to deal with hostile foreign leaders and renegade nation-states.” This was an illusion that came back to haunt successive administrations elsewhere, particularly in Latin America.

Shortly after the Arbenz episode, Bissell was assigned to a unit that eventually developed and supervised flights of the U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union. Insofar as the technical aspects of this subject are concerned, the account is admirable for its lucidity and completeness. But it is even more revealing when it comes to the politics involved. To a degree perhaps unmatched by any civilian chief of state before or since, President Eisenhower successfully maintained civilian control over a vital intelligence project, this despite relentless challenges from the Air Force, backed by its allies in Congress.

Bissell also reveals that Eisenhower saw the U-2 as fulfilling a function in domestic politics as well as foreign policy. “If information brought back from the flights revealed that Soviet capabilities remained limited”, the President could “use it in the fight against increased defense spending.” Through U-2 surveillance, the White House learned that there was neither a missile gap nor a bomber gap (contrary to what Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy claimed during the 1960

presidential campaign), partly as a result of which Eisenhower was able to leave office with his budget in surplus.

It was during Bissell's watch that U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union and eventually produced for display in a Moscow courtroom. This was, of course, the biggest single intelligence disaster of the Eisenhower administration, leading to the dramatic collapse of a Paris summit with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The best explanation Bissell can provide is that "we felt that there was very little chance that a pilot would be shot down and live." In another one of his breathtaking understatements, he simply adds "we were not well-prepared for what happened."

BY THE TIME John F. Kennedy took office in 1961 the Agency was already at work on what became the Bay of Pigs invasion. This section of the book will probably hold the greatest interest for readers, though some of what Bissell reveals has already been covered by others, notably Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Peter Wyden.¹ Evidently, the Cuban affair was intended to replicate the Agency's success in Guatemala: An exile force would land, establish a beachhead, and with the aid of radio broadcasts, leaflets, and general panic, invite the Cuban military and other functionaries to abandon their support of the Castro regime. This would also be the signal for anti-government elements across the island to declare their existence and join forces with the invaders.

Just before his departure from office, President Eisenhower was sentient enough to pose the following question to the Agency: "What are the feasible means of helping to mobilize a stronger invasion force so that a failure in the first effort would not wipe out the whole project?" The query received no immediate answer and was never again posed, possibly because the Agency task force encouraged or allowed Eisenhower's successor and his advisers "to believe that in the event of uncontrollable pressure at the beachhead the brigade

could retire and thereby protect the guerrilla option." Whether the "guerrilla option" was really feasible was apparently never thoroughly explored, possibly to avoid uncomfortable discovery that it was not.

As anyone who has worked in either the military, business, or government knows, big projects tend to acquire a life (and eventually, a justification) of their own. Within government, agencies strive not infrequently to be on both sides of a divisive question so that they will not be caught short no matter what happens. In the case of the Bay of Pigs, nobody seems to have been sure that the plan would have worked, but no one would say so forthrightly. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff produced a report that accurately predicted that loss of surprise "could lead to the destruction of all or part of the invasion force." Yet, it conceded, the chance of maintaining secrecy in Miami's gossip and rumor-prone Cuban community was next to zero. Significantly, however, this point was left out of the Executive Summary, whose optimism poorly reflected the whole document's actual contents.

It is generally conceded today that to have succeeded at the Bay of Pigs a series of air strikes would have been needed to take out the microwave radio links that constituted the island's basic communications network and also carried much of Castro's military traffic. But as planning for the invasion went forward, President Kennedy continually reduced the number of such strikes so as to provide plausible deniability of U.S. involvement in the affair. The President's anxiety was fed by pleas from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, both of whom were understandably reluctant to face the diplomatic consequences.

As a result, Kennedy repeatedly asked his aides whether the air strikes were really necessary at all. During those weeks Bissell's greatest

¹Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967); Peter Wyden, *The Bay of Pigs* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979).

fear was that he would be forced to say, "Mr. President, this operation might as well be made open because the role of the United States certainly cannot be hidden." Fortunately for him, that moment never arrived. Instead, Kennedy split the difference, ordering just enough air strikes to show our hand, but far fewer than required to make a military difference. With his communications network largely intact, Castro was able to move troops to the invasion sight much earlier than anticipated, effectively eliminating the possibility that a rebel beachhead would be established.

In retrospect, Bissell is still not certain that the air strikes alone would have been sufficient to guarantee success. But in yet another example of his penchant for extraordinary understatement, he writes that "there would have been a significant difference between flying eight sorties and close to forty." Perhaps the final word on the matter comes best from his chief, Allen Dulles, whom he quotes from a hitherto unpublished document: "Great actions require great determination. . . . One never succeeds unless there is a determination to succeed", which necessitates "a willingness to face some unpleasant political repercussions."

BISSELL LEFT the Agency just as its reputation for infallibility was crumbling. Still ahead lay disasters in Vietnam, Iran,

Nicaragua, and one in Iraq that required massive military action to repair. But to say that intelligence professionals and the White House can seriously err in the use of covert action is not to say—in Bissell's view at least—that our policies can somehow be made foolproof by submitting them to legislative oversight. Such oversight, he reminds us, always existed even in the heyday of the Cold War, though in those days the appropriate congressional committees were only briefed in a very general fashion. More to the point, with the exponential increase in the size of the staffs of the House and Senate, and their increasing tendency to leak sensitive materials to the press, one might as well abandon covert action as an option altogether. Whether our national interests will ultimately and always be served by such an abandonment is, of course, another matter.

Despite its unexciting prose and tendency to flatten what must have been far more dramatic events, *Recollections of a Cold Warrior* is informative and stimulating. It shows us where we have been and poses some hard questions on where we might wish to go in the future. It is both a fitting memorial and a legacy worthy of the conscientious public servant who has bequeathed it to us. □

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From Atatürk to Erbakan

Andrew Mango

Jeremy Seal, *A Fez of the Heart* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1996), 337 pp., \$14.00.

Tim Kelsey, *Dervish: The Invention of Modern Turkey* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1996), 322 pp., £18.

Jonathan Rugman, *Atatürk's Children: Turkey and the Kurds* (London: Cassell, 1996), 128 pp., £19.99.

IS THE WEST "losing" Turkey? The question has been prompted by the accession to power in Ankara in June 1996 of a coalition government in which the Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, or RP) is the senior partner, with its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, the prime minister. Concern in the West increased when in August Turkey agreed to buy \$23 billion worth of natural gas from Iran, just as the

U.S. administration was intensifying its efforts to ostracize the regime in Tehran.

The fact, too, that Erbakan chose Muslim countries—Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia—for his first foreign trip as prime minister suggested that Turkey might shift orientation from West to East. Furthermore, Erbakan's ambition to develop relations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria on the basis of Islamic solidarity appeared to dash hopes that a Turkish model of Western secularism would offset the Iranian fundamentalist one in the former Soviet Union as well as the Middle East. Erbakan's homely rhetoric has also strengthened the impression of a man bent on pushing away all that is Western. "If the West had to repay the debt it owes to the Muslim world for the gift of Arabic numerals", he told an audience in Malaysia, "it would have to mortgage its pants."

Turkish secularists shuddered at all this, seeing their worst fears confirmed: The religious men who had come to rule them were not only reactionaries but vulgarians. Millions of Turks, happy in their Western lifestyles, had long warned of the dangerous opening that Western-style democracy afforded to political Islam, and the pro-secularist media, which predominate in Turkey, were not slow to communicate their heightened fears to receptive Western democrats.

But while media passions have risen in Turkey and abroad, the scene inside the country has changed little. Topless tourists still crowd the beaches; Turkish drivers continue to threaten life and limb under the influence of alcohol; the Western world's favorite mixture of sex and violence is still provided in good measure on numerous Turkish television channels. Just as customary pleasures go on, so do the old pains, only more so: The budget deficit is growing faster than before, as are prices, and the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast is claiming more victims. The International Monetary Fund has warned again that the country must live within its means. And an

old familiar face, that of Mrs. Tansu Çiller, U.S.-trained professor of macroeconomics who had presided over the rake's progress of the Turkish economy, has reappeared after a brief absence, this time not as a prime minister needing Western help to stem the Islamic tide, but as a deputy prime minister and foreign minister in the Islamist-led coalition.

To crown the matter, the U.S.-Iraqi confrontation of late August and early September, which resulted in a dramatic alteration of the status quo in northern Iraq and a series of intense U.S.-Turkish exchanges, was met by stark silence from Mr. Erbakan. So stark was it, indeed, that it sent ripples of disapproval through the party faithful, among whom were those still expecting Erbakan's actions in office to bear a family resemblance to his words before and during the campaign. Even with respect to major initiatives, such as the establishment of a Turkish security zone inside northern Iraq, the prime minister was silent. Gone too was talk of Islamic solidarity, an Islamic NATO, a southwest Asian Islamic common market. When he returned from an unsuccessful trip to Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria in October, Erbakan defended himself by claiming that his aim had been to promote Turkish exports. His secularist rivals had said much the same.

So, then, what *is* new in Turkey? That an avowed Islamist is prime minister certainly is new in the seventy-odd year history of the republic. The constituency he represents, the backwoodsmen of the Anatolian Plateau, Turkey's poorest region, have long felt despised by their richer, more European neighbors in the western coastlands. The migrants they have sent to the city slums have good grounds for distrusting the leadership of the secularist parties. "He's a good Muslim, so he is less likely to steal", they reasoned, as their swelling numbers elected Islamist mayors in 1994 and Islamist members of parliament the following year. Their political power is indeed new.

But one must not exaggerate it. Despite the glaring faults of the outgoing, mainly Social Democratic, town councils, only 19 percent of the electorate voted for the Islamists in local polls. Despite economic mismanagement, which brought a record drop of 6 percent in GNP and record inflation of over 100 percent in 1994, only 21 percent voted for the Islamists the following year in parliamentary polling. Clearly, Turkey has not undergone a mass religious conversion. Rather, social division, heightened by uneven development (and development is always uneven), has simply increased political divisions that the Islamists, as one network among many, have worked hard to exploit.

Erbakan is not strong enough to change the system, nor can anyone else change it with only a bare plurality, not a majority, of political power. Moreover, there is no indication that he really wishes to do so. Rather, having finally achieved power, he intends to use it to help himself and his supporters. Turkey's Islamist-led coalition is not a radical government, and even before the northern Iraq crisis its policies showed as much. For example, Erbakan took the advice of his military and extended the stay in Turkey of the Allied aircraft that overfly northern Iraq. He also broke his promise to denounce Turkey's defense cooperation agreement with Israel and signed a still wider agreement on defense industry cooperation with that country.

The military's advice on specific issues aside, Erbakan is certainly enough of a pragmatist to realize that he cannot change the habits of the majority of his fellow countrymen or the basic legal framework under which they lead their lives. The supposed risk he poses to the status quo in Turkey is also belied by the comic side of some of his nostrums for dealing with domestic economic ills. One needs an adjective other than pragmatic to describe a politician who claims that he can finance his largesse to the electorate by making public employees pay for the gas they burn when they use official cars

on private trips, or who thinks that Turkey and Indonesia could together become world champions in aircraft production.

Erbakan's eccentricities apart, the central point is that the nexus of economic, political, and diplomatic relations that binds Turkey to the West remains in place, but that within it, Turkey has its own national interests, now as before. All Turkish governments have tried to develop profitable relations with their neighbors, including Muslim ones, while remaining faithful to the Atlantic Alliance. Erbakan's Islamic rhetoric is new, but the attempt to procure natural gas from Iran, Iraq, Qatar, and the Soviet Union goes back more than twenty years, and just as Turkish anti-communists raised no objections to the purchase of Soviet gas then, so Turkey's secularists support Erbakan's wish to buy Iranian gas now. The gas deal is not an anti-American gesture. It makes as much economic sense in Ankara as the U.S. policy of ostracizing Tehran may make political sense in Washington.

There is, nonetheless, reason for concern. The trouble is that the Islamic rhetoric that Erbakan has deployed may mislead not only the West, but, more dangerously, Middle Eastern dictators. Erbakan may endanger stability without meaning to, particularly if he starts talking again as he did last summer. Hence, his presence in the prime minister's office does invite a new look at the interests involved in the bilateral U.S.-Turkish relationship, and in the wider relationship between Turkey and the West.

The view, however, is often obscured by a variety of anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish hobby horses found in profusion in the attics of the West. Three books that have recently come from the pens of British writers, each broadly critical of the state of affairs in Turkey, make the point. *A Fez of the Heart* by Jeremy Seal is a travel book structured around the history of the fez, the red flower-pot-shaped hat introduced by the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and banned in 1925 by

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish republic. *Dervish: The Invention of Modern Turkey* by Tim Kelsey is a collection of vignettes of life in Turkey as seen through the jaundiced eye of a journalist. Another journalist, Jonathan Rugman, gives his report of the Kurdish insurgency in southeastern Turkey in *Atatürk's Children: Turkey and the Kurds*.

The three writers differ much in their literary approach. As his awful punning title warns, Jeremy Seal is jokey and, at times, fey. Tim Kelsey's is hard-hitting, but not necessarily on target, as he serves out dirt and mauls Turkey's history and geography. Jonathan Rugman provides a more straightforward eyewitness account of the Turkish military's anti-terrorist operations, an account illustrated by Roger Hutchings' telling photographs. All three concentrate on life in Turkey outside the tourist resorts and the diplomatic cocktail circuit in Ankara; all challenge the way in which Turkey's elite perceives the domestic scene; and are all critical of the legacy of Atatürk. Rugman sees that legacy as the brutal suppression of dissent, Kelsey as the denial of multiculturalism, Seal as the death of the cosmopolitanism, which, he believes, the fez symbolized. Of the three, Rugman is the most sympathetic to Turkey's circumstances, balancing the brutality of the security forces against that of the armed bands of the radical Kurdish nationalists of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party).

Seal, Kelsey, and Rugman have much company in the West, but criticism of Atatürk is also heard inside Turkey, albeit in muted form. It is muted because a law passed in 1951 (thirteen years after his death) makes it a punishable offense to insult his memory. Some domestic critics regret the denial of Kurdish ethnicity in Atatürk's republic; others argue against the forcible secularization of the state. Both groups base their criticism of the status quo on what they take to be modern Turkey's democratic premises. But the stoutest champions of democracy in

Turkey's liberal intelligentsia also happen to be the strongest defenders of Atatürk's legacy. Foreign observers—these three writers among them—may see this as a contradiction, for Atatürk was undoubtedly an autocrat, but their logic does violence to history. They seem to be unaware of several seminal truths about the founding of the Turkish Republic.

For the Turkish intelligentsia, Atatürk's greatest merit was that he opened the country to the world—as Peter the Great is said to have opened Russia's window to the West. Atatürk called it “catching up with contemporary civilization”—and the civilization in whose tenets he was schooled and into which he wanted to bring his country was best exemplified by the French Republic, the *grande nation* that emerged from the Revolution. Just as the French language and culture, and French citizenship built thereon, had made a French nation out of all the inhabitants of France, so too common Turkish citizenship, similarly based on a common language and culture, would create a Turkish nation out of the predominantly Muslim inhabitants of Turkey. It was a Turkish nationalist—not a cosmopolitan—vision, but Atatürk's nationalism was outward-looking, inspired by the conviction that there was only one universal civilization, defined in Enlightenment terms as the onward material and moral march of humanity. The Turkish nation would, thus and perforce, develop its identity within the world community of civilized nations. As Atatürk saw it, the ragged, convoluted cosmopolitanism that had been the accretion of empire had to go—and the fez along with it.

Like the French revolutionaries, Atatürk believed in the Goddess Reason. In his early years, he borrowed the argument of Islamic apologists that Islam was the reasonable religion *par excellence*; later, when the clergy posed an obstacle to many of his reforms, he sought to substitute Reason for Islam. “Catching up with contemporary civilization” meant adopting the best practices of

the world, which is to say the highest agreed standards of conduct. These, of course, have varied over time. Between the two world wars, democracy was absent from much of the West; today it is universally seen as the best political model. In Atatürk's day, cultural divisions within the modern nation were seen as retrograde; today multiculturalism is the latest fashion. Turkey's appeal to democratic standards in the 1920s has thus not kept up with liberal Western intellectual fashion.

Nonetheless, the appeal to such standards in "developed countries" (the modern locution for "the civilized world") remains almost universal in Turkey. Just as Atatürk took his political ideas from French Jacobins, his civil law from Switzerland, his commercial code from Germany, and his penal law from Mussolini's Italy, so Turks today take their constitutional models from Western Europe, their business culture from the United States, their fashion from Italy, and their "high culture" from the Western canon, of which Turkey's best writers—Orhan Pamuk and Yaşar Kemal today, Sait Faik before them—are more conscious than some of their Western contemporaries. Foreign films, television, books in translation (appearing with remarkable speed), Western press material, and Western advertising all feed both "high" and "low" culture in Turkey. For a writer like Pamuk the problem is not his acceptance of universal culture, but the difficulty of contributing to it from an off-center location.

Turkey is off-center economically as well as culturally. For most Turks, catching up with contemporary civilization means leading more prosperous lives. Although the sixty-five million citizens of Turkey today live longer and better than the twelve or thirteen million who lived in the country when Atatürk founded the republic, they are still much poorer than most Europeans. However much one may qualify GDP figures, the difference between Turkey's \$2,928 per capita GDP and the \$7,071 level achieved in Greece, let alone \$23,537 in Germany, points to a

huge disparity in material standards. Seal and particularly Kelsey describe in fascinated detail the ugliness and squalor of Turkey's provincial cities. Poverty is not pretty, and those laboriously acquiring material possessions are not often choosy about aesthetics. But pointing the finger of scorn at the bad taste and the cultural incongruity of the lives of migrants from the countryside—and most Turks fall into this category—is itself rather ugly. Kelsey in particular concentrates on the seamy side of things—stonewalling bureaucrats, prisons, transsexuals, the contrast between pretentious environmentalists and a degraded environment. In both books, the device of the literal translation of conversations makes for gratuitous funny talk.

Disorder is indeed the first impression that strikes many a foreign visitor to Turkey. Seal rightly sees that its obverse is vitality—the vitality of a developing society thrashing around to achieve a productive articulation. Such an articulation may yield cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, attributes that Seal and Kelsey believe Turkey lacks to its misfortune. But they seem unaware that the loss of these attributes with which the Ottoman Empire had been endowed was not exclusively or even mainly the fault of ethnic Turks. The non-Turkish peoples of the empire were not thrust from Turkish rule, for the most part, but chose to leave it. The Greeks removed themselves finally and officially when their Patriarchate severed links with the Ottoman state in March 1919; the Armenians broke away under more complex and tragic circumstances during and just after the First World War.

Meanwhile, the Muslims who were left in possession of Asia Minor after the First World War had always been considered a single community under the empire's *millet* system of sectarian-communal autonomy. Though ethnic Turks were the majority, the Muslim community also included Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, and Albanian and Bosnian refugees from the Balkans. Atatürk thus built on an existing reality when he

decided to make of them all a Turkish nation, without distinction of "race"—what we nowadays call ethnicity. He succeeded except for the Kurds, whose unrelenting insistence on a separate national identity gives urgency to Turkey's main political task today: the redefinition and reorganization of the state.

Rugman understands the difficulty of the task. He notes that the war with the PKK has driven a vast Kurdish underclass into Western Turkey. If the past is any guide, the descendants of these migrants will be assimilated into the surrounding Turkish society. The situation is different in the predominantly Kurdish provinces, where assimilation has made little progress. But, to quote Rugman, "if Turkey were to abrogate its responsibilities toward the southeast, the lack of political structures and alternatives in what is still a tribal society would probably result in a regional bloodbath." Given that withdrawal would be disastrous, multiculturalism, as part of democratic reforms throughout Turkey, may soften, even if it does not solve, the conflict. However, practical multiculturalism, which means in the Turkish case the recognition of a separate Kurdish culture, can only come with the consent of the Turkish majority as expressed in parliament. But overweening patronage networks control parliament and have virtually taken over the state in the name of democracy. They are abusing Turkish national sentiment in order to perpetuate their own rule, and under such conditions meaningful political majorities favoring change cannot congeal. A sensible accommodation between Turkish and Kurdish national sentiments will be possible only when Turkish democracy cures itself of these abuses.

Turkish domestic opposition to Atatürk's legacy comes from people who are suspicious of the outside world; the criticism that Atatürk was a barren imitator of the West, in particular, feeds on xenophobia inside Turkey. It is therefore both curious and revealing that the same line of criticism is implied by foreign observers, most of them liberals, whose sensibility is disturbed by the patchiness of Turkey's adoption of what used to be Western, but is now universal, culture.

Indeed, the subtext of both Seal and Kelsey is that the Turks are not, cannot be, and ought not try to be Europeans. Such liberal criticism of the Turks has a long pedigree. In the past, it concentrated on the maltreatment of non-Muslim minorities, while disregarding the sufferings of the Muslims elsewhere. (Gladstone's injunctions to throw the Turks bag and baggage out of Europe paid little heed to *their* human rights.¹) Religious bigotry has long poured from liberal English mouths in the guise of racial generalizations. As Michael Llewellyn Smith has remarked, Lord Curzon, who as foreign secretary seconded the efforts of Lloyd George to cut Turkey down to size, "like many of his epoch . . . invariably named [the Turks] in the singular as if they were a genus 'Turk' to which the epithets corrupt, oppressive, intriguing applied."² Always ugly, such bias is now thoroughly atavistic. Continents are being drawn together, much of the world's culture is becoming truly global, and its Western guardians will not be able to keep the Turks indefinitely locked out of it. In Turkey's case, being European is more a matter of choice than of geography, and that choice is most sensibly left to the Turks themselves. No number of books about strange looking hats and ugly towns ought to be allowed to change that. □

¹See Justin McCarthy, *Death in Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922* (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995).

²*Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor 1919-1922* (London: Allen Lane, 1973), p. 65.

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Geotherapy:

CONGRATULATIONS on Stephen Sestanovich's brilliant "Geotherapy: Russia's Neuroses and Ours" (Fall 1996). Sestanovich has put his finger on the fallacy of viewing Russian imperialist urges as a significant problem for U.S. foreign policy. Recommendations based on the "geotherapeutic" ideas Sestanovich identified are likely to turn out worse than merely ineffective; by attempting to ward off an imaginary danger they would diminish the United States' ability to promote its actual interests—which, in fact, are not in fundamental conflict with Russia's real interests.

Let us hope that policymakers in both countries will continue to ignore the alarms of polemicists who are captive to superficial and misleading geopolitical slogans.

*Jack Matlock, Jr.
U.S. ambassador to Russia (1987-91)*

STEPHEN SESTANOVICH'S essay shows him to be one of the few prominent "Russia hands" in the United States today who sincerely believes that the United States should not paint Russia into a corner. I agree with all four elements of his corrective analysis and I would like to add a few observations that arise from my perspective here in Moscow.

First, as to the supposed imperial mindset of the current Russian elite, Dr. Sestanovich is polite in understating the nature of this elite. Insofar as an elite may be said to exist, it seems to consist partly of burly young men who spend \$10,000 a night in Moscow discotheques, and for whom

"imperial designs" mean simply how to get their dirty money out of Russia in order to buy property in the United States or in the Bahamas. Another part consists of those leftover mediocrities from the former Soviet *nomenklatura* who cling to power like lichen, and their young impudent assistants immersed in solving the problems of state, notably how to get rid of their elders so as to have more freedom to enrich themselves. Today's Russian elite (and one should really ask pardon for using the term) is now deeply engaged in the only business the rulers of Russia have ever really mastered—the business of stealing, of *kormleniya s vlasty* (feeding from power).

As to the imperial mindset of the Russian people, this is sheer nonsense, as Dr. Sestanovich demonstrates. In fact, yes, Russian nationalist feelings are aroused because Russians, who among the peoples of the world were one of the most immune to the bacilli of nationalism, have finally had it. They are fed up with being poked and punched by Armenians, Estonians, and Chechens. They do not want to give up parts of their national territory for nothing, but that is the extent of their "expansionist feelings." Most Russians today could not care less about Poles, Czechs, Cubans, Angolans, Ethiopians—or even Russians living outside the Russian Federation.

The so-called "imperial mindset" ascribed to the Russian people by some American experts is not a longing for empire but a nostalgia for the days when one could move freely in the space of the FSU. Americans should try to understand the situation in the terms of an analogous fracturing of the United States. Imagine that while living in Maine you are unable legally (through the

post office!) to transfer money to your son who happens to study in Pennsylvania, or that while going from the state of New York to Texas or California you have to cross three or four customs checkpoints and be thoroughly frisked by at least four lots of border guards, in a country that you and your grandparents used to criss-cross without impediment. That is what most Russians have to put up with today, and it is not surprising that they do not like it. But that dislike hardly amounts to an “imperial” state of mind.

As to whether Russian leaders are preoccupied with questions of prestige and status, yes, they are. It cannot be otherwise in a country that only a decade ago used to be a superpower, and now ranks among less developed third world countries. The fact is that after Moscow’s military fiasco in Chechnya even the tiny option that remained useful—a policy of bluff (as was so masterfully used by Khrushchev, who also acted from a position of weakness)—is no longer available to Kremlin strategists. Lacking any firm base on which to stand, Russian leaders desperately pretend that Russia has residual great power status. Hence, for example, the sickening invocation by the Russian leadership and its servile mass media of the “G-8” and “16+1” meetings and other “colossal breakthroughs” as a result of which Russia supposedly stands even with the major powers. Feelings of total impotence blind common sense: When traveling to Beijing in April (if only to show, even symbolically, that Russian diplomacy still exists) President Yeltsin started to brag about the “great assignment” ostensibly given to him by the G-7 to talk the Chinese into supporting the CTB Treaty. Now think: Why, during such a golden opportunity to demonstrate some freedom of maneuver, should President Yeltsin present himself as an errand boy of the West? Only because of the total obsession with “being equal” to other “big boys.” . . . Our leaders are multiplying words to compensate for the lack of substance. This is plain as can be in Moscow.

Also plain here is the deeply destructive impact of U.S. policies on the goodwill built up for decades among the Russian intelligentsia. Dr. Sestanovich quotes my colleagues Alexey Bogaturov and Viktor Kremenyuk writing recently about “the Americans who will never stop.” That is not just their view. It has become the predominant conviction of the majority of Russian intellectuals—including those intellectuals who, in the darkest days of the Cold War, privately looked to the United States as a guiding star of democracy and justice, and who sincerely believed that what the Russian people did since the mid-1980s to make the world truly safe for democracy would be rewarded by real, not sham, partnership with the United States.

All the illusions on that score are gone now. The United States is increasingly seen as a selfish, insatiable giant that will stop at nothing to grab from a weaker “partner” whatever is possible. While speaking grandiloquently of the need “to erase the Cold War’s outdated frontiers forever”, what Washington is actually doing now is creating a new dividing line between the West and the East in Europe, using the seasoned instrument of the Cold War: the NATO Alliance.

I hope Dr. Sestanovich’s essay gets the wide reading it deserves. Our two countries are in the process of trading one tragic epoch for another. It is almost too sad for words.

Henry Trofimenko
Institute of the USA and Canada, Moscow

STEPHEN SESTANOVICH provides a needed corrective to what he calls the “geotherapeutic” school of Russian analysts by pointing out that present-day Russians have other concerns than imperial expansion and superpower status. He may well be right that interest in these matters has declined visibly in the past five years. But in so doing, he commits the same methodological error of which he accuses Kissinger, Brzezinski, and, by implication, me.

The issue is not “either-or.” The Russians may be—and in my opinion, are—bewildered by the loss of their international standing and still assign higher priority to other concerns, such as political and social stability, improvement of their living standards, and reduction of crime. I believe these are indeed their current priorities. But to concede this does not mean nostalgia for empire and superpower status do not lurk in the background, ever ready to spring forward.

Some of the documents Mr. Sestanovich cites actually demonstrate the opposite of what they are meant to prove. The fact that the prestigious Council on Foreign and Defense Policy declares that “closer relations between Russia and the Soviet states are probably inevitable” does not inspire confidence, for we know from experience that in the Russian political vocabulary the “inevitable” usually requires outside help. Nor do I derive comfort from assurances that Russia will “lead” rather than “control” her one-time republics. Wasn’t the Communist Party also “leading” the Soviet Union?

And finally, my remarks about the adjustment of France and Portugal to the loss of empire must not be taken out of context. Of course, both countries fought for their imperial possessions because they were valuable assets. But their loss did not affect their sense of national identity. It is different in the case of Russia whose empire grew—both geographically and historically—concurrently with its national state. For this reason, its loss has been much more traumatic.

*Richard Pipes
Harvard University*

IN ADROITLY APPLYING a medical metaphor to criticize those fearing a resurgence of Russian imperial expansionism, Stephen Sestanovich raises a critical question: On what evidence do we judge Russia’s “appetite for empire”? If the Kremlin is no longer bent on resurrecting

the USSR (even without Communist rule), then what *is* Russia trying to achieve in the CIS? Since a neurosis, according to Dorland’s Medical Dictionary, is “an emotional disorder due to unresolved conflicts, anxiety being its chief characteristic”—and since the end of the Cold War has left Russia with a fair share of unresolved conflicts—how does the Kremlin aim to resolve these conflicts and calm its post-Soviet anxieties?

While another USSR is clearly not on Russia’s policy agenda, those identified by Sestanovich as “geotherapists” (Kissinger, Brzezinski, et al.) are right to warn of a new Russian expansionism if by it they mean that Moscow seeks greater leverage over the security and economic policies of the CIS member-states. Indeed, treated with attention to detail, key pieces of evidence from “Geotherapy” confirm this interpretation of current Russian policies.

First, while it is true that the March 15, 1996, Duma decrees annulling the USSR dissolution accords of 1991 were denounced by the Yeltsin government, their vitriolic anti-communist thrust suggested a fear that the Communists would steal the thunder from Yeltsin’s own effort to show Russians how much he himself lamented the collapse of the union. Yeltsin’s press office called the Duma resolution detrimental to the “real process of CIS integration”—a statement clearly consistent with a desire to increase Moscow’s influence. Furthermore, recall that Yeltsin claimed, at about the same time that he signed the 1991 accords dissolving the Soviet Union, that his aim was to *preserve* what he could of the decaying federal structure. Yeltsin may have truly believed that by annulling the 1991 accords, the Duma *undermined* his effort to maximize Russia’s leverage in the CIS.

Second, the Integration Agreement with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—and the bilateral alliance with Belarus—while undertaken largely for symbolic purposes (Sestanovich is right here), were nevertheless huge public-relations undertakings aimed at

selling Yeltsin as the more skillful and cunning re-integrationist. Watching Lukashenka's visit to Moscow last spring on Russian state-controlled TV threw me back in time, so pompous, senselessly long, and "Sovietized" was the coverage. Would such an effort be necessary if Yeltsin's pollsters thought the Russian public did not care deeply about the loss of the USSR, as Sestanovich seems to imply?

It is also remarkable—given the deep ideological divide between Yeltsin and the Communists on domestic issues—how similar their positions have been on foreign policy. Search as they could, spokesmen for the Yeltsin and Communist election teams could not find foreign policy differences worth exploiting even in the heat of the campaign. Consider, too, that the only Yeltsin cabinet member endorsed by the Communists was Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, while the only Communist appointed as a government minister by Yeltsin (Aman Tuleyev) is in charge of CIS affairs. Great Power nostalgia has been bipartisan, with Communists stressing the trauma of loss and Yeltsin emphasizing the pragmatics of restoring it non-aggressively.

Sestanovich's polemic is on target when he argues that Russia knows that it is too weak to play the old superpower game. But the sense of weakness may well heighten the desire to be stronger. Again, the evidence cited in "Geotherapy" may be read this way. Russia is determined to strengthen its position in the CIS using means other than those normally associated with imperial expansionism: exchanging debt for ownership of local industrial facilities, setting up joint financial-industrial groups and banks, and so forth. Does this mean USSR-II? No. Does it mean that Russia's post-imperial "neurosis" is safely cured? Also no.

All this aside, Sestanovich is certainly correct to say that U.S. policymakers must undertake a more systematic effort to create conditions in which the major "defeated" power of the Cold War, Russia, finds a

respectable and responsible place in the international system. Even if Russia is "neurotic", it is not in the U.S. interest to needlessly evoke "symptoms" through policies that exaggerate Russian hostility.

Mikhail Alexseev

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies

Sestanovich replies:

Richard Pipes and Mikhail Alexseev worry about continuing Russian imperial urges, but the symptoms they cite are mild indeed. Professor Pipes correctly reminds us that in the totalitarian lexicon the Communist Party had only a "leading role" in society; *ergo*, it's disconcerting to hear that Russia wants to exercise "leadership" in the former Soviet Union. This would be a telling point if the totalitarian lexicon were still in use. But Russian political discourse, although full of evasions, half-truths, and outright lies, is no longer conducted in Stalinist code. If we keep trying to decode it, we won't get very far.

Mikhail Alexseev asks why, if Russians don't care about empire, agreements on "integration" get so much TV time. Well, because political candidates like to claim credit for even the tiniest deeds (forgetting about them once the votes are in). Is this more disturbing in Russia than anywhere else? As for Russia's interest in debt-equity swaps, which help it to gain ownership of factories, refineries, and so forth, in the "near abroad", these deals will make some Russians rich. Do they show a lingering post-imperial neurosis? Maybe, but let us recall how often we lecture the Russians not to see a geopolitical plot whenever we, or the Germans, acquire similar economic assets in the former Soviet Union. We say it's just good old-fashioned entrepreneurial greed at work. We're right, and should not find it so hard to believe the Russians when they say the same thing.

Let Iraq Collapse:

DANIEL BYMAN'S article, "Let Iraq Collapse" (Fall 1996), has done a commendable job, making about as good a case as one can for the thesis that Iraq should be allowed to break up. However, the fundamental premise of the article is wrong: the collapse of Iraq is neither imminent (as the article implies), nor in the U.S. interest. Moreover, the article completely overlooks the crucial issue of whether the break-up of Iraq is attainable if the country does not collapse under the weight of sanctions and its own contradictions.

First of all, while America has no compelling interest in the unity of Iraq per se, it does have a vital interest in preserving access to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf at reasonable prices. The break-up of Iraq thus matters only to the degree that it impinges on U.S. access to Persian Gulf oil. While Saddam threatens the oil resources of the region (he attacked Iran's oil producing region in 1980 and burned Kuwait's oil wells in 1990), the break-up of Iraq and turmoil in the oil-rich south of that country could likewise disrupt oil exports. It is not self-evident which outcome—unity or break-up—better serves U.S. interests.

If Iraq is unlikely to collapse on its own, how might the United States hasten the break-up of the country? The United States could arm Kurdish and Shiite opponents of the regime in the north and south of the country, but Washington has steadfastly refused to do so since 1991 and is unlikely to start now, with Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia almost certain to oppose such a venture (thereby denying the United States crucial staging areas). Furthermore, neither the Iraqi Kurds nor the Shi'a actively seek the break-up of Iraq. Iraq's Kurds may dream of seceding, but they recognize that all neighboring states oppose their independence. Accordingly, they seek autonomy in the framework of the Iraqi state, while most Iraqi Shi'a simply want a political voice commensurate with their preponderant demographic weight.

If somehow Iraq were to break into three pieces—Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite—the result would be more instability, not less. The largely Sunni center, which would inherit the most capable units in Iraq's armed forces, its residual nonconventional weapons capability, and nearly all its military-industrial infrastructure, would almost certainly try to resurrect Iraq to gain control of the country's oil resources and the means to bring it to market (that is, ports and pipelines). Such efforts would likely push the Kurdish and Shi'a entities into the arms of rival powers—especially Iran—for self-preservation. To keep Iraq apart, Washington would have to assume an open-ended commitment to keep Baghdad out of the north and the south, and to keep Tehran from intervening (though Tehran's reliance on surrogates to do its bidding—such as the Badr Brigades—would greatly complicate these efforts). To make matters worse, America's major allies in the region—Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—would probably welcome Baghdad's return to the north and south as a means of keeping Iran out, and would thus work at cross purposes to the United States. America would find itself taking on the probably unattainable task of hemming in Baghdad without the help of its regional partners—and perhaps in the face of their active opposition. Would the United States ultimately be able to prevent Baghdad from restoring its control throughout the country when America's own allies clearly favor this? Recent experience suggests not.

Were Iraq to break up, however, it would probably not fracture into three pieces, but hundreds. The break-up of Iraq would spur the emergence of local warlords exercising greater influence than any regional authority in the north, center, or south of the country. Under such circumstances, Iranian influence in the north and south would be likely to grow, as competing warlords sought aid and assistance from any quarter. In short, the likely result of break-up would be chaos, not coherence. . . .

Thus, even if the United States could somehow engineer Iraq's break-up, it would create as many, if not more, problems than it would solve. The obstacles to realizing this outcome, however, are great; Iraq is unlikely to disintegrate on its own as long as Saddam remains in power. He appears to have enough income from 100,000-200,000 barrels per day in oil sales (both authorized and illicit), plus cash reserves, to maintain a firm grip over the areas he now controls. Policy planning should therefore focus on how best to deal with the problems posed by a unitary Iraq.

*Michael Eisenstadt
Washington Institute for Near East Policy*

DANIEL BYMAN poses a false alternative when he writes about whether to allow Iraq to divide into a Kurdish state, a Shi'a state, and a Sunni state. Events in northern Iraq over the last six years show that the true alternative to a unitary Iraq is the disintegration of all effective governmental authority. When the United States encouraged the Kurds to establish an autonomous zone in 1991-2, there were great hopes that this was the beginning of Iraq's democratic future. Instead, the Kurdish authority soon fell apart under the pressure of tribal vendettas and the various leaders' unbridled pursuit of personal wealth and power, all poorly disguised as partisan disputes. In theory, Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani are in control through their respective political parties (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdish Democratic Party). In fact, power rests in the hands of local militia (*peshmerga*) leaders, each of whom has his band of armed men, some of whom are basically thugs.

Iraq's Sunni center is ripe for a similar development. After decades of decay, the tribes are back. Urban Iraqis who have never paid attention to tribal roots are finding that tribal connections are becoming key, reports Amazia Baram, a leading scholar of Iraq.

Over the last few years, it is through the tribes that riots protesting government policy have been organized, and it is by mobilizing police and army units drawn from other tribes that Saddam has put these down. If Baghdad's power collapsed, the ensuing violence would force urban Sunnis to turn to their tribes, the only groups that could offer protection.

Were we to follow Byman's advice to let Iraq collapse, the central government would be replaced by three hundred fiefdoms, not three states. Byman may be correct that "Iraq's historical trajectory is unmistakably toward disintegration", but let us be clear that disintegration means something like Lebanon of the 1980s or Somalia of the 1990s. I fail to see how that is in the interests of the Iraqi people.

*Patrick Clawson
National Defense University*

MR. BYMAN'S piece proposing an alternative solution to the conundrum of Iraq has provoked an interesting intellectual debate, but one that is not grounded in reality. Mr. Byman's thesis presumes that an Iraqi break-up would pose little threat to U.S. allies, including Turkey, that the United States could easily counter any "tilt" in the regional balance of power toward Iran, and that a divided Iraq would no longer pose a threat to the oil-rich Gulf states. Mr. Byman needs to review his presumptions about the region and assumptions about how the United States chooses to use its power there.

Why three Iraqs? It is easy to understand the Kurdish versus Arab territorial divide, but Iraq's Shi'a have neither a clearly defined territory nor a desire to live separately. Mr. Byman also fails to suggest how to divide Sunni from Shi'a Iraq. Do the Sunni Arabs of central Iraq get Tikrit as their capital or Baghdad, a city with a large Shi'a population and by no means a Sunni Arab enclave? Iraq's Shi'a remained loyal to the Iraqi state

in war against other Shi'a (the Iraq-Iran war) not only because of Arab-Persian cleavages but also because the diverse Shi'a community sees itself as part of Iraq. Indeed, Baqr Sadr and other Shi'a dissidents have as their avowed goal the establishment of a form of democracy in Iraq that would allow one person, one vote. The "assumption" here is that if every Shi'a could vote in open elections—and they represent 65 percent of the population—then Iraq's Shi'a would have a majority voice in *all of Iraq*.

Does Iraq have an identity crisis? Like many Middle Eastern countries, Iraq was invented with artificial boundaries and imported rulers at the end of the First World War. If Saddam has done anything positive for Iraq, it has been to foster a sense of national identity and even self-esteem. Most Kurds and Shi'a see themselves as Iraqis and would not welcome partition and policing by the West. Nor would they live peacefully with each other or their neighbors—Turkey, Syria, and Iran—who would see danger as well as opportunity in Iraq's dismemberment.

Who gets what? How would Mr. Byman divide Iraq's resources? Who gets the oil, which is not equally and naturally apportioned throughout the whole country? The Kurds may not fight for Arab territory but the Arabs will fight to retain oil-rich Kirkuk, which is not entirely Kurdish. Who gets the military arsenal or, more importantly, Iraq's still-hidden stock of biological and chemical weapons and nuclear know-how?

Who polices the three Iraqs? Mr. Byman says his solution requires U.S. military intervention. While no one would argue with the humanitarian concerns that led to the creation of Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, a decision to intervene to preserve three Iraqs would require political and military commitments no U.S. government would be willing, or perhaps even able, to maintain indefinitely.

Mr. Byman's failure to address the proliferation of unconventional weapons, Turkey's reaction to an independent Kurdish

state, and the daunting problems of the U.S. managerial role in a partitioned Iraq are serious gaps. If nature abhors a vacuum, then so too does this volatile region of the Middle East. If Iraq did not exist, then it would have to be re-invented.

Judith Yaphe
National Defense University

Byman replies:

DR. EISENSTADT, Dr. Clawson, and Dr. Yaphe raise several excellent points. However, when they discuss the disadvantages of an Iraqi break-up, the alternative they have in mind seems to be a non-aggressive, gently governed Iraq rather than the true Iraq of this century. It is this blood-soaked and belligerent Iraq that should be compared with the divided Iraq that I propose. Although it is hard to endorse the instability that would accompany partition on humanitarian grounds, clearly the status quo is repugnant for its unconscionable abuse of human rights.

Moreover, all instability is not alike. The instability generated by the shattering of Iraq into three pieces or more is hardly the same threat to U.S. interests that an aggressive, unitary Iraq is. A shattered Iraq, after all, is far less likely or able to invade its neighbors or challenge the U.S. regional presence. Furthermore, as Dr. Eisenstadt notes, the break-up of Iraq would chiefly matter to the degree that it would impinge on U.S. access to the region's oil. But clearly a unitary Iraq—which has repeatedly threatened the Gulf states and invaded Iran—has proven a nightmare for those who worry about the flow of oil. A weak, fragmented Iraq, on the other hand, could disrupt only its own oil supplies. We have found we can live without Iraqi oil quite easily. I do not care to run the risk that Iraq will gain control of the Iranian, Kuwaiti, or Saudi fields.

The Short March:

CONTRARY TO WHAT many believe about the strength of centralized Communist Party control in China, many decisions governing the utilization of resources are made at the grassroots level. Henry Rowen's article, "The Short March: China's Road to Democracy" (Fall 1996), accurately depicts these tendencies, and presumes further that a nascent democracy, coupled with a growing domestic concern for the rule of law, is emerging. But will an apprenticeship in local resource management really precipitate pressures for a modification of strict Party control in Beijing?

Despite the range of decisions made at the local level, mechanisms that would lead to pluralism in Beijing have yet to be programmed into China's political future. A prescient leadership that wants legitimacy based on its ability to increase national wealth might be thinking along these lines, and there are certainly many Party members who realize that their claims to leadership will be stronger if linked with progressive tendencies. But strong forces exist to preserve the Party's centralized control over policymaking, and there are still many who believe economic prosperity threatens the Party's hold on power. Thus, China's short march to democracy may become a very long march.

Rowen's comparison of China's would-be evolution with Taiwan's transition is not necessarily instructive on these points. Taiwan became more democratic as it became wealthier in an international context that encouraged leadership in Taipei to distinguish itself from China. Embracing democracy was a way to make unification more cumbersome and to enhance Taiwan's standing among those countries whose political support it sought. International acceptance is less likely to matter in China's political evolution. Future Chinese leadership will support greater democracy if it will improve the Party's probability of staying in power. Claiming responsibility for steering a successful transition to a market economy,

for example, may be the best way for the Party to legitimize its continuing grip on government.

Local democracy in China need not be connected to the decline of Party domination of the central government, and there is no certainty that a transition to elections at the center would be peaceful. Consider another absolutist, highly centralized-style party state that ultimately became a democracy. Although the French monarchy instituted effective village government beginning in the 1660s, the centralized monarchy did not relinquish its control for another 130 years and then only after a bloody revolution in 1789. The creation of strong village governments, in fact, strengthened the monarchy, as the enhanced village institutions increased resource mobilization and extraction by the center. It took over a century before those same institutions turned into battering rams used to bring down the monarchical edifice. Participation at the local level can be compatible with single party control at the center and may even increase that control for a considerable length of time.

China's present system of centralized control is efficient, taking into account the Communist Party's preference for giving up as little control as possible to intermediary bodies. An alternative to Communist control will arise as the nation finds it increasingly difficult to raise taxes and expand the center's fiscal capabilities without a credible intermediary body such as a national parliament. One solution might be to expand the fiscal and tax collection role of the National People's Congress, making it responsible for the nation's fiscal credibility—giving it a share in policymaking in exchange for more fiscal authority. It was exactly the unwillingness of the French monarchy to endow an institution to represent the nation's shareholders that precipitated the French Revolution. Chinese leadership may find instructive the disastrous consequences of the French monarchy's recalcitrance to encourage unified corporate responsibility for the nation's debt through the creation of a national participatory body.

The best case for China to expand its democratic alternatives is linked to the role it will play in world affairs. . . . China's capacity to become a more important player in international affairs is restricted precisely because of the central government's weak fiscal resources. Right now, China is on its way to becoming a rich country with a poor government. If it develops a more participatory foundation for national tax collection, however, China could become a more formidable world power. A more democratic China under an adjusted form of Communist Party control could be a stronger China without becoming a friendlier one.

*Hilton Root
Hoover Institution*

HENRY S. ROWEN rightly highlights several good reasons for feeling optimistic about imminent political reform in the People's Republic of China.

His analysis relies, however, only on very recent developments, and fails to acknowledge the long historical context in which these developments are happening. The trouble with the Chinese Communist Party, in fact, is not that it is communist, but that it is Chinese.

China's political dilemma has always been much deeper than the mundane inadequacies of the government of the day: it has been the oppressive cultural legacy within which the government must function.

The imperial, bureaucratic absolutism that is China's characteristic political style . . . has been enforced more or less continuously since the first emperor, the tyrant Qin Shi Huangdi, unified China over two millennia ago.

The defining principle of China's imperial, bureaucratic absolutism is simple: there can be but one leader.

Despite its recent liberalizing moves (which have taken place mainly in the economic sphere), the Chinese Communist Party is an extreme instance of the historical model.

Unlike some earlier dynasties that tolerated a small measure of dissent, the CCP permits no public expression of opposing political views whatsoever.

China's authoritarianism is rooted not just in the machinery of governance. It is entrenched in the fundamental institutions of Chinese society. It is entrenched in the language, the mastery of which requires years of mind-numbing, rote learning. It is entrenched in the neo-Confucian family and clan structures that serve as models for the paternalistic state. And it is entrenched even in prosaic symbols—for example, the dragon, the classic icon standing for the all-powerful emperor, and, by extension, symbolizing the supremacy of state authority. . . . Tellingly, in China the dragon remains a relatively benign symbol. The creature is regarded with fear and dread (as it is in some European cultures) but also with affection, as one might regard a stern but lovable father. The autocratic state is not only imposed from above, it is embraced from below.

China's essential authoritarianism is confirmed even in the built environment. A foreigner arriving in China is immediately impressed by the importance of walls and gates. . . . Clearly a vital purpose of these barriers is more than ensuring routine physical security: it is also to remind Chinese citizens of the ultimate authority of the state. Access, the uniformed sentries declare, waits upon our pleasure.

Considering that among China's most famous antiquities are many compounds or walls—Beijing's Forbidden City, the ancient fortified capital of Xi'an, the Great Wall itself—obviously the Chinese state has been keen to dramatize its rule since long before the arrival of the Communists. And despite the positive changes that Henry Rowen cites, the Chinese state is likely to continue to assert itself long after the current crop of despots has faded from the scene.

*Patrick Kavanagh
Ottawa, Canada*

Rowen replies:

Hilton Root and Patrick Kavanagh, in effect, argue that a country whose population will be prosperous, well-educated, well-informed, and increasingly cosmopolitan will long remain under bureaucratic, absolutist rule. That has not happened anywhere else, including several culturally “Confucianist” countries. That a Communist Party can slow progress to modernity is attested to amply in the world, but the Chinese look like they have made an irrevocable decision to get rich.

Root predicts a long march to democracy unless the Party sees loosening up as helping it stay in power. That motivation is plausible and there are parallels elsewhere in East Asia. He also suggests that the decline of the Party might be accompanied by violence. Indeed, it might.

I agree with him that China will become a formidable world power. There is the danger that this could happen before its politics evolve in the way that I have suggested.

Seeing Red:

PERMIT ME TO supplement Dr. Muravchik’s reference to Joseph Davies in his review of *Red Scare or Red Menace* and other works (Fall 1996). The former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union did more than just demand in the name of Christianity and good sportsmanship that we trust Stalin. His admiration and even loyalty to Stalin went far beyond such fatuousness. In 1946, the Associated Press quoted Mr. Davies as saying that “Russia in self-defense has every moral right to seek atomic bomb secrets through military espionage if excluded from such information by her former fighting allies” (*New York Times*, February 18, 1946). Here we have a high-ranking American diplomat and close friend of President Roosevelt justifying Soviet espionage against his own country. No doubt Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and others like them, agreed with Mr. Davies.

I tell you this because I am troubled by Dr. Muravchik’s overuse (three times on page 102) of the tendentious noun “obsession” as in “an era of obsession with subversion.” I wonder whether it was obsession or an essential vigilance to be concerned that between 1941 and 1946 the vice president of the United States and later secretary of commerce, Henry A. Wallace, was, like Davies, a staunch defender of the Soviet political interests in the name of Christianity. Mr. Wallace, in a later epiphany, agreed that some of the people around him, like Lee Pressman, were communists. Had not FDR in his 1944 fourth-term election bid dumped Wallace, Stalin would have had his man in the White House on April 12, 1945, the day FDR died.

I hold no brief for Senator McCarthy, who most certainly was not “obsessed” with subversion. He was, as Sidney Hook put it, a “cultural vigilante”, who came to power with the backing of the communists in Wisconsin. Even worse, McCarthy’s antics jeopardized the fight against communism, though not fatally. So with the John Birchers. But whatever their obsessions, neither McCarthy nor the Birchers constitute “an era of obsession with subversion.”

I would hesitate to exploit psychological terminology in dealing with the reality of the communist conspiracy when every day there is a new surprise: that John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman, according to the Klehr-Haynes volume, asked (in writing) Earl Browder to supply Communist Party members as CIO organizers; and that at one time one-quarter of the CIO executive board were either members of the Communist Party or their willing captives.

In my unobsessed opinion, with the opening of the Soviet archives we have just begun to scratch the surface of the communist conspiracy in the United States.

*Arnold Beichman
Hoover Institution*

Muravchik replies:

I THANK MY old friend Arnold Beichman for alerting me to that stunning quote from Joseph Davies. Also for affording me my first experience of being accused of being in some sense soft on communism. To count how many times the word "obsession" appears on a single page of my text strikes me as, well, somewhat obsessive. Beichman and I agree that the received wisdom that has denied or belittled communist subversion in America has been erroneous: this was the very point of my essay. Where apparently we disagree is in my belief that the discovery of this subversion in the 1950s yielded a reaction that was in various ways excessive, namely in imagining that all those dupes, naifs, and opportunists who dallied with communist-supported causes were themselves communists, or in believing that communists could do great harm if allowed to occupy such positions as public school teacher. □

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NATO Enlargement

What's the Rush?

Adam Garfinkle

THE QUESTION OF enlarging NATO has occasioned the most important foreign policy debate in the United States since the end of the Cold War, and rightly so. The issue is integral to determining America's future role in Europe, still a very important place in world politics.

But it has been a curious and unsatisfying debate in several ways: Unsatisfying because it often seems as though there has been no debate at all, only contrary assertions passing each other without making useful contact; curious because of the various and contradictory trajectories of shifting opinions. Several policy analysts who started out favoring NATO enlargement have subsequently become opponents of it, while the Clinton administration has moved in the opposite direction, from skepticism and efforts at deflection to avid embrace and the declaration, last summer, that debate over essentials was closed.¹

Not only have the intellectual and policy processes been out of sync, but the debate has also divided both rock-hearted realists and passionate idealists in unusual ways. That Henry Kissinger and Václav Havel find themselves together on one side of the issue, Paul Nitze and Richard Barnett together on the other, suggests that this is a trickier problem than most. And it is tricky, not least because the question at the center of the debate—to

enlarge NATO or not?—turns out to be the wrong question (but of this more below).

Realist Enlargers

REALISTS DEFINE foreign policy as being first and foremost about national security in the literal sense: protecting the country and its citizens from physical or economic harm. How does the prospect of NATO enlargement look from this perspective, in which geopolitics trumps all? As indicated above, it looks equivocal, for, although operating from the same premises, various realists reach different conclusions. To give one striking example: a Council on Foreign Relations working group co-chaired by Henry Kissinger and Harold Brown could not agree on their Final Report in 1995. That report—*Should NATO Expand?*—lists only Brown as chairman, a note within stating that Kissinger and Samuel Huntington, though members of the group, declined to sign it.

The central argument made by realists who favor enlargement is that, in the nature of things, given its size and historical ambitions, a resurgent Russia is likely again in due course to threaten Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter, for the sake of parsimony, simply Central Europe). It is therefore best

¹Strobe Talbott's 1995 defection to the pro-enlargement camp symbolized this shift: see "Why NATO Should Grow", *New York Review of Books*, August 10, 1995.

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to seize the moment of opportunity and to move the line of confrontation east while Russia is weak. We should consolidate the historic outcome of 1989-91 while we can, permanently erasing the unnatural division of Europe represented by the Cold War.

It is on the basis of this logic that such advocates refer unrepentantly, and often unselfconsciously, to Central Europe, the Baltic republics, and Ukraine as a No Man's Land or a cast of nervous neutrals—as though the Washington-Moscow conflict were a historical constant rather than a politically contingent condition. Peter Rodman expresses clearly the essential logic of the pro-enlargement realist case—its assumption of the incorrigible nature of Moscow's ambition—in these terms: “The only potential great-power security problem in Central Europe is the lengthening shadow of Russian strength, and NATO still has the job of counter-balancing it. *Russia is a force of nature; all this is inevitable.*”²

Further, not to expand NATO would be taken by the Russians as tacit U.S. acceptance of Moscow's right to define Central Europe as its security *glacis*. And to allow Moscow this interpretation would amount to acquiescence in the rebirth of the Warsaw Pact, or something like it—a folly, some say, destined to rival Yalta as a symbol of infamy.

Some prestigious early commentary also argued for NATO enlargement in institutional as well as substantive terms. We need NATO against an uncertain future, said Dr. Kissinger in 1994, but “NATO cannot long survive if the borders it protects are not threatened while it refuses to protect the borders of adjoining countries that do feel threatened.”³ Senator Richard Lugar's view that NATO had to go out-of-area or risk being out-of-business was similarly motivated: preserve the alliance by expanding its functions as well as its members, for while we do not need a military shield now, we may find it impossible to reconstitute one should we need it later.⁴

Other realists favor expanding NATO less out of fear of a future Russian military threat,

and more as a means of achieving long-term political stabilization in Europe. This argument comes in three related variations.

First, expanding NATO is said to be necessary to protect Central Europe's new democracies and their liberal economic reforms from being swallowed up by political opportunists feeding on the dislocations of the post-communist era. The West, it is maintained, needs to give these countries a roof for their reconstruction more than a wall against an external threat.⁵ This is particularly the case in such an ethnically heterogeneous region, it is argued, because liberal free-market democracies provide better protection against explosions of ethnic hatred than regimes commandeered by nationalist oligarches.

Second, keeping Central Europe at peace with itself, both within and between its countries, helps prevent a broader danger, that of this region's again becoming a theater for the intrigues of Russia and Germany, a fate that has been its historic lot. Some worry more about Russia, some more about Germany, but all worry about a collision (or collusion) between them. The gist of the pro-enlargement view based on this concern is that just as NATO managed in time to solve the problem that had given shape to the First World War—the long-standing Franco-German rivalry—so it should expand to solve the problem that helped shape the Second World War—the equally long-standing Russo-German rivalry. Few who reason

²Peter Rodman, “4 More for NATO”, *Washington Post*, December 13, 1994. (My emphasis)

³See Henry A. Kissinger, “Expand NATO Now”, *Washington Post*, December 19, 1994.

⁴Richard Lugar, “NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business”, remarks at the Open Forum, U.S. Department of State, August 2, 1993.

⁵William Odom, “Establish a Concert of Great Powers”, *Orbis* (Spring 1995); and see Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and Stephen Larabee, “Building a New NATO”, *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1993).

this way claim that this will be easy. What they do argue is that this should be a pre-eminent task of a geopolitically-minded statecraft for the next several decades, and that only the wise application of American power can achieve it.

Third, there is fear of German resurgence itself. After forty years of tense competition between the United States and Russia, few are inhibited from speaking of Russia as a future problem. Not so with Germany, a democracy and an ally; but the fear exists and the inhibitions do sometimes break down. Tony Judt describes the basic physiognomy of this fear in the context of EU deepening; now that the Germans

... lead Europe, where should they take it? And of what Europe are they the natural leaders—the West-leaning Europe forged by the French, or the traditional Europe of German interests, where Germany sits not on the eastern edge but squarely in the middle? ... [T]he image of a Germany resolutely turning away from troubling Eastern memories, clinging fervently to its postwar Western allies, as though they alone stood between the nation and its demons, is not very convincing.⁶

Anthony Hartley, too, in an essay entitled “Thomas Mann and Germany’s Demons”, argues that “Germany still retains the indeterminateness that Mann saw in it. Behind it looms the ambivalence of German culture. No one”, he added, “can have much certainty as to the direction in which a newly reunited Germany will jump.”⁷ Robert W. Tucker and Thomas C. Hendrickson have argued that Germany as “the most powerful state in Europe will entertain pretensions to a role and status commensurate with its power. In doing so, it is bound to stimulate the suspicions and unease of a continent that has not forgotten the past.”⁸

Adding to the anxiety is knowledge that the Germans as a people still cannot decide what the rightful borders of their country should be; that stridently nationalist rhetoric

has been heard with greater frequency since reunification; and that German government ministers even speak of wanting apologies from the Czech Republic for the postwar expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.⁹

Clearly, the possibility that German interests will pull it away from its Atlantic moorings, destroying NATO in the process, and lead to a Germany with nuclear weapons haunts many minds. Translated into the terms of the NATO debate, this becomes an argument that, if Germany continues to sit on the eastern frontier of NATO, its inevitably large diplomatic (and economic) agenda in the lands between it and Russia will become divorced from U.S. power and political influence. But if Central Europe is brought into the alliance, it is argued, America can play a leavening role, reducing the prospect of conflict over expanding German power.

These various arguments for enlarging NATO—one emphasizing the need to deter the Russians militarily, others the need to secure Europe politically—are sometimes characterized as complementary, as well they may be in some respects. But in one sense they are mutually exclusive: The former cannot hide its anti-Russian premise, while the latter believe that expanding NATO need not be anti-Russian and that, once they get a grip on their reduced circumstances, the Russians can be so persuaded. And they should acquiesce, the reasoning goes, because unless Moscow contemplates future aggression in Central

⁶Tony Judt, “Europe: The Grand Illusion”, *New York Review of Books*, July 11, 1996, p. 6.

⁷Anthony Hartley, “Thomas Mann and Germany’s Demons”, *The National Interest* (Summer 1996), p. 97.

⁸Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, “America and Bosnia”, *The National Interest* (Fall 1993), p. 25

⁹See Hans Koning, “German Irredenta”, *The Atlantic Monthly* (July 1996), pp. 30, 32-3; and Jacob Heilbrunn, “Germany’s New Right”, *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1996).

Europe, Russians should be grateful for any institutional arrangement that promises to save them from yet another historic confrontation with the Germans. However, with one school marking them as villains and the other marking them as benefactors, many in Moscow cannot help wondering which argument is sincere and which is pretext. Plans that include both enlarging NATO and creating other arrangements to assuage Russian concerns, while not illogical in themselves, seem to particularly frustrate Russian observers.¹⁰

Realist Doubters

OTHER REALISTS, with no less impressive credentials as masters of realpolitik, reject all these justifications for enlargement. As for the Russia-oriented argument, they point out that there is simply no Russian military threat in sight, and that there will be plenty of time to respond if one begins to emerge. And what other sort of occasion to advance Russian ambitions is there likely to be? Central Europe fell into Soviet domination because the Red Army moved into a virtual political vacuum with the defeat of Nazi Germany, and Moscow solidified control partly through the use of communist “internationalism.” Today there is no such vacuum and no such “internationalism”, and neither is likely to reappear in the foreseeable future.

As for the argument that NATO can be kept alive by enlarging its membership and functions, opponents of enlargement see in this a vast underestimation of NATO’s considerable and well-appreciated “as is” value as a guarantor against Russian imperial recidivism. That view is also criticized for reversing means and ends, letting the survival of NATO drive security policy rather than serve it.

As for the more political arguments for enlargement, realist skeptics are impressed with both the social and moral transformation of Germany and the weakness of Russia. They therefore argue that Russo-German competi-

tion will not unsettle Central Europe as it once did. NATO enlargers are said to be busily engaged in solving yesterday’s problems, with those who fear the Russians still fighting the Cold War, and those who fear the Germans still fighting the two wars before that.

Most such observers find it highly improbable that Germany would write off decades of integration into Atlantic and European institutions, and the German government, if anything, shows more of an inclination to deepen that integration. Moreover, it is plain that an awakening German pride no longer finds expression in military ambitions and metaphors, and that its demographic profile shows a rapidly aging and slightly shrinking population, leaving the country without means for protracted military assertion. Current demographic and economic trends suggest further that the relative size of the German economy will decline as well, to the point that within fifty years the German and French economies will be roughly the same size, both of them in turn of a similar order of magnitude to that of Great Britain.¹¹

As for Russia, those inclined against enlargement see neither the Russian people nor the Russian elite as imperialist. Rather, as Charles Fairbanks has put it, “Russian national reassertion is not a mass taste or instinct, but a posture or gesture.”¹² Russian concern for the “near abroad”, it is claimed, is no more (or less) imperial than the historic U.S. concern for the Caribbean and Central America.

Some argue further that there is already a security structure in place in Central Europe, composed of a floor-to-ceiling array

¹⁰As with Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe”, *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1995).

¹¹As noted in John O’Sullivan’s “Presented at Court” in this issue, p. 76.

¹²Charles Fairbanks, “A Tired Anarchy”, *The National Interest* (Spring 1995), p. 20; and see Stephen Sestanovich, “Geotherapy: Russia’s Neuroses, and Ours”, *The National Interest* (Fall 1996), pp. 5-9.

of arms control agreements (CFE + INF + START) and networks of economic and institutional engagements, all buttressed by what amounts to a moral commitment to European peace.¹³ Both the United States and Russia are parties to these agreements, so Central Europe is already included “in effect” in the security structure that bridges Europe. But given the fragile condition of both the Russian state and psyche after the Soviet era, advancing NATO toward the Russian steppes might well lead to the collapse of these existing military-strategic understandings. Enlargement is thus characterized as being less likely to solve a problem than, as Sam Nunn put it, “to help create the very threat we are trying to guard against.”¹⁴

More specifically, it is argued that if NATO pushes itself part but not all the way eastward, it will create a compressed and volatile tinder out of the Baltic states and Ukraine. It would, in short, not eliminate an unstable zone between Russia and Germany but bring a more combustible one into being. This would be the case not only in a political but also in a military sense. Pushing NATO’s military muscle eastward would invert the nuclear first-use imperative of Cold War days: instead of NATO employing that posture to deal with its conventional military inferiority to the Warsaw Pact countries, Russia would do so in response to the new NATO conventional superiority.¹⁵ It would be awkward, to say the least, to refute Russian logic on this point, since it is a logic that NATO itself invented.

To drive home the point that NATO enlargement would represent geopolitical overreach of a dangerous kind, some of those opposed to enlargement put the matter in these terms: If it had been proposed to you in 1989 that the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union both would come peaceably to an end, that Germany would be reunited in NATO, and that all Russian military forces would withdraw behind their own frontier—and that all that was asked in return was that NATO not take advantage of this retreat by moving eastward—would you have accepted? Extraordinary as it would have sounded then,

had it been put so succinctly and all in one breath, this is more or less what was in fact proposed in the “two-plus-four” agreement for the reunification of Germany, and later accepted as the Warsaw Pact collapsed. The United States affirmed and helped guide this progression of events from the pinnacle of its leadership, and most Russian observers today see U.S. support for NATO expansion as being inconsistent with this undertaking. Thus Sergei Karaganov, one of Russia’s friendliest critics of NATO enlargement:

In 1990 we were told quite clearly by the West that dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German unification would not lead to NATO expansion. We did not demand written guarantees because in the euphoric atmosphere of that time it would have seemed almost indecent, like two girlfriends giving written promises not to seduce each other’s husbands.¹⁶

In short, then, it is argued that expanding NATO represents both the breaking of at least an implicit promise, and an expression of geopolitical greed toward a humiliated former superpower adversary that still possesses enormous nuclear clout, and whose cooperation is still needed on a range of critical international problems. It is to ignore Churchill’s famous advice—“In victory: magnanimity”—in the most pig-headed way.

The concern of other realists is focused on the prospect that expanding NATO will vitiate its core mission: that of a military alliance which, while not urgently needed at

¹³See Michael Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1996).

¹⁴Sam Nunn, “The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World”, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, July 15, 1995, p. 585.

¹⁵Noted in Anatol Lieven, “A New Iron Curtain”, *The Atlantic Monthly* (January 1996), p. 22.

¹⁶Quoted in Anatol Lieven, “Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion”, *The World Today* (October 1995).

present, might be so needed in the future.¹⁷ It is especially risky to push on with enlargement before we have answers to some important questions:

- How will expanding the alliance influence NATO's military strategy? If NATO troops and nuclear weapons are deployed forward in Central Europe, how many and whose will they be? Will the CFE and INF treaties have to be re-negotiated—assuming the Russians do not renounce them outright?

- If military forces are not moved forward, what would the resultant multi-tiered membership structure do to NATO's political coherence? To the functioning of its unanimity rule? To the already difficult problem of reaching a consensus on the alliance's role in out-of-area domains?

- What steps are to be taken to ensure that new members will meet existing standards of military capability and performance? Or will standards be lowered for new members, and if so at what risk to military effectiveness?

- How much will the various versions of enlargement really cost the United States, particularly at a time when our allies' military expenditures are falling even faster than our own? Since when does a military alliance, in the absence of a threat, take on expansive and expensive new responsibilities at a time when the defense budget of every member of that alliance is falling?

- How does the seemingly bipartisan concern to curb the power of the U.S. federal government play against the assumption of substantially more responsibilities abroad? Having once secured sixty-seven Senate votes in favor of enlarging the alliance, will it be possible to get even simple majority votes, year after year, on the appropriations bills required to fulfill the commitments undertaken?

These are hardly minor issues. Without at least tentative answers to such questions it is difficult to see how a sensible conclusion about enlargement can be reached at all.

Finally in this regard, some observers who oppose the expansion of NATO but take seriously the anxieties of the Central Europeans, sug-

gest more modest steps, such as expanding the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union to meet the needs of the supplicant states.¹⁸ The general point in such suggestions is that we have choices other than extending formal security guarantees or doing nothing. "The Cold War framework has distorted our perceptions", writes Robert Jervis. "We have become accustomed to thinking that important interests require firm commitments and that little else will be effective. We have neglected much of the range of classical diplomacy."¹⁹

The NATO Debate as Culture War

MOST OF WHAT we hear about NATO enlargement falls into the realist domain—but not all of it. There is, in addition, an undertone of argument that takes an idealist or, better, a cultural form. This undertone has to do largely with divergent interpretations of what constitutes politically binding "kinship." It is, in essence, the replaying in a new context of the debate over the "West", and there is a close symmetry between the two. Partisans of enlargement generally affirm the reality of the "West" along both historical and ideological lines, while those opposed most often do not.

As for the historical rationale, those favoring NATO enlargement argue that Slavs and Hungarians, as well as Slovenians and Balts, share the heritage of the Renaissance and the Reformation, being both culturally "modern" and within the domain of Western Christianity. As for the ideological, Central European countries are deemed fit for inclu-

¹⁷Fred C. Iklé, "How to Ruin NATO", *New York Times*, January 11, 1995.

¹⁸See the letter in the *New York Review of Books*, September 21, 1995 signed by, among others, Paul Nitze, Jack Matlock, and Robert Bowie.

¹⁹Robert Jervis, "Legacies of the Cold War", *Brown Journal of World Affairs* (Summer 1995), p. 25.

sion to the extent that they are democratic and free-market oriented.

Those persuaded by the historical rationale are represented prominently by Samuel Huntington, who favors NATO expansion as a means of politically unifying the cultural West around U.S. leadership to face Orthodox, Islamic, and other civilizations.²⁰ Those more focused on ideology would expand NATO in order to expand the “West”, conceived as a metaphysical zone of free political choice (democracy), free markets (capitalism), and free minds (liberty). Many credit Havel’s argument that the West has a moral commitment to protect Central Europe.²¹ But the practical side of the argument usually takes pride of place: Societies marked by such qualities do not war on one another, so the clear American interest is to expand the domain of Western civilization by bringing Europe’s fledgling free to shelter under NATO’s wing.

Contrarily, those inclined against enlargement generally argue that there is no West in a meaningful politico-military sense, now that there is no communist East against which to define it.²² Some go further, claiming that there never *was* any such thing as a political West. What seemed to be the “West” arose from Cold War melodrama, a notion summoned from the vasty deep but now banished back to its vaporous etherae. Why ethereal? Because claims for the “West” as a traditional repository of positive political values do not stand up to scrutiny. Germany was undoubtedly Western over the past century, yet it often respected neither human rights, nor the rule of law, nor representative democracy, not to speak of having started two world wars in which over sixty million people were killed. And three centuries before that, divisions between Catholics and Protestants were often murderous.²³ Since the so-called West has neither venerable pedigree, nor a clear set of political values, nor any experience of continuous political unity within the last thousand years, the extent to which Central Europeans are culturally Western is simply irrelevant to a debate about contemporary security issues.

So much for the historical case; what about the ideological one? First of all, many observers question the true extent and likely longevity of genuine political and economic reform throughout Central Europe.²⁴ Others wonder as well if contemporary *Western* Europe is still “Western” in the philosophical sense. The contemporary idea of “Europe”, it is said, which champions corporatism in place of democracy, socialism within and protectionism without in place of the free market, and a continental-scale bureaucracy in place of the prerogatives of liberty, does not square with Western political values as they are traditionally understood. Many of those who espouse this view see West European societies much enfeebled by the demobilizing comforts of the welfare state, and their governments easily cowed by any halfway ruthless challenger.

The implication for NATO enlargement is obvious: If the Europeans have lost their own political verve to the point that they do not seriously contemplate ever again having to defend their own vital interests, what makes anyone think that Frenchmen, Germans, or Dutchmen will fight for the sake of Poles or Hungarians? On occasion, too, West Europeans seem far more intent on keeping Central Europe as a plantation, exploiting its cheaper skilled labor and resources but keeping out its lower priced goods and bumptious immigrants. Some West Europeans may therefore favor NATO expansion to deflect pressures for the expansion of the EU. Others

²⁰Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 160-1.

²¹See Havel’s “A Call for Sacrifice”, *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1994).

²²See Owen Harries, “The Collapse of ‘The West’”, *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1993).

²³See Michael Lind, “Pax Atlantica: The Case for Euramerica”, *World Policy Journal* (Spring 1996).

²⁴See Johnathan Sunley, “Post-Communism: An Infantile Disorder”, *The National Interest* (Summer 1996).

may do so because they fear a “deeper” Europe that would exclude America and Central Europe. But very few support it because they feel a strong historical or ideological kinship with Central Europeans. That being the case, it is argued, NATO enlargement must be decided solely on strategic grounds, stripped of any larger purported cultural significance.

Getting Serious

WHETHER THE NATO debate is about the definition and scope of European civilization, the structure of European security, or some of both, it is a serious matter—more serious than the debate over enlargement has often been. Some proponents of enlargement sing the praises of marching eastward as if prepared to lug the caissons themselves, ready to die for Bratislava without being able to find it on a map. Others urging Czech, Polish, and Hungarian membership in the first round seem to be unaware of the fact that without Slovakia, and sans Slovenian or Austrian entry into NATO, Hungary has no border with any NATO country. There are also those who seem to miss the exhilaration of Cold War competition, and who actually relish irritating the Russians.

On the other hand, some arguing against enlargement hold simultaneously that since Russia is so weak, there is no need to expand, and that since Russia may one day again be strong, it is too dangerous to expand. Relatedly, others argue that since Russia is weak expansion is not needed, and, simultaneously, that expansion would be too expensive given falling budgets and other needs—but enlargement at the political level can proceed without large additional military expenses as long as Russian behavior makes such expenses unnecessary.

A greater barrier to serious intellectual engagement than any amount of wayward punditry, however, has been the Clinton administration’s weaving and wobbling its

way to a conclusion on NATO enlargement. The sitting administration’s actual policy record inevitably shapes thinking about major foreign policy issues; in this case, the Clinton team’s dissociated approach to European security has had the general effect of disorganizing the existing stock of geopolitical knowledge.

The administration’s embrace of the pro-enlargement view proceeded in an ungainly two-step process. First, by late 1993 expectations of quick economic and political reform in Russia had acquired a thick patina of doubt, inspiring the new elites in Central Europe to remember their histories. Their subsequent ministrations to Washington were not entirely welcome to Clinton administration principals, who had until then ignored NATO (and other traditional U.S. alliances, too) in favor of assertive multilateralism, democratic enlargement, and other catchy-sounding substitutes for geopolitical thinking. These ministrations led, however, to the deliberately off-putting episode of the Partnership for Peace, a halfway-house of both commitment and understanding that ended up assuming more substance than its authors probably intended, for fast on the heels of the Partnership came the growing American policy debacle in Bosnia. The administration’s subsequent embrace of NATO enlargement seems to have come partly from concern to repair the damage done by its mistakes there. This repair job was undertaken despite the fact that it contradicted U.S. policy of pragmatic partnership with Russia.

In other words, U.S. policy toward Bosnia formed reactively, in isolation from any sense of a general U.S. policy toward Europe, eventually endangering NATO; and then U.S. policy toward NATO formed reactively, in isolation from its implications for U.S. policy toward Russia, eventually endangering partnership. This was a perfectly backwards way of thinking about European security, but we have been backing into that subject for so long now that it has become

for many an unconscious habit. We need to turn around and face front: *The real issue is not how large NATO needs to be, but how large the American role in Europe needs to be to assure European security after the Cold War.* It really is important to start with the right question.

If it is to be successful, security policy must respond realistically to the level of threat. In the case of security guarantees offered to distant allies, that sense of realism turns on two factors: how serious the threat is, and the extent to which one's allies can meet it on their own. Clearly, then, what Europeans themselves do now that the Cold War's constraints are gone will have a major impact on the problem at hand. Whether the new democracies of Central Europe become going concerns, and what becomes of efforts to create European political union are clearly the two key factors involved.

To the extent that Europe coheres politically and inclusively, it should dampen internal conflict, embed Germany safely in a multinational diplomatic cushion, and provide both an economic and social basis for Europe to manage more of its own security problems. If Europe does not cohere, or if the core EU countries "deepen" their association at the expense of Central Europe, then a less benign result may be expected. This is not the place to examine all possible European security environments that may arise over the next few decades; the point is simply that planning the U.S.-led facet of the European security equation—NATO—cannot proceed in isolation from consideration of other integrally European facets.

The future of European integration and the future of NATO are each a function of the other, in the sense that the ideal extent of the American security role in Europe is that required portion that is left after what the Europeans themselves provide. The Europeans could do much more for themselves than they do at present if a more autonomous NATO-European pillar within the alliance were to develop in tandem with a wider inter-governmental European

Union. If it does, the United States could, and should, still contain both Germany and fears of Germany, and offset Russian strategic forces. But Europe could, and should, assume more of the political and conventional military burden for balancing Russia, and for keeping its own house in order. This defines the difference between Copernican and Ptolemaic conceptions of the U.S. orb in Europe—the former includes America as a part of that world, but not as its center, as the latter would have it.

This is probably the best of possible futures, but at present Europe appears instead to be set on course either for "deep"-and-small-EU, or for retrograde motion toward newly competitive security policies should European Union "beyond Maastricht" fail. It will probably fail. Nor have the major West European states shown much talent for handling security issues at their periphery, as the Bosnia experience shows. But whatever happens, the evolution of European politics, well entangled as they already are with American political influence and military power, will be more important to European security than whether NATO is enlarged in the near term or not.

Walk, Don't Run

UNFORTUNATELY, the enlargement dilemma deflects attention from all this—but that dilemma sits in our laps and something must be done about it. What is that something? It is, I suggest, to slow the policy process down to give ourselves a chance to sort out these larger issues. The polarizing tendencies of polemic aside, we face a common problem over NATO enlargement: that of wanting something, but not wanting to pay the price for it. It is possible simultaneously to credit most *prudential* arguments against enlarging NATO and still respect some arguments *in principle* favoring it. The trick, as always, is to judge wisely with both sets of arguments in mind.

The best argument for enlargement is that which sees a larger NATO as protection against a Europe returned to re-nationalized, competitive security policies. The optimists may be right about both Germany and Russia, and correct that even a revival of their rivalry would be expressed only in relatively harmless economic terms. But that is by no means clear. The German political personality floats today in a historical space defined by the memory of moral enormities and dual national defeat on the one side, impressive economic success and recent reunification on the other. It is, indeed, too soon to draw confident conclusions about its future.

As for Russia, few would claim that its journey is set and its destination known. So far, so pretty good, but until Russia has built a social infrastructure for political pluralism and the rule of law—both unknown in six hundred years of its modern history, and still little more than noble intentions—no one could be blamed for expecting another autocratic, imperial emergence from another Russian Time of Troubles. And, certainly, Central Europe has a capacity for home-grown mischief whose exploitation by troubled powers on the flanks could once again prove irresistible.

That said, concern about future

European troubles is at present very speculative. There is plenty of time to see whether such worries are justified, so there is no need to rush into major commitments without really having thought them through. That we are on the verge of such decisions anyway owes much more to the fallout from the Clinton administration's accident-prone experience in Europe over the past four years than to careful analysis.

Temporizing is not always a good idea, but neither is impetuosity, and it is nothing other than impetuous to end the NATO enlargement debate prematurely, to decide such an important issue before its time. In one sense, though, debate *cannot* end, for events will re-open it—several times, no doubt—in the years ahead. As they do, we shall be reminded that there are some things in life that, if they cannot be done properly, ought not be done at all.

Time, therefore, is of the essence in the special sense that we should use the uncharacteristically ample supply at our disposal to apply the diplomatic arts and to examine carefully all the options in Europe, not only those directly pertaining to NATO enlargement. If the Clinton administration is not so disposed, then the Senate, before and during ratification hearings, should insist on it. That is, in this case, the national interest. □

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
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